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ABSTRACT
Non-causal  and  causal  explanation  in  science  are  unified  under  an 
extension  of  James  Woodward's  manipulationist  account  of  causal 
explanation. Scientific explanation is about capturing and representing the 
modal  structure  of  the  world.  Both  causal  and  non-causal  explanations 
often involve implicit and explicit modelling steps. Manipulationism can be 
extended to models; models have an endogenous set of rules that allow the 
specification  of  model  analogues  of  manipulations  and  explanatory 
invariances. A pluralist view of explanation is defended. Models can explain 
despite,  and  sometimes  because  of,  ineliminable  fictions  they  contain. 
These  fictions  do  not  undermine  an  ontic  account  of  explanation  if  the 
intuitions  informing  ontic  sensibilities  are  suitably  disaggregated.  Ontic 
explanation is a two-levelled process. On the one hand, if we can connect 
variables with objective modal connections and those variables correspond 
to entities or properties of entities, or real structures in the world, then we 
have  a  correspondence  explanation.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  can  still 
objectively  produce modal  connections  but the  ontology of  the model  is 
strictly false, then the variable terms do not correspond to real entities. It 
only  appears  as  if  they  do,  and  we  have  a  quasi-explanation.  A  quasi-
explanation  is  only  applicable  in  a  certain  empirical  domains.  This 
disaggregation has implications for realism. Often explanations will  only 
license an attenuated realistic-or  surrealistic-  attitude to  the ontology of 
models. This extension of manipulationism to models is far reaching, and as 
well as unifying many types of scientific explanation it also has applications 
in pure mathematics. 

A NOTE TO THE READER
Although each chapter in this thesis is intended to follow on from the last 
and to cumulatively build an account of scientific explanation, depending 
upon  the  reader's  background  knowledge,  some  chapters  are  more 
important  for establishing that  account than others.  For  readers  already 
familiar with general issues around scientific explanation, Chapter 2 is the 
most  important  in  Part  1.  Chapter  2  discusses  at  length  Woodward's 
manipulationist account and this is essential to the rest of the thesis. In Part 
2, especially for those already familiar with fictional model explanations, 
such  as  those  used  in  quantum  chaos  theory,  Chapter  6  is  the  most 
important. This sets out the positive extended manipulationist account. In 
Part  3,  Chapter  8  completes  the  fleshing  out  of  the  extended 
manipulationist  framework.  Many  chapters  are  heavily  footnoted,  with 
footnotes used for referencing and for elaboration. The intention is not that 
the reader should consult every footnote, rather that there be an inner core 
of a document surrounded by a cloud of supplementary material. Because 
something is footnoted that does not mean it is not of importance to the 
main  text,  only  that  it  would  interrupt  the  flow of  the  main  argument; 
however, the reader is encouraged to consult footnotes only when they feel 
the accompanying point in the main text requires greater clarification. 
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CHAPTER SUMMARIES
PART 1 | CAUSAL AND NON-CAUSAL EXPLANATION
1 | THE RISE AND FALL OF DEDUCTION
The  Deductive-Nomological  account  of  explanation  due  to  Hempel  & 
Oppenheim  proposes  that  explanation  is  a  form  of  deductive  argument 
leading to a conclusion that the thing to be explained, the explanandum, 
had to happen. DN envisages explanation as the subsumption of facts under 
empirical lawful regularities. DN is skewed by an over-reliance on logical 
empiricist  reconstructions  of  atypical  case  studies  from  the  history  of 
science, such as General Relativity. Conceiving of explanations as deductive 
arguments  alone  cannot  account  for  scientific,  or  wider,  explanatory 
practice.  Explanations  are  asymmetric,  deductive  arguments  are  not. 
Explanations  are  ruined  by  citing  irrelevances,  deductive  arguments  are 
not.  In  response  to  these  shortcomings  emphasis  in  the  philosophy  of 
science shifted to citing causes as essential to explanation, but causation is a 
tricky notion to pin down. Both Salmon's mark transmission, and Dowe's 
conserved quantities account of it, fail to have the necessary properties for a 
causal-explanatory relation.
2 | MAKING, & IMAGINING, THINGS HAPPEN
Woodward's  manipulationist  account  of  causal  explanation  overcomes 
many of the shortcomings of previous accounts. Explanation is understood 
counterfactually,  as  providing  answers  to  “What-if-things-had-been-
different?”  questions.  Causation  is  not  reductively  defined  but  causal 
explanation is  explicated in causal terms in a way that  displays virtuous 
circularity.  Causes  are  identified  by  manipulating  the  world  through 
interventions, themselves a special type of causal process. Manipulationism 
extends the logic of experimental science to causal thinking more generally. 
By intervening on variables and determining how other related variables 
change, we map the causal structure of the world. 'Intervention' is not an 
anthropocentric  notion,  and  is  not  limited  by  the  actual  manipulations 
humans can perform. Interventions are activities contiguous in some sense 
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with actual manipulations, being local for instance. Explanation does not 
involve  the  problematic  concept  of  laws,  which  are  difficult  to  apply  to 
biology for example, but instead utilises bounded invariant generalisations. 
Invariances are defined by testing interventions, manipulations designed to 
test whether a generalisation applies in a particular domain of study. 
3 | OF MICE AND FRACTALS
Not  all  explanations  in  science  are  causal.  This  chapter  examines  an 
example  of  non-causal  explanations  from  biology:  allometric  scaling 
relations.  Organisms  across  a  huge  range  of  species  obey  the  same 
allometric  scaling  relationships  between  their  metabolic  rates  and  body 
masses.  This  can  be  explained  by  invoking  a  non-causal  geometric 
constraint  based  on  the  limits  of  self-similar  branching  networks.  Non-
causal  explanations  like  these  have  many  parallels  with  causal 
manipulationist explanations. One source of disanalogy however is in the 
explanatory generalisation invoked, which in this case is not an invariance 
in  Woodward's  terms  since  a  testing  intervention  cannot  be  performed. 
Manipulationism can be extended to non-causal explanations by liberating 
the  notion  of  intervention  from  causality.  Understanding  non-causal 
explanations as model based allows us to see how otherwise unintelligible 
interventions are possible within a model world.
PART 2 | MODELS & FICTIONAL EXPLANATION
4 | THE NIHILISM OF MODELLING
Understanding  modelling  is  central  to  explicating  scientific  explanation. 
The role  of  models  in explanation introduces philosophical  puzzles.  One 
particular  puzzle  is  how  models  can  explain  when  they  contain 
idealisations, abstractions and ineliminable fictions, that is "lies" about the 
world. Two extreme types of model explanation that involve these fictional 
elements  are  asymptotic  models  and  semi-classical  models  of  quantum 
chaotic systems. In the former, singular limits are taken, these limits are 
essential for defining new same object classes (objects that are definably on 
an intelligible scale of variation with respect to some axis of counterfactual 
speculation). In the latter, non-existent classical structures seem to add to 
our explanatory understanding of pseudo-chaotic quantum systems. In the 
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ontic tradition we need to account for these models in terms of facts about 
the  world.  Bokulich's  analysis  of  quantum  chaos  models  suggests  that 
structural  continuities  that  capture  modal  information  are  key  to  these 
explanations.  She  takes  the  counterfactual  elements  of  Woodward's 
manipulationism  but  forgoes  manipulations  themselves.  This  is  an 
inadequate  extension  of  manipulationism.  Sans  manipulations  we  loose 
several  key  successes  of  the  framework,  such  as  the  ability  to  locate 
asymmetry in explanations, and to define explanatory invariances.
5 | THE ONTOLOGY OF MODELS
An  extension  of  manipulationism  to  model  explanations  is  provided.  A 
parallel set of concepts to those in Woodward's causal theory are applicable 
within models  and are  developed.  Investigators  conceptually  manipulate 
elements in models  to explore the modal architecture of a model world. 
These model modal facts can then be said to represent the modal structure 
of the world if there are justificatory reasons for thinking so. Justification 
takes the form of one of, or a combination of: experimental evidence, wider 
theoretical principles, or bootstrapping from other models. If models are to 
be manipulable in some sense then this constrains their ontology. Models 
are fictions, just as the world of a novel has certain rules so too do model 
worlds. Which manipulations are allowable is defined by rules of generation 
that specify which moves in the make-believe game are allowed.
6 | MANIPULATIONISM RESURRECTED
Extending manipulationism to models allows asymmetry and the notion of 
invariance to be applied to causal and non-causal explanations. These two 
types  of  explanation  are  on  a  continuum  and  are  linked  by  common 
modelling steps. Asymmetry can enter model explanations in three ways: by 
parallel  real-world  interventions  of  the  model  interventions,  by 
asymmetries in the rules of generation that mean the model interventions 
are  asymmetric  themselves,  or  by  asymmetric  structural  hierarchies. 
Extending manipulation offers the possibility of a unitary account of many 
types of scientific explanation all conceived of as forms of direct or indirect 
model explanation.
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PART 3 | THE CHANGING SHAPES OF KNOWLEDGE
7 | PERSPECTIVISM
What must be preserved when a new explanation is formed, that in some 
sense replaces an old explanation, is a special element of modal structure, 
the  modal  "topology".  This  topology  is  the  linking  of  input  and  output 
variables, it is this element of an explanation that must be preserved. New 
intermediate stages can be added but the linking of  these variables  in a 
given domain of applicability is set. In order to say what depends upon what 
we  must  specify  these  variables  and  this  naturally  leads  to  a  certain 
perspectivism about explanation. Modal connections are objective once a 
variable base is specified but the choice of base is contextual and depends 
on  how  the  world  is  partitioned  theoretically  into  input  and  output 
variables. This perspectivism fits nicely with an attenuated form of realism: 
surrealism. The fact that the world can consistently appear as if an entity or 
process exists, even though it doesn't, can itself be used to specify objective 
modal relations. We can explain "surrealistically" as well as realistically.
8 | THE PATTERN ON THE CURTAIN
Many models/theories are ontologically false yet they are also true in some 
sense. The appropriate concept for capturing this partiality of truth is not 
approximate truth but rather da Costa & French's quasi-truth. Theories are 
quasi-true as a whole in a given domain, they appear as if they are what 
Tarski  defined  as  correspondence  true  in  that  domain.  This  distinction 
between truth and quasi-truth applies to explanations as well. A quasi-true 
theory  can generate  quasi-true  explanations.  There  is  then  a  distinction 
between  explanations  with  false  ontology,  either  through  error  or 
deliberately  through the use  of  fictions,  which are  quasi-true,  and those 
which  get  the  fundamental  ontology  of  the  world  correct,  which  are 
correspondence  explanations.  The  ontic  intuition  that  explanation  is 
specifying  explanatory  facts  about  the  world  is  disaggregated  into  two 
levels. At the first level to offer a quasi-explanation we need only provide a 
wide enough set  of  answers  to  w-questions,  if  we can provide  a  certain 
amount of objective modal facts then we have quasi-explained. The second 
level involves not only correctly linking variables modally but also asserting 
that  those  variables  are  genuinely  representative  of  the  structures  and 
entities in the world; this is correspondence explanation.
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PART 1 | CAUSAL AND NON-CAUSAL
EXPLANATION
The physicist may be satisfied when he has the mathematical scheme 
and knows how to use for the interpretation of the experiments.
 But he has to speak about his results also to non-physicists 
who will not be satisfied unless some explanation is given in plain language.
 Even for the physicist the description in plain language will be the criterion 
of the degree of understanding that has been reached.
WERNER HEISENBERG — PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY
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1 | THE RISE AND FALL
OF DEDUCTION
 
 
The topic of this thesis is scientific explanation. The thirst for explanations 
seems a central  component of  what it  means to be a sentient being.  All  
human cultures have strived for explanations, and articulated them in the 
paradigms central to their cultures. Creation myths abound, and part of the 
function of religion is not only to provide cultural glue, as Durkheim would 
have it, or moral instruction, but also to explain. To say how and why we as 
observers  of  the  universe  got  to  be  here.  In  our  culture  science  is  the 
predominant paradigm and explanation is central to it. If science could not 
offer explanations, as well as give predictions and inspire technologies, then 
it would be greatly diminished in cultural importance. Explanations locate 
us as observers in the universe, they allow connections between seemingly 
unrelated events to be established, they impose order on phenomenological 
chaos. 
Of course it is not a straightforward matter to say what an explanation 
actually is. Different cultures and people have had different standards for 
explanation, and even today among the philosophical community two broad 
caricatures of  intuitions can be sketched.  On the one hand we have the 
epistemic  notion  of  explanation:  if  something  is  explained  then  it  is 
understood,  and  explanations  are  informational  structures,  sometimes 
designed for specific audiences. On the other hand we have the so called 
ontic intuition: explanation is about facts, to explain is to state true things 
about the world that are responsible for a phenomenon.1 This thesis will be 
aiming to explore explanation from the point of view of the latter intuition. 
I will not be concerned with notions such as understanding, but rather seek 
to give an account of explanation in terms of the structure of the world. A 
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specific  kind  of  structure:  modal  structure.  By  determining  what  was 
possible,  impossible,  inevitable  and  contingent,  we  can  provide  an 
explication of explanations within the scientific paradigm.
One  route  to  explanation  is  to  cite  causes.  Causation  is  not  an 
unproblematic  notion  in  philosophy,  but  it  holds  a  special appeal  in 
explanation.  For  some,  the  only  type  of  explanation  possible  is  causal 
explanation, this is not my position. My aim in this thesis is to investigate 
those explanations in science which are not causal, and by doing so liberate 
our account of scientific explanation in general from some of the properties 
of causal explanation. Yet at the same time, by doing so, we can shed new 
light on causal explanations themselves.
The starting point for this story is James Woodward's  Making Things 
Happen.  Woodward  creates  a  compelling  account  of  how  causal 
explanations  operate  in  science  as  extensions  from  the  practices  of 
experimentation. The ability to manipulate and control experimental set-
ups forms the basis of a methodology which is  conceptually extended to 
other  areas  of  theoretical  causal  explanation.  My  aim  is  to  extend 
Woodward's account further, to non-causal explanation, and by doing so 
resolve new aspects of old puzzles concerning scientific explanation. 
Manipulation is central for Woodward and so it shall be in this thesis. 
However, the manipulation argued for here is not confined to the causal 
processes Woodward focuses on. I will argue that we can define a parallel 
notion  of  manipulation  which  applies  to  models  and  by  manipulating 
models we can use them as epistemic tools for investigation.  A unifying 
feature of all the explanations considered, causal or non-causal, is that they 
involve explicit or implicit modelling. By requiring that we can manipulate 
models, to extend Woodward's scheme, we are forced to consider what type 
of  thing a  model is.  The answer  is  to  be found in  the parallels  between 
scientific  models  and literary  fictions.  Models  are  a  species  of  fiction,  a 
model creates its own fictional world, and scientists are able to manipulate 
it in that world. This fictional aspect of models allows us to understand the 
role that abstractions and idealisations play in scientific explanations. Such 
"lies"  models  tell  seem  at  first  sight  to  undermine  the  ontic  notion  of 
explanation. If the explanation says things which are not true at all then 
how is it giving us facts which capture the modal structure of the world? By 
seeing explanatory models as manipulable fictions we can understand these 
fictions within fictions and understand their explanatory function.
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However,  allowing  these  fictions  to  be  explanatory  requires  a 
disaggregation of the intuitions behind the ontic conception of explanation. 
The  nature  of  truth  is  of  central  importance.  By  making  a  distinction 
between senses of truth we can define a hierarchy of ontic explanations. In 
all explanations modal information is captured, but in some cases this is 
done through ontologies that only appear true from a certain perspective, 
and these explanations are a lesser version of science's ultimate explanatory 
goal of a full and true correspondence between the ontology of a theory and 
the real world. 
The scope of this thesis is deliberately broad. In detail, the way scientific 
theories  explain  is  extremely  heterogeneous,  varying  not  just  across 
disciplines but within them. Nevertheless the aim here is to parallel what 
many of the case studies presented here do.  That is,  abstract away from 
particulars  and provide a unitary  account  of  what  all  explanations must 
have in common. Before considering such things we should begin at the 
standard  starting  point  for  any  discussion  of  the  modern  history  of 
philosophical grapplings with explanation: the logical positivist account and 
the role deduction plays in scientific reasoning. 
THE DEDUCTIVE-NOMOLOGICAL ACCOUNT
In 1948 Hempel & Oppenheim2 set out their Deductive-Nomological (DN) 
account  of  explanation.  They  proposed  an  inferential  conception  of 
explanation. When we explain we provide a deductive argument showing 
that  the  course  of  events  observed  had  to  be.  Starting  from  a  set  of 
premises,  at  least  one  of  which is  a  law,  the  event  to  be  explained,  the 
explanandum, is shown to follow nomically, that is in a lawlike manner, as 
the conclusion of the argument.  DN is one of the so-called covering law 
conceptions  of  explanation.  The  intuition  behind  the  covering  law 
framework is that to explain an event is to subsume it under a known lawful 
regularity.  The  argument  leading  to  the  the  explanandum  is  called  the 
explanans and is based on premises that state antecedent conditions and 
general laws. 
The DN framework has two requirements: firstly, that the explanation 
must be a valid deductive argument and secondly, that the explanans must 
contain  at  least  one general  law.  It  is  also constrained by two empirical 
requirements:  the  explanans  must  have  empirical  content,  and  the 
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explanans must be true.3 The DN model is anti-Wittgensteinian as it uses 
an  artificial  language  to  analyse  scientific  explanation.  It  is  logical  in 
approach  and  pragmatic  considerations  play  very  little  role.  Hempel  & 
Oppenheim's program is firmly routed in the logical positivist tradition and 
shares its ambitions. It seeks to banish both pragmatism, metaphysics and 
non-objective  accounts  of  explanation.  DN  is  unitary:  Hempel  & 
Oppenheim aim to show that the social sciences can also be explicated in 
terms of deductively drawn conclusions from laws. It is important to stress 
this  last  point.  Hempel & Oppenheim do not contend that  merely some 
types of scientific explanation follow a DN pattern but that all deterministic, 
non-statistical, explanations do.
PROBLEMS WITH DN
The DN framework only applies to the explanation of particular facts, not to 
the derivation of laws themselves from higher laws. When a derivation of a 
regularity  is  considered  the  DN  account  suffers  from  the  problem  of 
conjunction. That is, since we are dealing with purely deductive arguments 
any law can be derived from an arbitrary conjunction of itself and any other 
law. DN does not specify how to rule out adding irrelevant premises to the 
argument, so if we derive Coulomb's law from Maxwell's equations we can 
also add my shopping list this week and still have a true and perfectly valid 
deduction.  This  is  a  severe  shortcoming  as  in  a  deductive  argument  an 
irrelevance does not invalidate an argument but in an explanation adding 
an  irrelevance  can  negate  an  explanation,  since  irrelevances  are  not 
explanatory. 
Apart from this there are many other unsatisfactory aspects of DN. For 
example,  it  cannot  accommodate  functional  and teleological  explanatory 
practices. For Hempel these types of explanation are not true explanations, 
yet they often appear in explanations in the life and social sciences. Another 
lacuna in the DN account is that it does not explicitly impose any causal or 
temporal structure on the explanans, explanations are seen as symmetrical 
with predictions. 
There  are  many classic  counter-examples  to  DN accounts  of  singular 
events.  Since  an  explanans  contains  no  temporal  order  it  is  possible  to 
argue  from future  events  to  past  ones.  For  example,  one  can  invert  the 
standard explanation of an eclipse to construct a valid explanation, in the 
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DN schema, of an eclipse from the positions of the planets after totality.
Another famous counter-example, which shows that DN can be used to 
argue from effects to causes, concerns the relationship between a flagpole 
and its shadow. The DN account of this phenomenon works equally well 
deductively arguing from the shadow's length to the flagpole height as it 
does  the  other  way  around.  DN accounts  also  do  not  pick  out  common 
causes  such  as  in  the  case  of  a  barometer  and a  storm.  Since  they  are 
perfectly correlated, one can argue deductively from a barometer reading to 
the storm, but a falling barometer does not explain a storm. The DN model 
does  not  pick  out  the  causal  structure  of  explanations  and  Hempel's 
symmetry condition, that explanations and predictions have essential the 
same  types  of  logical  structure,  is  highly  problematic.  Asymmetry  is  a 
crucial feature of explanation and any adequate account must capture it.
In the case of particular facts the DN model must distinguish between 
genuine  laws  and  accidental  generalisations,  which  have  no  explanatory 
force. The explanans must contain at least one law-like sentence. However, 
Hempel's definition of law-like is quite specific: they must be universal in 
scope and not refer to particular objects and must contain purely qualitative 
predicates.  It  is  not difficult  to see,  therefore,  how limited and ideal  the 
paradigm for explanation DN gives us is. For example, many areas of the 
life sciences do not have laws, and certainly not ones universal in scope. 
A LOGICAL LEGACY
One  may  wonder  how  Hempel  could  have  produced  an  account  of 
explanation that is so at odds with standard explanatory practice; cultures 
that have no notion of deductive logic still have notions of explanation for 
instance. One possibility is that Hempel based the DN ideal on case studies 
from the history of science that are simply atypical. For example, Hughes 
points  out  that  Hempel  was  greatly  influenced  by  attempts  to  logically 
reconstruct Einstein’s General Relativity. 
The history of the logical empiricist tradition is a long and winding road.4 
In  its  modern  formulation  it  begins  with  the  formal  logic  of  Frege, 
Reichenbach, Hilbert and Russell and found fruition in the work of Carnap 
(who was a student of Frege's). In the context of explanation Hempel is the 
most notable logical empiricist.  Its spirit  can be traced further back and 
found  in,  for  instance,  Aristotle's  Posterior  Analytics  or  the  work  of 
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Descartes. More contemporaneously Tarski claimed that a scientific theory 
is a series of true statements5 and this view was predominant in the middle 
years of the 20th century.
In 1924 Hans Reichenbach proposed a logical axiomatic reconstruction 
of  Einstein's  theories  of  relativity.  In  1939  Carnap,  inspired  by 
Reichenbach's work, advocated that physical theories should be explicated 
within first order logic.6 To fully present a theory, what is required are the 
axioms of that theory, essentially syntactically defined rules, wedded to a 
series of semantical rules for the (partial) interpretation of theoretical terms 
in the observational language. Carnap's work, once taken on and modulated 
by Ernst  Nagel7 and Carl  Hempel,8 became widely  accepted and dubbed 
“the standard view”.  (Terms can be misleading in  this  context:  Carnap's 
syntactic view places great importance upon semantic rules as well.)9 10 11
For Hughes the logical empiricists and the structuralists are both guided 
by the same set of assumptions: They regard the target of the philosophy of 
science  to  be  scientific  theories,  they  seek  to  (re)construct  a  canonical 
formulation  of  those  theories,  and  assume  empirical  science  forms  a 
homogeneous class when viewed in this way. One philosophical size should 
fit all.12 
The  founders  of  logical  empiricism,  such  as  Schlick,  Carnap  and 
Reichenbach,  were  all  deeply  influenced  by  Einstein's  theory  of  General 
Relativity.13 For  Machian  positivists  and  neo-Kantians  the  theory  was 
empirically  suspect,  its  concepts too remote from sensory experience for 
comfort.14 However,  inspired by GR the logical empiricists took a radical 
step in making the a priori itself a matter of convention. They took Kant's 
doctrine  that  all  scientific  theories  can  be  partitioned  into  foundational 
principles and empirical laws, but they diverted from Kant in holding that 
foundational principles themselves are not apodeictically true but are a free 
choice  of  the  theorist,  thus  building  in  the  kind  of  conventionalism  in 
theories pointed out by Poincaré for instance.15 
Reichenbach's axiomatisation of GR sets a pattern for the philosophy of 
science  as  a  program  to  reconstruct  a  theory's  credentials  for  empirical 
adequacy.  This resulted in a distorted picture,  since GR is not typical of 
most physical theories.16 For instance GR turned out to be axiomatisable, 
but (contra Hilbert) most of the rest of physics is not. Physics instead is 
fuelled  by  models,  as  such  the  logical  empiricist  work  on  GR  is 
unrepresentative  of  how the  philosophy of  science  should  be  conceived. 
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Moreover,  it  inspired  the  Hempel-Oppenheim  DN  construction  of 
explanation even though almost no actual scientific explanations fit the bill 
of the DN scheme.17
PROBABILISTIC EXPLANATIONS
Hempel recognised that not all  scientific explanations are based on non-
deterministic laws, some explanations require probabilistic judgements. He 
developed two accounts: the Deductive-Statistical (DS) and the Inductive-
Statistical (IS). DS is a subset of DN, where the covering law happens to be 
a statistical one. Unlike DN however, it can only cope with generalisations 
not occurrences of particular events; DS can account for outcomes of an 
ensemble process only. As with DN the explanandum follows deductively 
from the explanans. IS on the other hand is an account designed to cover 
the case of  specific  occurrences of  an event.  It  is  an inductive argument 
which is  deemed adequate  if  it  shows that  the  explanandum  was to  be 
expected, that is it had a high probability of occurring. This high probability 
is essential to retain the notion that IS is similar in structure to DN, without  
it an IS account cannot be a good argument for a particular explanandum. If 
the requirement of  high probability  is  relaxed then isosthenia creeps in. 
Statistical explanations are no longer arguments since the same steps can 
be used to argue for two mutually exclusive conclusions; to both explain a 
low probability event and to explain the non-occurrence of a low probability 
event. 
However there are several problems with the IS account. Like DN, it fails 
to pick out a causal structure:  correlations do not imply causations. For 
something  to  count  as  a  genuine  element  of  an  explanation  it  must  be 
statistically  relevant  and  be  a  so-called  difference  maker. It  must  have 
made a difference  modally to what occurred.  If  the explanandum would 
have occurred regardless of a particular feature in the explanans then the 
explanans is faulty. For example, taking birth control pills does not explain 
the lack of pregnancy in a man. High probability in an inductive argument 
is not enough to make it an explanation. 
There is also the problem of ambiguity. Valid deductive arguments are 
monotonic, if an extra premise is added then the conclusion will still follow. 
Inductive  arguments  are  non-monotonic,  adding  an  extra  premise  can 
change the conclusion. Hence, if a new fact is added to an IS explanation, 
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then the negation of the previous conclusion may become the most likely 
outcome.  The  problem  is  not  merely  inductive  inconsistency,  otherwise 
Hempel could just specify that the explanation with the false conclusion is 
abandoned. The ambiguity arises out of uncertainty as to which reference 
class to place the explanandum in: all relevant factors must be considered, 
but how is relevant to be defined? 
Not  all  information  can  be  included  since  then  the  fact  that  the 
explanandum  occurred  would  have  to  be  too,  which  would  make  the 
explanation trivial. So, a subset of all available information must be decided 
upon. Hempel identifies the “Requirement of Maximal Specificity” (RMS) 
as the way out of this pickle: the reference class of the explanandum must 
be  the  narrowest  possible  given  a  particular  knowledge  situation.  DN 
explanations  automatically  satisfy  RMS  since  they  are  monotonic,  but, 
because of RMS, IS explanations are essentially  epistemically relativised. 
This is not merely the relativity of knowing whether a given set of laws are 
true or not (this relativity would effect DN as well as IS explanations) it is 
much more fundamental. 
This essential epistemic relativisation leads Coffa and Salmon18 to attack 
IS  as  self  defeating.  When  we  consider  a  DN  explanation  it  is  non-
epistemic.  A  DN  explanation  can  be  stated  without  reference  to  a 
knowledge situation. Subsequently, a knowledge situation can be used as 
grounds  for  thinking  that  a  DN  explanation  is  well  confirmed  or  not. 
However Hempel's contention that an IS explanation needs a knowledge 
situation in its construction means that there is no such relationship, which 
would  allow  one  to  define  a  well  confirmed  IS  explanation,  as  there  is 
between  a  true  DN  explanation  and  a  well  confirmed  DN  explanation. 
Coffa19 concludes  that  this  means  there  is  no  such  thing  as  inductive 
explanation by Hempel's account. A further problem with RMS is that we 
cannot  be  allowed  to  draw  a  partition  at  will.  Consider  a  patient  who 
recovers from an illness due to a medicine and that recovery is subsequently 
reported on the news. Under RMS the news report could be included in the 
IS  explanation,  but  this  is  absurd  since  the  reporting of  the  event  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  cause of  the  event.  Like  DN,  IS  ignores  the 
underlying temporal/causal structure of many explanations. 
Salmon proposes a different view of statistical explanation based upon 
the notion of statistical relevance (SR). SR is objective, leading Salmon to 
dub SR an  ontic account. Explanations are no longer to be thought of as 
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arguments,  and statistical  relevance is  important,  not  just  correlation.  If 
one factor screens off another, that is, if the probability of the explanandum 
is unaffected by its removal, then that factor is not statistically relevant and 
plays  no  part  in  the  explanation.  This  is  another  way  in  which  the 
symmetry  of  explanation  and  prediction  is  broken.  In  prediction  all 
information,  whether  known  to  be  relevant  or  not,  should  be  included. 
However including irrelevant information undermines an explanation. For 
Salmon  explanations  are  not  arguments  and  the  high  probability 
requirement of IS should be dropped, allowing low probability events to be 
explainable  just  as  high  probability  events  are.  An  explanation  simply 
consists  of  accounting  for  the  range  of  probabilities  of  events.  If 
explanations are arguments then low probability events  are inexplicable, 
the best argument is for them not to occur! Explanations require temporal 
asymmetry but arguments do not.20 
Railton21 argues  that  since  IS  is  based on nomic  expectability  it  is  in 
tension with itself. Nomicity and expectability don't always act together. For 
example the rare radioactive decay of an isotope may be nomic but it  is  
unexpected.  Railton  argues  that  nomicity  is  the  key  to  explanation  not 
expectability  (he is  in the ontic  school  with Salmon).  In  a  deterministic 
world the three conceptions are the same, but once statistical explanation is 
required  they  are  quite  different.  Modal  explanation  excludes  statistical 
explanation altogether. Epistemic only allows high probability explanation, 
while the ontic conception demands that objective probabilities be provided 
to explain an event.22
ONTIC AND EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS
Ontic and epistemic intuitions concerning explanation are very different. 
Grounding the ontic notion is the idea that explanations are constituted by 
facts, they are objective. An explanation does not rely on the audience and 
their  ability  to  understand,  explanations  do  not  alter  with  culture,  or 
through history, other than being superseded by improved sets of facts. The 
contrast  with  epistemic  notions  couldn't  be  more  stark.  For  example, 
Achinstein's  contention23 is  that  explanation  is  an  illocutionary  act. 
Explanations are provided by sentences, those sentences are constructed to 
make the explanandum understandable to the audience of the speech. For 
Achinstein  the  act  of  explaining  is  logically  prior  to  the  concept  of  an 
explanation. In the “ordered pair view”, an explanation is an ordered pair of 
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the form {proposition, act of explaining}. Achinstein keenly emphasises the 
pragmatic nature of explanation in high contrast to the formalised Hempel-
Oppenheim mixture of syntactic and semantic elements. 
Another  proponent  of  epistemic  explanation  is  R.I.G.  Hughes.  His 
account is sympathetic with Achinstein, but proposes a modification that 
puts the emphasis upon people, rather than theories, explaining. Hughes 
believes  statements  such  as  “Theory  T  explains  X”  should  be  actually 
interpreted as “A speaker S could use the resources of T to explain X”. What 
is  outstanding,  is  the  problem  of  audience  preparedness.  What  can  be 
made  understandable  depends  upon  the  audience  and  is  highly 
sociologically  and  psychologically  contingent.  Hempel  denied  that 
comprehensibility  was  present  in  the  logic  of  explanation,  in  contrast 
Achinstein  requires  only  that  a  speaker  has  the  intention  to  make  a 
statement understandable for it to count as an explanation. However, this 
in  itself  doesn't  seem  to  capture  our  intuitions  about  explanations.  If 
someone tries to explain Quantum Field Theory (QFT) to me in Spanish, a 
language I do not speak, then they will not have explained to me in any way 
QFT. At the same time, there are puzzles for the ontic tradition: if a set of  
sentences form an explanation regardless of whether I can understand it,  
why  do  those  same  sentences  generated  at  random  by  the  proverbial 
monkey at a typewriter constitute any less of an explanation?24
For Hughes the question is whether explanation is an illocutionary act or 
a perlocutionary act. A perlocutionary act, such as an act of persuasion, has 
the  aim  of  bringing  about  a  change  in  the  listener.  If  explanation  is  a 
perlocutionary  act  then  it  is  possible  to  make  unsuccessful  attempts  to 
explain, and this is surely correct. Simply trying to explain is not the same 
as  explaining!  Hughes  suggests  that  the  situation  can  be  meliorated  by 
allowing  different  explanations  of  the  same  event  tailored  for  different 
audiences,  for  instance,  a  popular  science  account  of  QFT  and  an 
undergraduate  textbook  account,  each  with  its  own  audience  that  it 
functions as an explanation for.
However, "understandable" is not an all or nothing term: some audience 
members will wholly understand, some partially, some not at all. Pragmatic 
considerations  matter.  An  explanation  should  be  pitched  at  a  level 
appropriate for a given audience, hence the model used should be one that 
the  listener  is  familiar  with  or  could  reasonably  be  expected  to  become 
familiar  with as the explanation proceeds.  As such, Hughes seems to be 
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advocating  an  ensemble  interpretation  of  explanation.  Explanation  is 
viewed  as  a  public  practice,  a  fundamentally  sociological  endeavour, 
something is an explanation if it is capable of making some members of an 
audience  understand,  explanations  therefore  are  open  to  community 
discussion. 
This perhaps nicely captures some of the sociological aspects of science 
itself, within a given discipline what is accepted as an explanation is often a 
matter of debate. Not simply which proposed explanations are thought to 
be  true,  but  which  descriptions  of  phenomena  are  even  explanatory  in 
principle,  for  instance in the debates  during the early years  of  quantum 
theory.
So we have two very different senses of explanation, an epistemic one 
and an ontological one. Clearly Hughes is more concerned with the former 
than the latter. He makes no reference to which facts about the world are 
necessary  to  make  something  an  explanation.  There  is  a  problem  with 
regarding these two senses of explanation as completely distinct since the 
practice of science seems to involve elements of both. 
The epistemic notion may be good at capturing some of the pragmatic 
aspects  of  explanation  but  it  simply  does  not  lend  itself  to  a  unitary 
exposition of explanatory practice. Understanding rather like beauty, is in 
the eye of the beholder, it changes with discipline, culture and psychology. 
Furthermore, if Hughes is correct then it is not even definable at anything 
other than the sociological level, so should we really take a straw poll at the 
end of a physics lecture to see if enough students felt they understood to 
decide if the material on the blackboard constitutes an explanation? Is a 
simple explanation better automatically than a complicated one simply in 
virtue of being understood by a wider group of people? I think not. Instead 
what we should say is that we can legitimately make a distinction between 
an  explanation  and an  explanation  for  us.  A  tablet  in  some  long  dead, 
untranslatable language may well be an explanation, that is it is an accurate 
and truthful summary of modal facts, but it will not be an explanation for 
us.  There  is  no  possibility  of  understanding.  That  said,  understanding 
cannot be foundational to a definition of explanation, this relativises the 
concept  hopelessly  and  worse  still  does  not  actually  distinguish 
explanations from other activities, such as story telling. If one is ontic in 
intuition then an explanation is a set of facts about the world that stand in 
some explanatory relation to a phenomenon. Epistemic considerations can 
30
matter, but we must have an element of ontic explanation to fully capture 
practice.  There  is  a  sociological  atmosphere  surrounding  a  solid  ontic 
“planetary core”, that makes up the notion of explanation.
Since explanation is a sociological activity, it does require the possibility 
at least of understanding, but that alone is not enough, it also must be tied 
to real networks of facts, things which are the building blocks of genuine 
explanations, not spurious ones. For something to be an allegorical painting 
it must be a painting, a physical object made with paint, but it must also be 
viewed. In some sense to be allegorical it must be viewed as allegorical, but 
at  the  same  time  it  must  be  capable  of  being  viewed  allegorically.  The 
allegorical part is an epistemic relation that supervenes upon the material 
building blocks and requires the intentions of the painter to be to depict an 
allegory. 
In a similar sense, explanations are made up of facts, a particular type of 
fact, modal facts, but these facts must be constructed into a superstructure 
of  explanation.  Without  the  epistemic  component  they  are  not 
explanations.  This  Hegelian,  dialectical,  conception  of  explanation,  facts 
and  epistemology  interacting,  can  account  for  the  historical  nature  of 
understanding.  Different  communities  at  different  times  have  different 
notions of what is understandable or provides understanding. To Newton 
and his contemporaries action at a distance through gravitational force was 
unintelligible, the generation that followed accepted it unproblematically. 
The dialectic conception can accommodate this, whilst the facts in the two 
cases haven't changed the epistemic import of them has. However, in both 
cases the explanation must be made out of objective facts about the world. 
The primary focus of this thesis will be in constructing an ontic conception 
of explanation for this very reason. The epistemic aspects interact with the 
core of modal facts about the world, and it  is  in these facts that we can 
locate a suitably broad and objective conception of explanation. 
LAWS OF NATURE AND EXPLANATION
DN explanations place such an importance on laws that the concept must 
be clearly defined and distinguished from accidental generalisations, and 
this has proved a challenging problem for the philosophy of science. The 
concept of law is essentially fuzzy linguistically and conceptually. Hume25 
defined laws as simply empirical  regularities,  but not all  regularities are 
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laws,  so  something  else  must  be  operative.  There  are  several  different 
positions.
Braithwaite26 contends that it is epistemic attitudes to regularities that 
confer law-like status, but this undermines objectivity; law-hood is in the 
eye of the beholder. By contrast Mills, Ramsey & Lewis27 suggest that laws 
are objectively defined, they come out of our best deductive systematisation 
of the world, where best is an optimisation of simplicity and strength. No 
regularity in and of itself can be said to be a law, it is only when it is placed 
in a context of the wider deductive structure that it can be said to be a law. 
This  conception identifies  laws  independently  of  their  ability  to  support 
counterfactuals  and  makes  lawhood  a  sociological  term.  Armstrong, 
Dretske, & Tooley28 hold that laws are not defined by regularities, rather 
regularity  itself  is  a  symptom  of  the  nomic  necessitation  relation  of 
properties that constitutes laws. Accidental regularity is not even that, but 
what exactly the nature of the nomic necessitation relation  is is  unclear. 
These views to differing degrees hold that laws are contingent, that in our, 
or other, world(s) they could have been different. Alternatively there is the 
Aristotelian  view  that  laws  are  metaphysically  necessary  and  follow 
essentially from the essences of properties, which makes the status of laws 
super-empirical.
The covering law conception of explanation raises particular problems in 
relation to capturing the ontology of explanations in the life sciences and 
social sciences. Much of biology is often claimed to not have laws, and so to 
be  "nomically  inhibited",29 since  many evolutionary outcomes are  highly 
contingent upon initial conditions, and biological systems in general are too 
complex to be captured straightforwardly with exceptionless laws. This has 
lead to much work on the structure of so called “ceteris paribus laws” that 
include  background  specifications  of  when  a  contingent  law  holds.  The 
problem is how to specify,  in any rigorous way, all  the circumstances in 
which the regularity will not hold and to avoid the circularity of reducing 
laws to statements of the form “X...if not X”. Some have also questioned the 
usefulness of the concept of a law of nature even in physics.30
UNIFICATIONISM & THE PROBLEM OF CONJUNCTION
There have been several attempts to patch up DN in a way that overcomes 
its shortcoming, unification is one such attempt. There are two schools of 
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unificationism,  one  due  to  Friedman,  the  other  to  Kitcher.  Friedman31 
attempts  to  solve  the  problem  of  conjunction  from  a  unificationist 
perspective. Unification leads to understanding by reducing the number of 
brute facts about the world. A deductive explanation of one law in terms of 
another  is  allowed if  the DN model  is  supplemented with the notion of 
minimising the number of independent regularities. He defines the notion 
of “atomic sentences”: sentences that cannot be partitioned into multiple 
logically/empirically  independent  components.  If  a  DN  explanation 
involves a conjunctive law (one that can be spit into two independent laws) 
then it is not allowed. If the law is atomic then it is a valid explanation. 
However there are problems with defining the notion of atomicity since a 
statement can always be trivially split up by placing an arbitrary distinction 
between  set  members  (e.g.  all  large  mass  bodies  attract  each  other 
gravitationally and all small mass bodies do). Advocates of atomicity might 
argue that any legitimate partition must pick out a  natural kind but then 
they  must  provide  a  definition  of  what  counts  as  a  natural  kind.  When 
Newton proposed his universal law of gravitation there was only evidence 
for the mutual gravitational attraction of medium and large mass bodies, 
but  subsequently  Cavendish's  experiments  demonstrated  attraction  for 
small mass bodies. These experiments provided independent evidence, thus 
allowing Newton's law to be partitioned. Yet, in Friedman's conception only 
atomic  sentences  have  explanatory  power,  this  means  that  Cavendish's 
experiment  reduced the explanatory  power of  Newton's  theory,  which is 
clearly the reverse of the true situation. The conjunctive nature of a theory 
should not depend on the temporal ordering of finding evidence for parts of 
it. 
If there are no atomic sentences then Friedman's account cannot work. 
Friedman defines unification in a syntactic manner just as Hempel does 
with explanation. Hempel wrestles with the problem of how to select laws 
form accidental generalisations, Friedman of how to pick out good unifiers 
from bad unifiers. According to Psillos32 a purely syntactic approach will 
always  fail.  There  is  also  a  further  problem  with  Friedman's  claim that 
atomic sentences are the only ones that explain, as it is sometimes the case 
that  multiple  independent  laws  are  brought  together  to  explain  a 
phenomena. Here we have a conjunction but a perfectly legitimate one, e.g. 
the derivation of adiabatic expansion by combining Boyle-Charles' law and 
the first law of thermodynamics.
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Kitcher33 offers  an  alternative  view  of  unificationism.  Instead  of 
minimising  the  cardinality  of  axioms  needed,  what  is  important  is  the 
number of  explanatory  patterns.  For  Kitcher  explanations  are  deductive 
arguments and many different phenomena can be derived from the same 
pattern. However, in some cases the pattern itself does not provide enough 
for an explanation. F = ma is a law, but the force function must be supplied 
on a case by case basis.  It  is  not  supplied by the general  pattern of  the  
argument, it is not the same argument that applies to many cases rather the 
law,  so  in  this  case  unifying  many  phenomena  seems  to  be  about 
minimising the number of axioms not patterns. There are several problems 
with Kitcher's unification. How, for instance, are such complex reductions 
in patterns transferred sociologically? Do we learn to think in such terms as 
small  children?  Are  societies  without  deductive  reasoning  unable  to 
explain?  Unification  is  clearly  very  important  in  how  science  explains 
regularities but it is not clear how to explicate it, and unificationism simply 
cannot be a means of foundationally grounding all explanatory practice. 
DEDUCTIVE-NOMOLOGICAL-PROBABILISTIC  EXPLANATION 
& THE IDEAL TEXT
Deductive-Nomological-Probabilistic Explanation (DNP) is an amendment 
to DN proposed by Railton34 for probabilistic explanation. A standard DN 
argument is used to lead to the specification of the probability value of an 
unlikely  event.  After  the  conclusion  of  this,  a  parenthetic  addendum is 
added stating that the explanandum did in fact occur. DNP itself is not an 
argument,  the  explanandum  does  not  deductively  follow  from  the 
explanans. 
In addition to the standard premises of a DN explanation Railton adds 
the requirement of deriving the covering law used. By doing so he adds a 
mechanistic requirement to an explanation. All events can be explained in 
the same way, regardless of likelihood. Railton uses a single case propensity 
interpretation  of  probability  (unlike  Salmon's  frequency  interpretation) 
hence all of the probabilities are objective (since the probabilistic law must 
contain  all  relevant  information  to  actually  be  a  law,  it  is  automatically 
maximally specific, as it is false if not). A DNP explanation places an event 
in a web of laws, and derivations of laws and mechanisms; subsumption 
under a covering law alone is not enough. 
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One criticism of the DNP account is that many real explanations omit 
many of the laws and derivations of laws a DNP explanation requires. In 
response Railton proposes that scientific explanation is actually concerned 
with what he calls an ideal text. The ideal text is the complete, exhaustive, 
scientific description of a phenomenon. It is too complex to ever construct 
in many cases but this does not matter. Rather what is important is that any 
arbitrary  part of  the  ideal  text  can  be  constructed  when  needed. 
Explanatory information is any part of this text that is useful for explaining 
in a given context. 
Salmon  believes  this  distinction  can  reconcile  pragmatic  and  ontic 
accounts. The ideal text is objective but pragmatics determine which parts 
of the ideal text are required in a given context, relevance is a matter of 
objective fact; salience is  a matter of pragmatics.35 Hence an astrological 
account  of  a  given  event  even though perfectly  acceptable  on pragmatic 
grounds alone is not allowed, as no part of this explanation coincides with 
any part  of the ideal text.  The ideal  text defines and limits the set from 
which explanatory information can be drawn. The ideal text includes laws, 
but explanations need not, as there can be explanations that simply utilise 
the non law-like components of the ideal text. The ideal text, in common 
with all ontic conceptions, suggests strongly that a realist interpretation of 
science must  be  taken if  explanation is  genuinely  providing information 
about the mechanisms operative in the world.
CAUSATION & MECHANISMS
By contrast with DN, for Salmon, fundamental to the notion of explanation 
is  causation  and uncovering  the mechanisms of  the  world.  Causation  is 
metaphysically prior to explanation. (This contrasts with Kitcher for whom 
causation is ascribed from the best deductive systematization of beliefs, a 
top down approach.) For Salmon, statistical relevance is not enough, in and 
of itself, as it doesn't necessarily pick out causes. If causation is central to 
many  explanatory  practices  then  a  way  must  be  found  to  distinguish  a 
causal process from other types of interactions. Salmon suggests a so-called 
“at-at”  theory36 of  causation:  causes  are  distinguished by their  ability  to 
propagate their own structure and to transmit "marks",  modifications of 
that structure. 
However, mark transmission is neither necessary or sufficient to pick out 
a causal process. For example, the shadow of a newly dented car will change 
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and transmit that change from that point onwards, but a shadow is not a 
causal process. Also Salmon requires that marks be propagated for some 
time,  but  this  rules  out  extremely  short  lived  causal  processes  such  as 
virtual particle interactions. 
Salmon's later work specifies that mark transmission is not the essence 
of  causation,  but  a  common  symptom  of  it,  and  that  Dowe's  theory  of 
conserved quantities37 is  a more promising candidate  as  a conception of 
physical causation. In this a causal interaction is defined as an intersection 
of the spacetime world lines of two bodies in which a particular quantity is 
conserved,  such  as  momentum  or  energy.  This  requires  a  radically 
reductionist  approach.  Under  this  scheme  the  only  genuinely  causal 
processes are ones at  the level  of fundamental  physics,  and it  is  unclear 
which conserved quantities are causally operative in a given circumstance. 
For  example,  when  two  snooker  balls  collide  it  is  usually  taken  that 
conservation of momentum explains their subsequent velocities, not one of 
the many other potentially conserved quantities, such as electric charge or 
lepton number. 
All of these views fail to accommodate any notion of negative causation. 
If causality is restricted to a particular type of physical process (whatever 
that  may be)  then the ordinary language usage of  causation is  rendered 
hopelessly  inflated.  It  is  common  to  talk  of  negative  causes  or  only  a 
particular event in a chain of causes as  the cause of an event. These ideas 
can be fleshed out in terms of "difference making", in which causation is 
about working out which factors make a difference to our event occurring or 
not. Difference making is a modal condition not a purely physical one, it  
requires  no  particular  physical  process  to  be  uniquely  causal,  and  it 
therefore allows negative causation. 
Whichever position is adopted, difference-making or physical causation, 
the key is to recognise that a  causal-explanatory relation is not the same 
thing as causation simpliciter. Even if physical causation is deemed the only 
legitimate  form  of  causal  interaction  it  would  not  mean  that  a  causal-
explanatory notion couldn't invoke absences of otherwise expected events 
as  a  causal  explanation.  Hence,  the  most  relevant  starting  point  for 
understanding  explanation in causal  terms is with difference makers.  Of 
course if  anything that  makes a difference is  deemed a cause then non-
causal explanations are rendered extremely rare or are reduced to simply 
definitional relations of the type "H2O is water".38 
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There must be a delineation between causal difference makers and non-
causal difference makers. This could be done by limiting causal difference 
makers  to  only  those  instantiated  by  some  particular  type  of  physical 
process which is a likely candidate for causation. However, as before, this 
would  render  a  vast  amount  of  commonly  thought  of  causal  difference 
makers  as  non-causal.  Rather  a  middle  ground  will  be  advocated  here, 
causality will  not be defined by one physical process but the notion of a 
non-causal difference maker will be defined as those properties of nature 
such as mathematical objects, geometrical/universal constants, symmetry 
properties,  etc.  which  may  (or  may  not)  make  a  difference  but  have  a 
different  character  to  ordinary  localised  space-time  event  difference 
makers.  These  features  are  universal  in  character.  Something  such  as  a 
background constraint isn't causally active, it cannot be turned off and on, 
and it applies equally to different outcomes. It is how different processes 
interact with a constraint that leads to different behaviours.39
LIMITS OF CAUSATION AND USES OF MANIPULATION
Our brief review of the discussions on causation of the latter half of the 20th 
century  reveal  the  central  role  causation  has  played  in  overcoming  the 
shortcomings of  the DN account.  Causation is  a source of  asymmetry in 
explanation  and  a  means  of  removing  irrelevancies  from  explanations, 
crucial elements of any account that can recover our explanatory practice 
and do justice to our intuitions about explanation. Yet, as we have also seen, 
causation  itself  is  a  difficult  concept  to  pin  down  and  there  are  many 
different accounts of causal explanation. We will now turn our attention to 
what  I  believe  is  the  best  explication  of  the  role  causation  plays  in 
explanation  available,  James  Woodward's  manipulationist  account.  By 
understanding manipulationism, and extending it, we can not only better 
account for causal explanations but we can transcend the limits any account 
of  explanation  incurs  by  such  a  reliance  on  causal  thinking. 
Manipulationism, suitably extended, offers the key to a unitary account of 
all  scientific  explanation,  both  causal  and  non-causal.  Before  extending 
manipulationism we must first understand it. Thus, the next chapter will 
outline  the  most  important  features  of  Woodward's  causal  account  of 
explanation.
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2 | MAKING, & IMAGINING, THINGS HAPPEN
 
James Woodward proposes a theory of causal explanation built around the 
notion  of  manipulation.40 His  contention  is  that  the  practices  of 
experimental science, of controlling and manipulating experimental set-ups 
to  determine  causal  relationships,  offer  a  starting  point  for  an 
understanding  of  all  causal  claims.  Woodward  seeks  a  non-reductive 
explication of causation. He cannot, and does not, define causal processes 
in terms of non-causal processes. Rather he uses the notion of manipulation 
to  constrain  and shed  light  on  the  ways  in  which  causal  processes  and 
explanations work and in doing so creates a virtuously circular argument 
for a manipulationist causal account. Woodward also illuminates the role of 
other concepts  in relation to causation and explanation,  such as  laws of 
nature  and  counterfactual  dependence.  Woodward's  conception  of 
causation  is  broad,  it  is  not  defined  by  any  particular  type  of  physical 
process.  Causation  by  omission  is  perfectly  allowable  for  instance,  and 
causal  processes  can  be  grounded  in  many  different  types  of  physical 
interaction.  By  contrast,  his  notion  of  explanation  is  relatively  narrow. 
Woodward is primarily concerned with causal explanation as understood 
counterfactually  and  his  notion  of  causation  is  based  upon  difference-
making.41 
[Theoretical explanations] locate their explananda within 
a space of alternative possibilities and show us how which 
of these alternatives is realized systematically  depends on 
the  conditions  used  in  their  explanans  (Woodward, 
Making Things Happen 2003, p. 191.).
Within Woodward's manipulationist framework explanation is a matter 
of  exhibiting  systematic  patterns  of  counterfactual  dependence. 
Explanations tell us how things could have been otherwise. In Woodward's 
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terminology they provide answers to a series of  What-if-things-had-been-
different? questions  (w-questions).  Woodward's  manipulationism  is 
therefore foundationally a modal account of explanation.
CAUSATION
In an experiment the world is partitioned: we isolate a small section of it 
from outside influences in order to investigate what depends upon what in 
our sub-system. The partitioning is both physical and theoretical. Elements 
of an experiment are changed to see what effects are resultant from others. 
Often multiple variables are altered in an experiment, one at a time, to map 
the dependency relations of a system. This experimental methodology is the 
starting  point  for  manipulationism.  Manipulationism  takes  this  logic  of 
altering variables to map dependencies and applies it to theoretical causal 
thinking  generally.  Ultimately  the  aim  is  to  map  the  counterfactual,  or 
modal structure of the world, that is, to say what was possible,  necessary, 
and impossible. Not just any modal structure is relevant for explanation of 
course,  we  seek  to  discover  those  modal  facts  which  relate  to 
counterfactuals which are salient to our explanatory interests.
Causation  itself  is  viewed  as  a  set  of  connections  between  variables. 
Variables represent events or properties of entities, and they must be able 
to  be  changed counterfactually.42 Explanations relate  the values  of  these 
variables  to  one  another.  Woodward  proposes  an  abstraction  in  which 
ordinary language terms are transformed into quantitative variable values. 
For  example,  imagine  a  school  boy  breaks  his  neighbour’s  window  by 
miskicking a football. The ball has broken the window and this is a causal 
interaction. Woodward suggests that we understand this process as causal 
because we can counterfactually say that if the ball had not been kicked the 
window would not  have broken.  So the ball  is  a  variable  in our  causal-
explanatory relation. It can be assigned a value,  1 if kicked, or  0 if not.43 
Similarly the window is a variable, with value  1 if broken or  0 if not. The 
aim is to change the value of ball from 0 to 1 and see if there is a resultant 
change in the window variable, from “not broken” to “broken”. If there is 
then we identify the kicking of the ball as a cause of the broken window. We 
change the values of variables in a scheme like this through manipulations, 
either real or hypothetical. 
Manipulations,  or  interventions,  are  designed  to  show  that  pairs  of 
39
variables are linked causally. If an intervention on X changes its value and 
results in another variable Y also changing, then the variables are causally 
linked.44 Interventions themselves are a special kind of causal processes.45 
An intervention on one variable is always relative to another variable and 
there  is  no  notion  of  intervention  simpliciter.46 Causal  networks  are 
represented by directed graphs linking input and output variables. When 
assessing causal  networks of  events  all  off-pathway variables  are  usually 
held fixed at  their  actual  values to see how the change in the particular 
input  variable  we  are  investigating  causally  interacts  with  our  output 
variable.  Alternatively,  off  path  variables  are  set  to  values  which  would 
allow  the  effects  of  our  intervention  to  be  seen.  This  is  a  conceptual 
mirroring  of  the  isolation  and  screening  off  of  potential  influences  in 
experiments. 
In  essence,  when  there  is  a  potential  causal  interaction  under 
investigation,  a  counterfactual  is  assessed,  isolating  one  variable  and 
allowing it to change whilst keeping all other variables fixed. If one asks a 
counterfactual question about a ball breaking a window, a relevant variable 
to consider might be the ball's momentum. Momentum can be changed in 
the counterfactual,  but all  other variables,  the strength of  the glass  etc., 
must be held counterfactually fixed. 
For general situations the values of variables, other than the one we are 
examining,  can  change  to  values  other  than  they  actually  have,  but  we 
cannot  change  those  values  once  the  intervention  on  our  chosen  input 
variable is made. So for instance when considering balls breaking windows 
in general we can assess the causal influence of balls by first imagining that 
the window were made of steel, say, rather than glass, and then make an 
intervention on the momentum of the ball to see what difference this makes 
to whether the window breaks.47 
INTERVENTIONS
Interventions  are  not  restricted  to  only  those  manipulations  we  can 
perform. This  would be to relativize  causality  to the latest  technological 
developments,  or  to  those  interventions  that  are  actually  performed  in 
experiments.  Rather  Woodward  is  concerned with  all  interventions  that 
might happen,  interventions  are  restricted  to  what  is  hypothetically 
possible.48 
40
The  sense  of  “potentially  exploitable”  to  which  I  have 
appealed is an idealized one; what matters is not whether 
human beings can actually carry out manipulations on the 
magnitudes  of  X  and  Y...  but  whether  the  relationship 
correctly describes how Y would change if a change in X 
were produced by a special sort of causal process that I 
call intervention. The notion of intervention is an abstract 
representation  of  a  human  experimental  manipulation 
that  is  stripped  of  its  anthropocentric  elements  and 
characterised in terms that make no reference to human 
beings or their activities (Woodward, 2003, p. 374).
That  said,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  Woodward  narrows  down  the 
possibilities of what can count as an intervention: interventions must be 
spatio-temporally local, for example. Woodward does not allow anything to 
count as an intervention, rather his interventions are an extension from the 
actual interventions we do perform to interventions that we could perform, 
and  then  to  interventions  that  we  could  never  perform,  but  that  seem 
contiguous with the kinds of physical processes that operate in our actual 
causal interventions. 
So we can intervene on a ball to kick it, we cannot directly intervene on 
the trajectory of a galaxy, but we can see that a galactic collision involves 
the  same kinds  of  processes49 that  a  boy  kicking  a  ball  involves.50 This 
highlights one of the weaknesses of the manipulationist account. Although 
Woodward doesn't give a reductive account of causation, or tie it to any one 
particular physical interaction, he does nevertheless rely on a vague set of 
intuitions about what can count as causal and be an allowed manipulation. 
Like  all  informal  concepts  there  is  an  inherent  fuzziness  at  the 
boundaries  of  our  definition.  Woodward  untethers  manipulations  from 
what we can actually do but without formally specifying their limits. In the 
absence  of  a  clear  set  of  properties  that  define  an  intervention,  we  are 
relying on nothing more than an intuition about what is or is not an allowed 
intervention.  Furthermore,  as  the comparison between kicking balls  and 
colliding galaxies shows, what intuitions we have about which processes are 
fundamentally similar to the manipulations we can actually do, are formed 
by the theoretical context we find ourselves in. This is a point I will examine 
more closely in Chapter 6, where I present a means to disaggregate some of 
our intuitions about interventions.
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COUNTERFACTUALS: SAME & OTHER OBJECTS
Within  the  constraints  discussed  above,  any  conceivable,  well  defined, 
counterfactual  change  can  count  as  an  intervention.  The  counterfactual 
change must be well defined in the sense that it is possible to understand 
what  it  would  mean  to  change  the  value  of  a  variable.  For  example, 
changing  the  value  of  a  variable  from  "Man"  to  "Chicken",  is  not  an 
allowable  intervention,  since  it  is  unclear  what  such a  change means  or 
what  evidential  basis  one  could  have  for  conclusions  drawn  from  it. 
Woodward conceives of these hypothetical interventions as assessing same-
object counterfactuals, not other-object counterfactuals:
The interventionist, same-object counterfactuals that are 
central  to  the  manipulationist  account  I  have  been 
defending are typically clear enough in meaning and we 
can often obtain scientific evidence that is relevant to their 
truth. For example, it may be possible to experimentally 
intervene to change the geometry or charge distribution of 
[a]  conductor  to  determine  whether  the  relationship 
expressed  by  Coulomb's  law  continues  to  hold  for  the 
conductor.  On  the  other  hand,  many  other-object 
counterfactuals lack a clear sense or any empirical basis. It 
is  wholly mysterious how we might test  counterfactuals 
about  what  would  happen  if  Bill  Clinton,  the  H.M.S. 
Victory,  or  a  neutron  were  to  be  a  long  straight  wire 
(Woodward, 2003 p. 283).
Woodward's account differs from the counterfactual theory of Lewis51 in 
that  it  does not build a complete alternate world.  Lewis's  counterfactual 
theory is problematic, as it involves imagining a counterfactual change to a 
possible  world  and  then  comparing  that  world  to  another  so  see  the 
similarities and differences in order to work out what effect our change had. 
However,  the  problem  is  that  unlike  in  manipulationism  we  have  not 
isolated  our  change  from  all  of  the  actual  consequences  such  a  change 
would have in the real world. It is not always clear how a localised change 
affects an entire other possible world in every respect. Simply looking at the 
outcomes holistically of changes can give erroneous results, for instance in 
cases of causal pre-emption.52 In these cases the possible worlds are exactly 
the same in terms of outcomes. Since difference makers are identified solely 
through differences in outcomes of closely related worlds, the actual causes 
in each world are incorrectly identified as not being difference makers. 
Woodward's  counterfactuals  are  different  in  character.  They  hold  all 
incidents  in  the  world  the  same  except  for  the  specific  one  under 
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consideration. So rather than construct an alternate world, propagate the 
consequences  of  a  change  through  it,  and  then  ask  how  this  world  is 
different  as  a  result,  manipulationism  holds  all  the  rest  the  same.  It 
therefore avoids the problem of pre-emption since the backup cause is kept 
switched off. (Alternatively we can change the offline variables to be values 
that allow the isolation of the causal branch we are investigating.) 
So  for  instance  take  the  case  of  assessing  the  cause  of  death  in  the 
political assassination of the so called “Mad Monk”, Grigori Rasputin, who 
was famously poisoned, then shot, before eventually drowned. To recover 
our  intuition that  the  cause  of  Rasputin's  death  was  drowning we must 
neutralise the other back up potential causes of death. Otherwise, under a 
manipulation, drowning will not be a difference maker, as Rasputin would 
have died anyway. So, we imagine that he was not poisoned or shot,  we 
change  those  offline  branch  variables  and  fix  them,  and  then  alter  the 
variable  of  him  being  drowned  and  observe  the  change  in  the  output 
variable,  his  survival.  In  other  words  we  circumvent  causal  redundancy 
leading to actual causes not counting as difference making by isolating our 
potential cause from these backups to see its effect just on its own. 
In manipulationism we have to isolate branches of modal dependence, 
screen off the unwanted backup causes and effects. In chapter 6 I will argue 
this is  achieved by implicit  modelling.  In cases like Rasputin's death we 
build  a model  where we set  the  offline  variables  to  the values we wish, 
without  this  intermediate modelling stage we cannot  make sense of  this 
kind of procedure. Rather than compare possible worlds as in Lewis what 
we do is create circumscribed fictional model worlds and compare those, 
and  we  only  have  to  propagate  the  consequences  of  our  counterfactual 
changes through the elements we have chosen to build our model world out 
of.
THE ORIGINS OF MANIPULATIONIST THINKING
Manipulability theory provides a non-trivial constraint on what it is for a 
relationship to be causal,  in terms of other separate causal relationships 
and  correlational  information,  without  providing  a  reductive  analysis  of 
causality.  Woodward's  lack  of  reductionism  is  not  the  same  as  being  a 
causal  subjectivist.  Woodward  stresses  the  objectivity  of  his  account  as 
opposed  to  other  previous  manipulability  accounts,  such  as  Menzies  & 
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Price's,53 in which causation is  projected from human experience  onto the 
world. Woodward rejects any such anthropomorphism around causation, 
stating that the causal/modal structure of the world would be the same even 
if there were no humans in existence.54
Theoretical and applied science are intimately linked and the same set of 
causal thinking is present in both, grounded in the notion of controlling and 
manipulating  the  world.  The  logic  of  experimentation  is  crucial  to  
manipulationism, almost every concept in it is a canonicalisation of  the 
underpinnings of experimental practice. Woodward speculates that there is 
a great evolutionary usefulness of having a notion of causation. Understood 
in these terms, it is a fitness advantage to develop brains capable of picking 
out the sorts of  dependencies we call  causal,  if  they allow us,  in certain 
circumstances at least, to affect our environment to our advantage. Once 
established, this mode of thinking is then applied to areas where we cannot 
manipulate. 
There is great continuity between everyday and scientific explanations in 
the manipulationist view. Both use the same type of manipulationist causal 
thinking,  scientific  thinking is  simply a more complex application of  the 
same principles. This contrasts well with the DN account, in which everyday 
thinking  is  actually  derivative  of  the  more  systematized  deductive  logic 
associated with advanced science. If the DN framework is  to be believed 
then either advanced scientific explanatory practice is completely distinct 
from everyday practice, or everyday explanation somehow involves utilising 
deductive  forms  even  in  cultures  with  no  knowledge  of  deduction.  All 
cultures  have causal  thinking,  but  very  few historically  have  had  formal 
deductive  logic,  and  all  cultures  have  had  a  notion  of  explanation  long 
before any laws of nature were discovered.55 
SERIOUS POSSIBILITIES
For  a  relationship  to  be  causal  it  must  be,  conceptually  at  least, 
reproducible. That is, the link between an intervention on an input variable, 
X, and a resultant change in an output variable, Y, must be a generalization 
that  is  invariant  over  some  set  of  circumstances.56 What  Woodward's 
reproducibility criterion usefully rules out is interventions that by their very 
nature  destroy  the  causal  connection  between  two  variables.  Causal 
processes should be invariant under interventions, either deterministically, 
44
or indeterministically, where reproducibility is understood as changing the 
probability  distribution  in  the  same  way  under  the  same  intervention. 
Accidental correlations between an intervention on X and a change in Y will 
not survive the infinite set of conceptually reproducible interventions on X, 
or  in  more  concrete  examples,  the  many  replicates  of  an  experimental 
actual intervention on X. 
Causal relationships are sensitive to the choice of representation in the 
sense  that  only  “serious  possibilities”  are  usually  considered.  Given  the 
same counterfactual structure there can be two different causal structures. 
For  example,  a  doctor  in  a  hospital  fails  to  give  a  life  saving  drug to  a 
patient and the patient dies, the doctor's failure is a cause of death. Contrast 
this with the failure of someone across the street to randomly walk into the 
hospital with no medical training and by chance happen to give the correct 
dose  of  the  correct  medicine  to  the  patient.  In  both  cases  we  have  a 
difference-maker clearly identified by counterfactual considerations. In this 
sense counterfactually these two cases are the same,  but causally we only 
take one as legitimate,  as  we do not  regard the medicinal  stranger  as  a 
serious possibility. It is such a vanishingly unlikely occurrence that we do 
not  think  of  counting  it  as  a  cause;  rather  it  is  relegated  into  a  set  of 
background conditions. By contrast, the doctor's failure to give a drug he 
ordinarily would have confounds our expectations and he is held directly 
responsible. 
In a given explanatory context we always have a contrastive reference 
class to which we are explicitly or implicitly referring. The stranger does not 
feature in the explanation of the patient's death even though he contributes 
causally to it (in a trivial non-explanatory way) since the reference class is 
all of the other patients with the same disease given the life saving drug by 
other  doctors.  The  counterfactual  structure  exists  objectively  but  the 
causal/explanatory structure is contextualised to our interests which in part 
are shaped by the objective unlikelihood of certain events. This subjectivity 
is not introduced indiscriminately: once the set of serious possibilities (or 
the  reference  class)  has  been  defined,  the  counterfactual  structure 
completely  determines  what  is  allowed  to  count  as  causal  in  an 
explanation.57
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ASYMMETRY & IRRELEVANCES
In  manipulationism  explanation  is  about  providing  modal  information, 
answering  w-questions.  Woodward  is  critical  of  nomothetic  species  of 
explanation  such  as  DN  and  Railton's  DNP  account  as  they  appeal  to 
hidden structure in explanations which is not necessary for Woodward. The 
manipulability account is not a covering law model. Whilst Woodward does 
defend a usable notion of law it is the  invariance of generalisations that 
matters for explanation, not the fuzzy concept of laws. 
Explanation  is  a  matter  of  establishing  systematic  patterns  of 
counterfactual  dependence,  the  key  feature  of  an  explanation  is  that  it 
provides answers to w-questions.  A DN subsumption argument does not 
qualify necessarily as an explanation. For example: “all ravens are black” is 
not an explanation in and of itself of the colour of a raven, even though 
blackness  nomically  follows  from  being  a  raven.  Nomicity  has  nothing 
essentially to do with whether something is an explanation or not.
The  counterfactuals  of  w-questions  are  those  associated  with 
interventions. This illuminates a great advantage of manipulationism, the 
ability  to  recover  explanatory  asymmetries.  Recall  that  one  of  the  great 
weaknesses of the DN framework is that it simply cannot make a distinction 
between causes and effects. A flagpole's height is structurally linked to the 
length of it's shadow, and one can easily be deduced from the other from 
either direction. Yet when we explain the shadow in terms of the flagpole 
there  is  a  clear  sense  of  asymmetry,  manipulationism's  strength  is  to 
formalise that intuition. What depends upon what causally is determined by 
what can be manipulated. We can manipulate the height of a flagpole but 
not its shadow, the asymmetry in what can be intervened upon provides the 
foundation of our intuitions about causal asymmetry. Woodward uses the 
example of a pendulum: the length of the its string explains its period but 
not the other way around, this is because a manipulation is possible on the 
string to change the period but the period cannot be manipulated to change 
the length of the string. 
Manipulationist  thinking  can  also  account  for  how  irrelevancies  ruin 
explanations but not valid deductive arguments. Such irrelevancies prevent 
the  answering  of  w-questions.  For  example,  including  a  witch  doctor's 
hexing of salt in the premises of salt dissolving prevents one answering the 
full range of w-questions one ought to be able to about why salt dissolves. 
Whereas hexing does not invalidate a deductive argument leading to the 
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expectation that  the salt  dissolves.  Although the answers to  w-questions 
often  are  deductive  arguments  they  need  not  be,  and  this  is  another 
strength of the manipulationist account. Since causal explanation is about 
identifying modal dependencies irrelevances can obscure the crucial ability 
of  manipulations  to  tell  us  what  depends  upon  what.  Stripping  away 
irrelevancies is essential for identifying the modal structure of the world.
INVARIANCE NOT LAWS
Invariance is the key feature a general relationship must possess if it is to be 
causal  or  explanatory.  Invariance  is  itself  defined  in  terms  of  causal 
processes,  a  generalisation  must  be  invariant  under  a  special  type  of 
intervention, a testing intervention. A testing intervention is a manipulation 
of the variables designed to break a generalisation.  If  an invariance still 
holds under this then it can be an explanatory  generalisation. This is very 
important as in Woodward's scheme explanation is about providing modal 
information,  modal  information  is  determined  by  manipulations  (which 
give  explanatory  asymmetry)  and  generalised  by  invariances,  which  are 
only definable in this account in terms of manipulations. 
A generalization being invariant is a much weaker requirement than that 
of it being a law of nature. The traditional characteristics associated with 
lawhood are not those that pick out invariances. There are several points of 
contrast  with  laws.  For  one  a  generalization  does  not  have  to  be 
exceptionless.  One  of  the  problems  with  basing  accounts  of  explanation 
upon the bedrock  of  laws  is  how shaky the notion is  when it  is  closely 
examined,  especially  for  sciences  other  than  physics.  A  theory  of 
explanation should not have to wrestle with questions of whether biology, 
say, has laws. At the same time we should not have to hold that if physics 
has laws but biology does not then there is one theory of explanation in 
physics and another in biology.
A  unified  treatment  of  all  science  is  desirable,  and  this  cannot  be 
achieved if we fundamentally need laws for explanation. Invariances, unlike 
laws, do not have to have great scope. Invariance is a modal notion, it is not 
concerned with how many entities actually exist that conform to a certain 
behaviour, but rather the range over which a particular set of interventions 
on just one entity will hold. The greater the range of invariance the better 
an explanation. A good explanatory invariance could just apply to one set of 
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objects in the universe. To explain we do not need to identify universal laws 
that apply widely to many different types of system. In some cases we can 
identify highly contingent but robust invariances specific to one particular 
type of system, and to explain that system we need that invariance.
Invariances  allow  a  threshold  for  explanation  to  be  established: 
relationships  that  are  not  invariant  at  all  under  an intervention are  not 
explanatory. It also allows a relative weighting of explanations by the degree 
to which they are invariant: the more invariant the more useful they are for 
manipulation  and  control,  the  better  an  explanation  they  provide.  This 
contrasts  with  the  sharp  explanatory/unexplanatory  law/non–law 
distinction of nomothetic accounts: invariance, unlike lawfulness, comes in 
degrees.  A  generalization  need  not  be  invariant  under  all  possible 
interventions in a given context, e.g. a spring that is to obey Hooke's law 
must be invariant under a range of stretching deformations, but it does not 
have to hold if the spring is pulled apart or heated until it melts. Laws, if 
there are such things, are a special case of particularly wide invariances.
To be explanatory generalizations must be change relating. They must 
relate a change in the value of one variable to another variable. Accidental 
generalisations  or  common  cause  generalizations  may  also  be  change 
relating, but they will not be invariant under interventions. Laws need not 
be change relating generally,  hence do not  pick  out  this  key w-question 
answering feature.  As stated, to be explanatory a generalization must be 
invariant under a  testing intervention,  that  is  an intervention on X that 
should  change the value of  Y  (as  opposed to  an intervention  on X that 
doesn't  reach  a  threshold  to  change  value  of  Y).  For  example,  the 
relationship between pressing a light switch and a bulb coming on is tested 
for  invariance  by  depressing  the  button  enough  so,  according  to  the 
relationship,  under  normal  circumstances,  the  light  ought  to  come  on. 
Merely depressing the button by a shallow amount so that the circuit is not 
made whole is not a testing intervention. 58
INVARIANCE & CONJUNCTION
The manipulationist account solves the problem of theory conjunction by 
applying this invariance criterion. The arbitrary conjunction of two theories 
will not be more invariant relative to a set of variables and associated w-
questions, even though the scope of the new theory will be wider. Scope is 
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not  relevant  to  explanatory  import.  So  we  are  not  dogged  by  artificial 
chimeral theories such as thermodynamics plus evolutionary biology, which 
when added together form a wider set of possible deductions, but do not 
form  better  explanations.  In  each  field  the  other  theory  is  modally 
irrelevant.  The  ability  to  derive  one  generality  from  another  is  not  an 
indication  that  it  is  more  invariant,  invariance  is  assessed  along  a  very 
specific axis relative to a set of change relating variables.59 
The  notion  of  invariance  can  naturally  and  easily  accommodate 
regularities in the biological and social sciences without needing to seek to 
classify them as laws in order to be explanatory unlike the DN framework. 
It  correctly  distinguishes,  as  is  usual  in  scientific  practice,  between  the 
theory itself and the boundaries on the applicability of a given theory. This 
is in contrast to ceteris paribus laws that complete generalizations by listing 
the exact circumstances in which they fail. Invariance does not require this, 
it is not necessary to be able to specify the exact boundaries of a theory so 
long  as  the region  one  is  using it  in  is  one  in  which  it  is  known to  be 
applicable.  Ceteris  paribus laws  merely  include  explanatorily  irrelevant 
boundaries  in theories  themselves and hence make them vaguer.  It  is  a 
great strength of invariances to know that there are boundaries to them, but 
we do not have to know exactly where those boundaries are to use them.
The distinction between a  law and a  regularity  is  fuzzy,  but laws  are 
defensible as the most invariant generalizations that break down only in 
relatively homogeneous circumstances. Invariance is a local consideration, 
it is not required to balance global properties of simplicity and strength. It 
fits  how actual science builds up a picture of reality in a small  localised 
region, then expands it outwards to test the limits of an invariance. Again 
invariance  is  a  multi-level  concept  there  can  be  different  invariant 
generalizations  at  different  descriptive  levels,  and  hence  different 
explanatory levels.
MULTI-LEVEL EXPLANATION
Woodward advocates a multi-level sense of explanation. It is not necessary 
in order to explain a causal link to say why that causal link holds. We do not 
have to be able to give an infinite regress of causes all the way to the bottom 
to be able to identify two variables in a cause/effect relationship. Woodward 
therefore contends that a phenomenological regularity such as the ideal gas 
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law  answers  a  set  of  w-questions  and  is  explanatory  in  and  of  itself,  
separately  from  any  explanatory  frameworks  such  as  kinetic  theory.  In 
addition the thermodynamic explanation is superior in some contexts since 
it  can answer  a  wider  set  of  w-questions  relating  state  variables  than  a 
detailed micro canonical treatment allows.60 
An interesting consequence of Woodward's counterfactual explanatory 
framework is that theories or models that "lie" can still be explanatory in 
virtue  of  answering  correctly  a  relevant  set  of  w-questions.  This  is 
potentially a very attractive feature in that it allows a rigorous explication of 
what  previous  theories  have in  common with replacement  theories,  and 
why  they  can  still  persist  as  useful  explanations  even after  replacement 
theories have emerged. It is not some similarity connection or some notion 
of approximate truth that is responsible for this feature, but rather a very 
specific capturing of the correct network of relations to answer w-questions 
that  matters.  This  unavoidably  leaves  the  manipulationist  as  unable  to 
make strong realist claims about the entities necessitated by theories.61
Is explanation then just a matter of answering w-questions? For Hughes 
not all  explanations are reducible to  why questions,  many questions are 
how questions or not real  questions at  all.  Hughes gives the example of 
explaining  the  offside  rule  in  football  as  an  explanation  that  cannot  be 
reduced to a set of questions. I think this is contentious, for a start it could 
be argued that the offside rule is not an inexplicable feature of nature we 
are  trying  to  understand,  rather  it  is  a  simply  a  definition,  and  when 
someone provides an “explanation” of the offside rule they are stating the 
definition. They are not for instance, typically, explaining the history of the 
rule or how it came to be or what the law maker's intent was in making such 
a law. In addition I think the off side law does implicitly contain the seeds of 
w-questions, the law tells us under what circumstances a player is deemed 
offside,  it  answers,  or  at  least  provides  a  resource  to  answer,  modal 
questions  about  whether  the  player  would  be  offside  in  a  different 
circumstance. I think this applies to mechanistic explanations as well. Some 
have drawn (see the inferential conception of causation) a sharp distinction 
between difference making accounts of causal explanation and mechanistic 
explanation and then lumped Woodward into the former camp. I believe 
this  is  a  mistake  as  the  modal  information  captured  by  Woodward's 
conceptualisation of w-questions is not limited to showing when something 
makes a difference,  it  is  about providing the outcomes from a  series of 
50
conceptual manipulations. Some of these w-questions will be answered in 
the  negative,  and  this  is  valuable  modal  information.  I  contend  that  a 
mechanistic  explanation  is  only  explanatory  because  it  either  explicitly 
answers  w-questions  on  its  formulation  or  that  it  implicitly  does  by 
providing a resource to answer such questions. What kind of explanation 
would a putative mechanism for a phenomenon be if we couldn't use it to 
answer how and whether that phenomenon would change under a set of 
reasonable changes in variable values?
For  Hughes  we  should  not  build  why  questions  into  our  theory  of 
explanation as why questions lend themselves to contrastive grammar: why 
this rather  than  that?  But  how  possibly  questions  do  not  fit  into  this 
pattern, to use the language of van Fraassen there is no plausible contrast 
that we can associate with “How do kidneys work?”. Hughes thinks that this 
point is crucial:
The  price  paid  for  apparently  minor  artificialities  of 
translation is  a skewed account of scientific explanation 
(Hughes 2010 p 212/213).
Although Hughes is correct in this minor point he misses the wider issue, 
that both why and how questions contain elements of w-questions,  both 
must  explain  by  providing,  explicitly  in  the  case  of  a  why  question,  or 
implicitly  in  the  case  of  a  how  question,  modal  information.  The 
appropriate questions to build a theory of scientific explanation out of are 
w-questions. Mechanistic  explanations  implicitly  have  within  them  the 
seeds of many w-questions, and it is by providing us with the resources to 
answer these that they are truly explanatory rather than merely definitional.
GOOD AND BAD MODAL INFORMATION
One  overlooked  aspect  of  manipulationism  is  that  it  is  not  only  modal 
information  that  matters  in  explanation:  the  manipulationist  account  is 
designed  specifically  to  disaggregate  correlations  from  causations. 
Manipulationism is not solely about difference making either, answering a 
w-question in the negative is potentially important, and it is not grounded 
in what actually did make a difference to what but what in principle could 
make a difference if certain circumstances were to hold. Many ignore the 
importance of this in non-causal explanation assuming the relevance of this 
aspect  is  only  to  do  with  causal  explanations,  but  this  is  not  so,  the 
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relevance  is  to  do  with  the  contrast  between  genuine 
dependence/covariance and mere correlation. 
For example, in the case of the philosophically over worked barometer 
and  its  correlations  with  the  ubiquitous  storm;  Woodward's 
manipulationist  scheme  is  designed  to  separate  out  this  correlation  by 
keeping every other variable constant (that is by keeping the environmental 
conditions  etc.  constant).  By  manipulating  directly  the  reading  on  the 
barometer  we  see  that  no  storm  is  produced.  The  correlation  between 
barometer reading and storm conditions is  not invariant under a testing 
intervention,  therefore  it  is  not  explanatory.  Clearly  though  in  many 
circumstances  the  barometer  can  be  used  for  storm prediction,  because 
there is a modal correlation between storms and barometers (under usual 
circumstances).  The  barometer  does  provide  some  modal  information 
about the storm but this is not explanatory, because it is not the right sort of 
modal  information:  it  is  not  modal  information  that  relates  to  the 
counterfactual difference a change in one variable brings about in another 
under an intervention.
WESLAKE'S  ABSTRACTIVE  ACCOUNT  OF  EXPLANATORY 
DEPTH
It  is  worth  considering  at  this  point  an  addition  to  the  manipulationist 
framework due to Brad Weslake.62 He suggests that Woodward's notion of 
invariance needs to be supplemented by a concept of abstraction. Weslake 
starts from the position of wishing to defend explanatory  autonomy, the 
proposition  that  there  are  contexts  in  which  explanations  in  the  non-
fundamental  sciences  exist  independently  from  explanations  of 
fundamental physics and can sometimes be deeper in some sense.
In  the  DN  view  the  link  between  explanation  and  understanding  is 
secured by the notion of expectability. Weslake suggests that a challenge to 
the DN view is that it does not adequately discriminate between different 
notions  of  expectability.  It  gives  no  grounds  for  choosing  between  two 
different  explanations  each  of  which  render  the  explanandum  expected. 
Why  is  nomic  expectability  more  explanatory  than  any  other  kind  of 
expectability? Hempel suggests that explanatory depth can be fleshed out in 
terms  of  the  range  of  possible  phenomena  captured  by  a  nomic 
generalisation: the deeper explanation is the one that utilises the law with 
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the widest possible set of instantiations, this is the property of scope. Scope 
is inconsistent with autonomy since at the lower level more fundamental 
laws will always apply in a wider range of cases. 
Weslake  also  contends  that  Woodward's  notion  of  invariance  is 
incompatible  with  autonomy,  since  it  is  the  fundamental  laws  that  are 
maximally invariant:
In particular  for  any determinate  w-question framed in 
terms  of  the  variables  employed  by  the  fundamental 
physical explanation, the explanatory model will specify a 
determinate answer.  If  we assume a reasonable form of 
physicalism,  then  there  are  no  questions  that  can  be 
formulated  in  terms  of  any  other  variables  that  do  not 
correspond  to  one  of  those  questions.  So  there  are  no 
physically  possible  counterfactuals  on  which  the 
fundamental physical explanation is silent (Weslake, 2010 
p.283).
For  Weslake  the  value  in  higher  level  explanations  is  not  that  they 
provide extra modal information or can answer questions that lower level 
explanations  cannot,  rather  it  is  that  they  are  more  abstract,  they  are 
multiply  realisable  in  many  possible  worlds  in  which  the  lower  level 
theories  are  different.  Fundamental  level  explanations  are  more  general 
than higher level explanations in terms of scope and invariance but they are 
not more abstract. 
For instance, the ideal gas law applies to only a subset of situations that 
the more fundamental physical laws apply. However, Weslake contends, the 
ideal gas law “as a whole” is more general than the microscopic explanation. 
The ideal gas law applies to a wider range of physically possible systems 
than  the  microscopic  treatment  “which  by  hypothesis  applies  to  only  a 
single  physically  possible  system”.63 The  microscopic  physical  system  is 
hyperconcrete; it is locked in by all of the causal details of the dynamics. 
This degree to which a whole explanation applies to a range of possible (not 
merely actual) situations is  abstraction.  Abstraction for Weslake is  to be 
understood in terms of how a theory can be compatible with many other 
possible worlds. A highly abstract explanatory theory could be compatible 
with many lower level theories in other worlds, whereas a concrete theory is 
constrained to be compatible with only a limited number of worlds.64
Weslake concedes that there is likely to be no measure of abstraction. 
However,  in  a  situation  where  the  higher  level  explanation  applies  to 
multiple  concrete  fundamental  descriptions  then  the  higher  level 
description  will  be  more  abstract  than  the  fundamental  description. 
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Weslake gives the example of a square peg not fitting into a round whole as 
supervening  on  any  possible  universe  in  which  the  laws  of  rigid  bodies 
applies. Abstraction trades off against invariance. Invariance measures how 
strongly  a  generalization holds  for  a  set  of  variables.  By abstracting the 
definitions of variables to create a wider class that can be connected we may 
loose  some  of  the  strength  of  a  generalisation  but  gain  breadth  of 
applicability.  The  more  abstract  a  generalisation  the  less  invariant  it 
becomes. There is a hierarchy of concepts, explanation requires a degree of 
invariance, it does not require abstraction or scope necessarily. Scope is the 
weakest concept, many widely found regularities are not explanatory at all. 
Abstraction  lies  between  scope  and  invariance,  and  sometimes  a  small 
amount of invariance can be traded off for a greater degree of abstraction.
For many, such as in Strevens' kairetic account,65 a gain in explanatory 
power  can  never  be  achieved  by  omitting  causal  difference  makers,  but 
abstraction captures the intuition that  sometimes ignoring causal  details 
can  lead  to  a  more  explanatory  description.  By  giving  up  only  a  little 
invariance  the  class  of  situations  that  an  explanation  covers  can  be 
increased hugely. This idea is in line with scientific practice, as we shall see 
in the case study discussed in Chapter 3.
Weslake's description offers us a way of viewing a claim of Lange's, that 
examples such as dimensional explanations are “meta-laws”,  that is laws 
that constrain lower level laws. Lange states: 
This  similarity  [between  dimensional  explanation  and 
explanation  from  symmetry  principles]  suggests  that 
some  dimensional  explanations  proceed  just  like 
explanations  from  symmetry  principles  in  that  the 
explanans consists of meta-laws; principles transcending 
the first order laws and imposing restrictions on the kinds 
of first order laws there could have been (Lange 2009 p. 
38).
These  meta-laws  inform  the  nature  of  physical  laws.  Dimensional 
constraints  operate  above  the  level  of  laws  of  nature  or  standard 
invariances.  They  are  relationships  that  constrain  the  laws  of  nature 
themselves,  like  symmetry  and  conservation  principles  (such  as 
conservation of energy and momentum). Whatever the true laws of nature 
are, we can be reasonably sure that they conform to the limits set by these 
wider symmetries.66 The independence of dimensional explanations comes 
from this constraining role as meta-laws.
But should this be interpreted as a metaphysical claim about priority or 
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an epistemic claim about knowledge? If metaphysical then the claim is that 
these  principles  constrain the parameter  space of  the laws of  nature.  In 
other  worlds,  (perhaps  in  an  evolving  multiverse  model)  other  laws  of 
physics are possible but these meta-laws remain unchanging. This notion of 
constraint is potentially problematic though. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to unpack all  of  the arguments for and against Humean and anti-
Humean conceptions  of  laws  and meta-laws,  but  whatever  the status  of 
these there is a simpler more straightforward way of defending explanatory 
independence via our an epistemic claim. The epistemic claim does not say 
that  these principles  constrain the laws,  rather they are all  on the same 
metaphysical  level,  there  is  nothing  in  principle  that  demands  that  the 
universe conserve energy or momentum or connect certain dimensions in 
certain  ways.  But  we  can  say  that  modally  we  can  separate  out  these 
dimensional or symmetry principles through abstraction, just as Weslake 
argues that higher level explanations can be abstractly separated from lower 
level  explanations  without  needing  to  argue  that  biology  constrains 
quantum physics. Therefore the independence of dimensional explanations 
here comes from the abstract nature of the explanation not its ability to 
constrain the laws of nature.
PROBLEMS WITH WESLAKE'S ACCOUNT
Weslake's  particular  conception  of  abstraction  relies  on  nomically 
prohibited worlds.  For Weslake a theory is  abstract if it  applies to many 
potential but not actual worlds. Moreover these potential worlds are often 
fundamentally incompatible with our own because they have different laws 
of physics that intersect with the more abstract autonomous higher level 
laws.  Is  it  necessary to appeal to these non-actual  worlds to understand 
abstraction in our own? It is not obvious that such an appeal is required, 
and in  Chapter  5  I  shall  argue that  Weslake's  theory abstraction is  best 
understood as comparing different fictional worlds created by models. 
The idea is that we can use a fictionalist account of models to make sense 
of our multiple realisability. Instead of saying that we identify theories that 
apply across many different possible worlds we instead say that they are 
multiply realisable with respect to many fictional worlds created by models. 
That is, when we say a model M1 is more abstract than model M2 what we 
mean is that the fictional world it describes is compatible with either of the 
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fictional worlds created by models  M3 and M4, whereas the fictional world 
of model M2 is only compatible with the world of model M3 . 
Why  is  this  an  advantage?  Well  the  notion  of  a  possible  world  is  a 
potentially  metaphysically  difficult  and epistemically ambiguous concept. 
What exactly do we mean by saying that there is a possible world in which 
quantum  mechanics  doesn't  apply  but  classical  mechanics  does?  If 
quantum  mechanics  is  the  true  ontology  of  the  world  and  classical 
mechanics some ultimately incorrect misrepresentation of it, in what sense 
is it possible  the world existed with classical mechanics but not quantum 
mechanics? Even if  such a notion of  possibility  makes sense how do we 
propagate all of the consequences such a change to the ontology of a world 
would result in? Without quantum mechanics electrons cannot be stable in 
atomic orbits so does that mean our possible world has classical laws but no 
atoms and hence no bodies that obey those classical laws? It isn't obvious 
that such a possible world is really intelligible. But by instead phrasing this 
discussion in the language of models we can avoid all  these pitfalls.  The 
abstraction  of  an  explanation  concerns  our  representations  of  our  real 
world not possible worlds. To say it is possible that we have classical and 
not quantum mechanics is then to make the straightforward statement that 
we are free to construct an imaginary world with classical and not quantum 
concepts as a partial representation of our own world. 
Although  Weslake  is  correct  in  a  sense  that  a  lower  level,  more 
fundamental  explanation,  will  contain  more  modal  information,  is  this 
always the case? 
The higher-level explanations give us access to modal information about 
what doesn't make a difference in a way that the lower levels cannot; that is 
they can answer w-questions about whether tell  the explanandum would 
have held even if the lower-level laws had been different. There is no way 
for the lower level description to tell us that a change in the lower level laws 
would have had no effect. When we say that the ideal-gas law would still 
have held under classical  micro-physics  rather  than quantum mechanics 
this  involves a violation of the micro-physical laws that figure in the lower-
level explanation. How can the lower-level explanation have anything to say 
about  what  gases  would  have  been  like  under  those  micro-physically 
impossible circumstances?67
However, even if Weslake is correct and the modal information in lower 
level descriptions is greater in principle that does not mean they form better 
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explanations in practice. It is not a question of the fundamental laws being 
modally silent, rather it is that their answer is drowned out by irrelevances. 
One  of  the  great  advantages  of  Woodward's  manipulationist  account  of 
explanation is an elucidation of why adding irrelevances can detrimentally 
change the nature of a proposed explanation. Irrelevancies drown out which 
features of the system are salient for manipulation and control. Weslake 
overlooks that by transcribing all higher level w-questions into fundamental 
ones which potentially introduces a complex of irrelevant information. It is 
not  that  the  modal  information  of  higher  level  explanations  cannot  be 
present  in  the  lower  level  explanation,  it  is  that  access  to  this  modal 
information is epistemically inhibited by irrelevancies.
In addition it is far from clear that all higher level w-questions can be 
translated into lower level w-questions. From the point of view of Laplace's 
infamous demon what would a question requiring an explanation look like? 
Unless a level of precision and coarse graining is specified many mesoscopic 
objects, objects of the typical size of the life world that humans frequently 
encounter, simply cease to have definite existence at the fundamental level. 
Tables  may be made of  quarks  but formulating counterfactual  questions 
about  tables  in  terms of  the  dynamics  of  quarks is  an entirely  different 
matter.  It  requires  justification  that  any  meaningful  w-question  at  the 
higher  level  is automatically  translatable  into  a  question  able  to  be 
articulated only in terms of the fundamental level without supplying some 
coarse  graining measure  which by definition  draws its  epistemic  import 
from meso-level structure. 
In other words, even talk of the fundamental level, if it is supplemented 
by levels of precision that only make sense post-facto from higher levels, is 
not strictly speaking a fundamental description simpliciter. Rather it is a 
hybrid  w-question,  that  is  only  articulable  because  of  the  pre-existing 
language of higher level structures.68 
Weslake  dismisses  such  considerations  by  contending  that  so  called 
taxonomic  considerations  are  orthogonal  to  the  question  of  explanatory 
depth since the notion of invariance relies only upon modal import, only 
modal information is relevant to explanation. However, modal information 
is the only relevant consideration once a w-question has been asked, but 
whether  a w-question can be asked in the first place relies on taxonomic 
considerations. These taxonomic considerations form part of the basis of 
explanatory perspectives discussed in Chapter 7.
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SUMMARY
Manipulationism is a theory of explanation built around capturing modal 
information. To causally explain is to say what-depends-upon-what. This is 
achieved  in  causal  explanation  by  modally  linking  input  and  output 
variables. When we manipulate an input variable we are looking to see how 
the output variable changes. In scientific theorising and experimenting we 
develop a network of modal dependencies between variables that we can 
then use to explain. The manipulations provide a source of asymmetry in 
explanations,  we  can  only  manipulate  on  some  variables  and  this 
distinguishes them as the input parameters. Manipulations are not limited 
to interventions that we can actually perform, but are a conceptual group of 
interventions that  share  some properties  with the kinds of  interventions 
possible in experiments. Manipulations allow a special kind of explanatory 
generalisation to be defined, an invariance. Invariances are limited in scope 
but do not suffer from the conceptual difficulties associated with laws. All 
sciences have explanatory invariances.
The manipulationist account has several clear advantages over its rivals. 
It fits scientific practice very well and does not require concepts such as 
laws  of  nature  to  be  defined  rigorously.  It  can  accommodate  deductive 
explanations,  but does not require them, and avoids needing to rule out 
negative causation or needing to specify just one type of physical process 
that  can  be  considered  a  cause.  Woodward's  framework  contrasts 
favourably  with  Salmon's  causal  mechanical  and  Kitcher's  unificationist 
alternatives.  Salmon's  notion of  mark transmission,  or  Dowe's  notion of 
conserved  quantity  exchange,  as  candidates  for  the  fundamental  causal 
notion  encounter  problems  the  manipulationist  does  not.  If  a  cue  ball 
strikes another  ball  it  may transmit  many different marks,  or  conserved 
quantities, but nothing in the causal mechanical theory picks out which of 
these is explanatorily relevant. Manipulationism does. 
Similarly, the manipulationist account avoids the problem of counting 
the number of  deductive patterns in Kitcher's  unificationist  account  and 
does  not  have  the  problem  of  determining  how  an  individual's  causal 
knowledge is gained from a wider societal causal systematization. Causal 
knowledge  is  gained  primarily  from  manipulating  the  world  around  us, 
either as a community or as individuals.
The focus of this thesis will  be to generalise manipulationism to non-
causal explanations and in the process to shed some new light on the causal 
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framework  as  well.  Woodward  himself  briefly  addresses  extending  his 
manipulationist framework to non-causal cases. He discusses a proposed 
mathematical model explanation of the stability of planetary orbits which 
invokes the dimensionality of spacetime:
Does  the  dimensionality  of  space-time  explain  why  the 
planetary  orbits  are  stable?  On  the  one  hand,  this 
suggestion  fits  well  with  the  idea  that  explanations 
provide  answers  to  what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions on one natural interpretation; we may think of 
the derivation as telling us what would happen if space-
time were five dimensional, and so on. On the other hand, 
it  seems  implausible  to  interpret  such  derivations  as 
telling  us  what  will  happen under  interventions  on  the 
dimensionality of space-time (Woodward, 2003, p 220).
[T]he  common  element  in  many  forms  of  explanation, 
both  causal  and  non-causal,  is  that  they  must  answer 
what-if-things-had-been-different  questions.  When  a 
theory tells us how Y would change under interventions 
on X we have...  a causal explanation. When a theory or 
derivation  answers  a  what-had-things-been-different 
question but we cannot interpret this as an intervention, 
we  may  have  a  noncausal  explanation  of  some  sort 
(Woodward, 2003, p 221).
So we are to regard those explanations that answer w-questions which 
can be categorised in terms of interventions as causal and those that cannot 
be regarded as non-causal. As such the use of interventions themselves is 
the  demarcation  of  causal  and  non-causal  processes.  We  shall  see  in 
Chapter 4 that Alisa Bokulich has advocated a similar approach in relation 
to structural model explanations which do not fit the causal bill. 
I will contest this intuition: in extending manipulationism to non-causal 
cases I hope to convince the reader that manipulations are a crucial concept 
for model explanations in general,  both causal  and non-causal,  and that 
furthermore an extension of manipulationism that removes manipulations 
in the way Woodward suggests cannot straightforwardly work. By removing 
interventions we can no longer define invariances and we lose many of the 
accomplishments of manipulationism. However, before that we shall first 
consider a case study in non-causal  explanation from theoretical  biology 
and  contrast  this  with  a  paradigmatic  case  of  causal  manipulationist 
explanation.
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3 | OF MICE AND FRACTALS
 
As we have seen, Woodward's account of explanation rests upon two key 
interrelated concepts,  intervention and invariance.  An intervention is  by 
definition  a  causal  process  in  Woodward's  framework  and  moreover 
effectively  operates  to  characterize  causality  without  offering a  reductive 
analysis  of  it.  Invariance  is  defined  by  robustness  under  testing 
interventions, without a concept of intervention, invariance, as presented 
by Woodward, cannot be defined. It will be instructive to consider a case of 
causal regularity explanation within the manipulationist framework so that 
we  can  see  how  these  concepts  interact  in  practice.  One  such  example 
Woodward himself uses is a derivation of the electric field at a certain point 
from a long straight conducting wire, using Coulomb's law. 
A  CAUSAL  CASE  STUDY:  COULOMB'S  LAW  FOR  A 
CONDUCTING WIRE
One  of  Woodward's  paradigmatic  cases  is  the  use  of  Coulomb's  law  to 
derive and explain the intensity of electric field around a long thin wire at a 
canonical  distance69.  Woodward  does  not  regard  Coulomb's  law  as  a 
genuine law in the strictest sense as it has exceptions (it is only applicable 
in the classical regime for instance).  Rather,  it  is a generalisation that is 
invariant under a range of testing interventions. Woodward describes how 
this  generalisation  is  used  as  the  starting  point  to  integrate  over  the 
contributions to the electric field made by small current elements of the 
wire, using approximations and idealisations to provide limiting boundary 
conditions which result in the final expression. 
Consider  the  explanation  of  the  expression  for  the  electric  field  at  a 
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perpendicular distance r from a straight wire. 
The field is given by:
where  is the charge per unit length of the wire. We subdivide the wire 
into infinitesimal segments of length and charge, and using Coulomb's law 
see that the charge element dq will result at a point P a distance s from the 
element, in a field of magnitude:
Integrating the x and y components of dE separately we have:
Substituting we have:
Shifting to polar co-ordinates:
E= 1
2π
λ
r
dE= 1
4πε
dq
s2
E x=∫ dE x=∫ dEsin (θ) E y=∫dE y=∫ dEcos(θ)
dE= 1
4πε
λdx
s2
dq=λ dx
x=rtanθ s=rsec θ dx=rsec2θd θ
dx
dE x
dE y
s
r
P
x
dE
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Hence:
By assuming that the wire is infinite in length we can specify the integration 
limits as
integrating we obtain:
So the field is perpendicular to the wire and its intensity is given by:
What  we  have  then  is  a  mathematical  derivation.  An  invariant 
generalisation  is  selected,  in  this  case  an  empirically  observed  physical 
generalisation. Then the generalisation is applied to a special case, a small 
element of the wire. Next the special case is extended to a more general 
case.  During  this  stage  boundary  conditions  are  applied,  involving 
approximations and idealisations. For example, the conductor is assumed 
to be infinitely long. The final result is deduced. In Woodward's example 
the electric field of a long straight wire is given a precise expression and 
explanation  due  to  its  derivation  from  the  starting  generalisation,  it  is 
shown to be a natural outcome of Coulomb's law.
What  makes  this  deduction  explanatory  (unlike  classification  based 
deductions such as “all ravens are black, Fred is a raven, so he is black”) is 
that it can answer a series of counterfactuals, the w-questions. For instance 
E x=
1
2π
λ
r∫ sin θd θ
E y=
1
2π
λ
r∫cosθ d θ
θ=0 θ=π/2
E x=0
E y=
1
2πε
λ
r
E= 1
2π
λ
r
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the shape of the conductor can be changed and we can calculate how the 
electric  field  will  change  as  a  result.  These  derivations  are  not 
straightforward,  one  would  have  to  be  familiar  with  calculus  and 
electromagnetic theory to be able to propagate a change in conductor shape 
to a change in field strength, so wider explanatory resources are required to 
answer the w-questions .
The Coulomb example can also tell us which changes will not propagate 
into  the  electric  field.  For  instance,  the  material  of  the  conductor  is 
irrelevant as long as it does conduct, and the history of the manufacture of a 
conducting wire is irrelevant for describing its field. If these variables are 
changed the field will not alter. The explanation implicitly tells us that these 
factors are irrelevant by not citing them in the explanans. 
A NON-CAUSAL CASE STUDY: ALLOMETRIC SCALING LAWS 
IN BIOLOGY
Having  now  established  the  apparatus  of  Woodward's  manipulationist 
theory of causal explanation, it is natural to see if it can be extended to  
include non-causal explanations as well.70 A non-causal explanation does 
not  necessarily  imply  that  the  explanandum  is  itself  not  expressible  in 
causal terms.  One species of non-causal explanation, which will provide a 
case study here for testing the flexibility of the manipulationist theory, is 
that of geometric explanations and these types of explanations often come 
up in biology. 
An illustrative case study in how the abstraction away from causal details 
to non-causal structural features can be explanatory can be found in the 
explanation  of  a  surprising  generality  across  the  biological  world,  an 
allometric scaling law. Generally speaking, a scaling law71 is simply a rule 
that  describes how one variable is  proportionally dependent on another. 
Most take the form of straightforward power laws: the dependent variable 
changes in proportion to the independent variable raised to some power.72 
As  Wiesenfeld73 puts  it:  “Scaling  laws...have  a  fundamental  importance 
since  they often-some would  say  always-reflect  a  deep  symmetry  in  the 
underlying physics.”
There  are  many  examples  of  scaling  laws.  Earthquakes  obey  the 
Gutenberg-Richter  law,  relating  the  probability  of  an  earthquake  to  the 
energy released by it. Hubble's law relates the recession speed of galaxies to 
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their  distance  from  an  observer.  Zipf's  law  describes  the  appearance 
frequency of words in a sufficiently representative piece of text, regardless 
of the language the text is  written in.  The fireball  radius of an exploded 
atom bomb grows with time to the power 5/2 and so on. Kleiber's rule in 
biology is another example of a scaling law.
KLEIBER'S RULE
Scaling laws have long been applied in biology. In 1891 the term “allometry” 
was  first  used  by  Otto  Snell  to  characterise  the  relation  between 
mammalian body and brain masses. Many so called allometric scaling laws 
relating quantities to body mass have since been discovered. In 1932 Max 
Kleiber74 analysed the relationship between body mass and basal metabolic 
rate  across  a  wide  range  of  mammal  and  bird  species.  He  discovered, 
unexpectedly, that basal metabolic rate scaled as the three-quarter power of 
body  mass  instead  of  the  two-thirds  power  that  was  expected  from 
Euclidean  scaling.  In  the  1980s  several  independent  investigations  by 
Calder,75 McMahon & Bonner,76 Peters77 and others, extended the scope of 
Kleiber's rule to total metabolic rate and to a vast and heterogeneous range 
of organisms, from bacteria, through plants, to blue whales. In total a whole 
27  orders  of  magnitude  of  body  size are  spanned  by  the  three-quarter 
power law relation.
Kleiber's  rule for metabolic rates is  just one example of an allometric 
scaling  law.  Despite  the  wide  heterogeneity  of  organism  structures  and 
functions  many  biological  processes  possess  near  universal  allometric 
dependencies upon body mass, regardless of class or taxonomic grouping. 
Moreover many of these scaling laws manifest themselves, just as Kleiber's 
rule does, as multiples of one-quarter. Examples include lifespan (~1/4) ,  
heart  rate  (~-1/4),  DNA Nucleotide  substitution  rate  (~-1/4),  lengths  of 
aortas  and  heights  of  trees  (~1/4),  cerebral  grey  matter  mass  (~5/4), 
densities of mitochondria, chloroplasts and ribosomes (~-1/4) and the time 
taken  by  an  electrical  impulse  generated  in  the  sinoaterial  node  to 
propagate  from  atria  to  ventricles,  the  so  called  electrocardiogram  PR 
interval, in mammals.78 Hearts as different in size as those of blue whales 
and field mice exhibit the same scaling with respect to body mass for their 
PR Intervals (~1/4).
These  allometries  also  lead  to  the  emergence  of  several  invariant 
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quantities  in  biological  systems.79 For  instance  mammalian  lifespan,  on 
average, increases as body mass to the one-quarter power. Heart-rate varies 
inversely with mass to the one-quarter, so the average number of heartbeats 
per  lifetime  is  approximately  invariant:  about  one  and  a  half  billion, 
independent  of  species.  Another  invariance  manifests  itself  ecologically: 
since  population  density  decreases  with  body  mass  to  the  three-quarter 
power and power usage increases with mass to the three-quarter power the 
total  energy  used  by  individuals  on  average  in  a  given  population  is 
constant.80
Geoffrey  West,  a  physicist  at  Los  Alamos  National  Laboratory  (who 
previously worked on scaling laws in the strong nuclear force),  and two 
biologists at the University of New Mexico, Jim Brown and Brian Enquist, 
have  collaborated  to  apply  the  tools  of  scaling  analysis  from physics  to 
biology.
As  previously  stated,  before  Kleiber's  discovery  it  was  expected  that 
metabolic  rate  would  follow  Euclidean  scaling.  Body  mass  scales  with 
volume, but since it is external surface area that determines heat exchange 
rates,  metabolic  rates  were expected to  scale as  the two-thirds power of 
body mass. However natural selection has overcome the limits of Euclidean 
geometric scaling. The ubiquity of quarter-power scaling laws suggests the 
presence of underlying mechanisms or constraints which act independently 
of the specific evolutionary history of a given species and West, Enquist and 
Brown have proposed that the commonality of fractal like structures and 
self-similarity in the natural world can explain the emergence of quarter-
power dependencies. 
At its most basic an object is self-similar if some part of it recreates the 
structure  of  the  whole  object.  The  natural  world  abounds  with 
approximately self-similar structures: the manner in which tree branches 
bifurcate and recreate the same patterns in smaller and smaller layers of 
branches,  or  the way networks of  nerve dendrites repeat the same basic 
patterns.  This  fact  is  proposed  as  an  explanation  of  quarter-power 
allometric scaling.
In a bid to convince biologists of their methodology, West et al. state:
The self-similar power law scaling implies the existence of 
averaged, idealized biological systems, which represent a 
'0th order' baseline or point of departure for understanding 
the  variation  among  real  biological  systems.  Real 
organisms  can  be  viewed  as  variations  on,  or 
perturbations  from,  these  idealized  norms,  due  to 
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influences of stochastic factors, environmental conditions 
or evolutionary histories (West & Brown, 2005 p.1576).
West, Brown, & Enquist propose several different fractal based models 
which  apply  to  mammals81 or  plants82 but  they  have  have  also  derived 
quarter-power  scaling  from  a  general  geometric  argument  that  is  very 
abstract.83 It relies on the assumption that organisms have been selected to 
maximise fitness by maximising metabolic capacity, given the constraint of 
a compact body, and that their internal structure is composed of volume 
filling fractals.
FRACTALS
Benoît Mandelbrot84 was the first to demonstrate the commonality of self-
similarity  in  the  natural  world  and  to  provide  a  precise  mathematical 
analysis of such shapes in terms of fractals. A fractal is a mathematically 
idealised self-similar shape; magnifying the original shape by a given factor 
reproduces  the  original  object.  Fractals  are  scale  invariant.  If  under 
magnification the characteristic length scale changes by a factor b, and N is 
the factor by which the number of basic component units increases in each 
magnification,  then  the  object  is  said  to  have  a  fractal  dimension  D, 
characterised by N = bD.
Mandelbrot established that the fractal dimension of a surface, A, is 2 + 
εA, where εA  is within the range 0 and 1 (inclusive). Analogously, the fractal 
dimension of a length, L, is given by 1+ εL where εL is also between 0 and 1. 
0 corresponds to the Euclidean limit and  1 is the maximum fractal limit. 
The fractal dimension of a volume, and therefore mass if density is assumed 
to be constant, will be given by 3+ εA+ εL. So, at maximum fractality a two-
dimensional surface area can fill as if it were a three-dimensional volume 
(an example of this would be the way sheets fill the volume of a washing 
machine, the surface area of the crumpled sheets scaling as a cube, not a 
square power).
West, Enquist and Brown's model assumes that biological systems have 
evolved  to  maximally  fill  available  space  through  fractal  self-similarity. 
Organisms are fractal-like since they do not infinitely repeat regardless of 
scale,  instead the self  replication terminates at a finite size.  Hierarchical 
fractal-like  branching  networks  distribute  energy  and materials  between 
macroscopic  reservoirs  and  microscopic  sites.  Examples  include  animal 
66
circulatory  and  respiratory  systems,  plant  vascular  systems  and  inter-
cellular networks. West et al. propose that quarter-power allometric scaling 
reflects a confluence of geometrical and biological constraints. 
Firstly:  networks  are  space-filling  in  order  to  supply  all  biologically 
active subunits. Secondly: the terminal units of the network are invariant, 
capillary  size  does  not  vary  from  person  to  person,  for  instance.  These 
terminal units (leaves, capillaries, cells, chloroplasts etc.) are not rescaled 
as  individuals  grow  or  species  evolve,  just  as  buildings  are  supplied  by 
networks that end in invariant units that do not vary in size from building 
to building, such as electrical sockets or taps. In biology, natural selection 
has optimised these terminal nodes and they are frozen into the system. 
Thirdly:  network  performance  is  maximised  by  minimising  the  energy 
required for resource distribution given the constraint of a finite body size. 
The  invariant  terminal  units  are  fed  by  area-preserving  branching 
networks. If a branch is split into two daughter branches then the sum of 
the cross-sectional areas of the two branches equals the area of the parent 
branch. Because of this, nutrients move at a constant rate throughout the 
organism.
Although West  et  al. have constructed detailed  dynamical  models  for 
mammalian circulatory and respiratory systems and plant vascular systems 
they have also presented a more general argument to explain Kleiber's rule 
of  metabolic  scaling  which  relies  especially  heavily  on  the  ways  fractal 
dimensionality modifies the apposite geometrical constraints. In this case a 
geometric  constraint  is  of  central  explanatory  importance,  namely  that 
many  biological  systems  fill  volumes  as  if  they  were  four  dimensional 
objects, and it is this that leads to the ubiquity of quarter-power exponents. 
It  is  this  simpler and more general  argument  that  will  be considered in 
detail  here.  (For the reader wishing to sidestep the mathematical  details 
please skip ahead to the section "Summary of West's model".)
GEOMETRIC EXPLANATION OF QUARTER-POWER SCALING 
LAWS: THE MODEL OF WEST, ENQUIST & BROWN
Across a wide range of species ,from microbes to blue whales, there is an 
allometric scaling relation of the form: 
Where  M  is  the  mass  of  an  organism;  Y0  varies  across  species  but  the 
Y=Y 0M
b
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exponent b is always a quarter fraction, for example relating metabolic rate 
to  body  mass  b  =  3/4,  for  heartbeat  rates  to  body  mass  b  =  1/4,  and 
diameters  of  tree  trunks  to  body  mass  b  =  3/8.  West  et  al. propose  a 
canonical  geometric  explanation  for  this  1/4  dependence  which  is 
independent  of  specific  anatomical  structure  and  applies  across  many 
taxonomies. Their starting assumption is that many organisms have been 
selected to maximise fitness  by maximising metabolic  capacity given the 
constraint of a compact body.
THE EUCLIDEAN REGIME
Consider the external surface area A and volume V of an organism. A is a 
function of the various length scales of the organism in question, Li which 
parametrise size and shape:
where G and Φ are dimensionless unknown functions. Let:
where  Λ is  an arbitrary  number,  this  similarity  transform preserves  the 
shape of the object as it varies with size, therefore:
assuming a size invariant uniform density then length and area scale with 
mass as 1/3 and 2/3 respectively. This result should apply to limb size in 
vertebrates, for example.
A=AL1 , L2 , ..=L1
2G L2/L1 , L3/L1 , ..
V=V L1 , L2 ,..=L1
3 L2/L1 , L3/L1 , ..
Li Li
'= Li
V V '= 3V L1 , L2 , ...A A'= 2 AL1 , L2 ,...
A
V 2 /3
= A
'
V ' 2 /3
 A∝V 2 /3
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THE FRACTAL REGIME
Unlike external features metabolic processes rely on fractal-like resource 
distribution  networks.  Although  organisms  vary  widely  in  size,  these 
networks  terminate  at  invariant  units  of  fixed size  in  each  case.  In  this 
internal structure the relevant variables are the effective exchange area for 
resources, a, and the total volume of biologically active material, v. Both of 
these are very difficult to calculate but this analysis only depends on the 
similarity scaling. The effective surface area is a function of this invariant 
length l0 and various independent length scales li (i = 1, 2...N). For example, 
two people of different height will have different characteristic limb lengths 
etc.  but  will  have  the  same  smallest  unit  of  lung  alveoli.  The  similarity 
scaling proceeds as before: 
where g is a dimensionless parameter. If we were in the Euclidean case we 
could proceed as before, i.e.:
However,  in  the  fractal  case  we  don't  know  the  λ  dependence  of  g 
straightforwardly, but it can be parametrised as a power law and assuming 
a fractal structure this leads to:
where da can be interpreted as the fractal dimension of the system, da  = 2 is 
the Euclidean case;  da =  3 is  the limit  of  maximum fractality where the 
effective area scales as if it were a conventional volume. Similarly for the 
biological volume:
a=a l0 , l1 , l2 , ..= l1
2 g  l0/ l 1 , l 2/ l 1 , ..
aa '=a l 0 , l1 , l 2 , ..=
2 l1
2g l 0/ l 1 , l 2/ l1 ,..
l i l i
'= li i=1, 2,3...
g l0/ l 1 , l2/ l1 ,..=
a g l 0/ l1 , l2 /l 1, ...
0a≤1
a '= 2aa l 0 ,l 1 , ...=
d aa l 0 , l 1 , ...
v=v l 0 , l 1 , l 2 , ..=l 1
3l 0/ l1 , l2 /l 1 , ..
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hence: 
The  volume  can  be  related  to  the  effective  area  by  some  characteristic 
length of the system l
Metabolic rate is proportional to the effective surface area and assuming 
constant density we have:
Where:
West et al. 's assumption is that b is maximised, this occurs when εa = 1 and 
εl =  0,  therefore b =  3/4.  This  limit  corresponds to maximum fractality. 
Organisms have exploited an effective fourth spatial dimension by evolving 
hierarchical  fractal-like  structures.  Biological  volume  scales  as  a  fourth 
power. This is found regardless of the details of the branching architecture 
and  specific  dynamics  governing  metabolic  processes.  It  applies  to  all 
l0 / l 1 , l 2/ l1 ,..=
vl 0/ l1 , l2 /l 1, ...
v v'=v l 0 , l 1 , l2 ,..=
3v v l 0 , l 1,...
a
v2a/3v
=
a '
v ' 2a /3v
 a∝v 2a /3v
v=al
l=l l 0, l 1,...=l 1 l 0/ l1, l 2/ l 1,...
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organisms that have maximised metabolic power under the constraint of 
minimising  internal  transport  distances.  These  systems  have  evolved 
independently, on multiple occasions, in many different areas. This scaling 
result can be generalised for effectively 1 or 2-dimensional organisms, such 
as roundworms or flatworms, as:
where D is dimensionality of the system. These arguments do not apply to 
filamentous algae of fungi which maximise their linear distribution. West et 
al. state that previous dynamical models achieving similar results in specific 
instances  should  be  viewed as  “manifest  examples  which  show how the 
more  universal  geometric  argument...is  realized  in  specific  network 
systems.”  Although all  of  life  is  embedded in  a  3  dimensional  space  its 
internal structures operate as effectively higher dimensional spaces due to 
the use of fractal structures. 
West concludes: “[I]t is testimony to the severe geometric...constraints 
on metabolic processes which have dictated that all of these organisms obey 
a common set of scaling laws."85 
West, Enquist and Brown's proposal raises many interesting questions. 
Their explanation abstracts away from the particular evolutionary history of 
a given organism, and hence from any concretely realised causal chain of 
events. A more general explanation is provided in terms of the non-causal 
geometric constraints that are apposite for all  of the species that exhibit 
quarter-power  scaling  allometries.  Geometry  is  a  relevant  constraint  of 
what is possible, but particularly in this case. The geometric constraint is 
unexpected, it is not a priori, and unifies an aspect of nature that would 
otherwise  be  mysterious.  Moreover,  the  model  of  West  et  al.  allows  w-
questions  to  be  asked,  since  it  explicitly  treats  the  cases  of  three,  and 
effectively  two-dimensional  creatures.  It  therefore  makes  reasonable  a 
whole series of counterfactuals relating to changing the dimensionality of 
the system. A whole class of counterfactuals regarding manipulations which 
may have seemed too imprecise or vague to have definitive answers in this 
context are made intelligible. 
a∝M
D
D1
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SUMMARY OF WEST'S MODEL
West et al.'s model can be summarised as follows. We have a regularity in 
the  world  that  needs  explaining:  1/4  power  scaling.  We  explain  it  by 
identifying a common process for many organisms, namely that  they fill 
their volumes using self-similar transport structures. West et al. derive the 
1/4  power  scaling  exponent  from  the  assumption  that  the  volumes  of 
organisms are  filled  by approximately  self-similar  fractal  like  structures, 
under the constraint of maximising transport efficiency for finite body size.
Self  similar  physical  objects  are  a  de-idealised  approximation  to 
absolutely self-similar fractals,  hence the mathematical  limits  of fractals, 
specifically how efficiently they can fill volumes, provide an absolute upper 
limit upon the physical internal packing of organisms by fractal-like means. 
It  is  an  open  question  whether  this  should  be interpreted  as  a  form of 
mathematical  explanation  or  the  mathematics  is  a  place-holder  for  the 
physical geometric constraints on what is possible, in either case it is not a 
causal explanation.
West  et  al.  produce  a  general  expression  that  applies  across  many 
species, it also applies to species which are effectively two dimensional (in 
that  their  internal  transport  networks  are  planar)  such  as  flatworms. 
Therefore the model can answer w-questions about how the dimensionality 
of an organism affects metabolic scaling.
They regard their explanation as a “zeroth-order” model: specific species 
will  have corrections around the 1/4 scaling for specific reasons,  but the 
general  trend  is  explained  by  the  common  occurrence  of  self-similar 
transport  networks  across  many  species  and  the  upper  bound  on  their 
efficiency placed by the limits of fractal geometry. 
Their  model  displays  many  features  common  to  model  explanations. 
They abstract and idealise not just for convenience and tractability, but also 
to define variable sets. To show that at some level of abstraction the vastly 
different  organisms  they  model  are  the  same  kind  of  entity.  These 
abstractions  cannot  be  removed  and  leave  the  explanation  intact.  The 
model is not a place-holder for a more realistic model, and although other 
realistic  models  can  be  provided,  that  does  not  change  the  explanatory 
nature of this abstract geometrical model. West et al.'s model explains by 
capturing modal information and answering w-questions,  some of  which 
could not be asked without the degree of abstraction they build into the 
mode.  For  example,  we  could  not  see  the  dependence  on  organism 
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dimensionality from a model which treated the individual organisms more 
realistically and heterogeneously. 
SIMILARITIES  AND  DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  THE  TWO 
CASES
The  two  examples  follow  a  similar  pattern,  a  regularity  is  used  as  the 
starting point for a mathematical derivation, the result of the derivation is a 
model  system  that  can  be  used  to  answer  a  set  of  w-questions.  In  the 
conducting wire case we can manipulate the charge distribution of the wire 
or its geometry to alter the intensity of the electric field. Irrelevances are 
ignored as it is the charge distribution/geometry of the conductor that is 
important not, say, the material of the conductor. The shape of the charge 
distribution  is  all  that  matters,  and  the  explanation  shows  how  the 
geometry  of  the  charge  distribution  is  what  determines  the  shape  and 
strength of  the electric  field.  Manipulations are possible in the Coulomb 
case and are the source of explanatory asymmetry. We can manipulate the 
wire but not the field.
Almost straightforwardly in some respects the allometric case follows a 
similar pattern. The derivation shows that  a generality can be explained 
(1/4  power  scaling).  It  identifies  which  elements  of  the  explanation  are 
irrelevant,  and  West  uses  a  mathematical/geometrical  constraint, 
Mandelbrot's limit on self similar packing, instead of a physical regularity, 
Coulomb's law, to answers a series of w-questions.
However, can we interpret this scaling law case in interventionist terms? 
There  are  several  different  types  of  w-question  that  West's  model  can 
answer and we must be careful to delineate their status with respect to the 
manipulationist framework. 
TO MANIPULATE OR NOT TO MANIPULATE? THAT IS THE 
QUESTION....
The first potential disanalogy between these cases is that the variables that 
are modally linked are very different. In the Coulomb case variables such as 
wire geometry are straightforwardly manipulable. In the allometric case the 
variables  are  more  problematic.  Is  the  dimensionality  of  a  species 
interpretable in interventionist terms? 
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Firstly recall the non-causal example Woodward himself has considered, 
the link between spacetime dimensionality and planetary orbital stability. 
In this  the  variables,  the number of  spacetime dimensions we have,  are 
clearly not manipulable. Variables such as this are global in character, one 
solar  system  with  stable  planets  cannot  have  a  different  number  of 
dimensions  from  another.  Variables  like  this  are  not  analogous  with 
experimental  manipulations.  Experiments  are  fundamentally  local  in 
character, the logic of experimentation requires isolating a sub-section of 
the world to examine it.
Unlike  this  dimensionality  of  spacetime  example,  the  dimensions  of 
organisms  are  the  variables  in  the  allometric  case.  These  are  local  in 
character; a particular organism has a local effective dimensionality, in the 
sense that it is isolatable from other dimensions in time and space. We do 
after all have variation in nature of the dimensionality of organisms. Nature 
has provided us with data points, such as flatworms that are essentially 2-
dimensional. Manipulationism is not limited to just those interventions we 
can  actually perform,  and  one  source  of  knowledge  of  the  effects  of 
manipulations  we  cannot  perform  is  natural  variation  in  systems  with 
respect to the relevant variable. This local aspect to the allometric variables 
means that we can think of altering them as an intervention. If flatworms as 
a species altered over time to be 3-dimensional then the scaling of flatworm 
metabolism would also alter accordingly. 
CONTEXTUALISATION OF COUNTERFACTUALS
A second objection to understanding the scaling law case in manipulationist 
terms  is  that  Woodward  is  very  clear  that  any  counterfactuals  must  be 
intelligible, and he is deeply sceptical that scaling laws provide intelligible 
counterfactuals.
[T]here  is  no  well  defined  notion  of  intervention  that 
consists in changing whether an organism is a mammal or 
a polar  bear,  such classificatory  schemes do not convey 
information that is relevant to manipulation and control 
and do not figure in the answers to a range of w-questions 
(Woodward, 2003, p. 364).
Woodward stresses counterfactuals have to be understandable and raises 
deep suspicions of what he dubs “other-object” counterfactuals. These are 
claims  that  involve  linking  two  radically  different  types  of  things 
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counterfactually, often in an unintelligible way, e.g. “If Bill Clinton was a 
doughnut he would be custard rather than jam”. Such statements are not 
sensible counterfactuals,  they  cannot  be  described  in  manipulationism 
because they link completely different types of entities. They are entirely 
metaphorical and there is no clear transparent metric for judging the effect 
of a manipulation. Woodward often cites as illegitimate counterfactuals that 
involve changing one biological organism into another, or altering radically 
the properties of an organism. 
West's model is highly abstract, irrelevant differences are ignored and so 
(nearly)  all  species  types are  treated as  essential  the same in  the model 
(apart from the few relevant variables such as body mass, metabolic rate 
etc.).  Just  as  all  conducting wires  are treated as the same in a textbook 
derivation of the electric field due to a wire because the conducting material  
makes no difference to the outcome or the logic of the explanation. Species 
and  organisms  are  the  same  when  viewed  from  the  point  of  view  of 
abstracted variables  in  the model  because differences  in  their  particular 
physiologies  make no difference in  the explanans.  In effect  they are  the 
same  kind  of  object  and  the  counterfactuals  involved  in  West  et  al.’s 
explanation need not be unintelligible. Or more precisely, we have created 
an consistent  metric  for  assessing the effects  of  manipulations  on  these 
organisms by defining an appropriate axis of variation. Abstractions allow 
us to unify seemingly disparate kinds of entities into a single class, and to 
therefore make them the object of counterfactual investigation.
Woodward's restriction on the intelligibility of counterfactuals is correct 
but it must be subtly applied, and the notion of same-object depends upon 
the axes of variation with a particular explanans. The differences between 
the composition of wires may be highly relevant in other explanations of 
different phenomena. Hence, treating them as the same for the purposes of 
evaluating  counterfactuals  may  be  illegitimate  in  some  explanatory 
contexts, but in this particular case these differences don't matter. They are 
the  same class  of  object  relative  to  a  particular  set  of  w-questions.  We 
contextualise  the  notion  of  same  object  relative  to  the  needs  of  an  
explanandum. That is to say, to access a set of counterfactual information 
we  need  a  metric  for  variation  of  properties,  so  relative  to  an  axis  of 
variation a  class  of  objects  can be the same (even though they are  very 
diverse in other respects), and what an appropriate axis of variation  is is 
determined by our explanatory requests.
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In West's  model  nearly  all  species  of  a  particular  effective dimension 
form a homogeneous reference class. The relevant axis of variation is the 
dimensionality of the organism, and West's model picks this out. It answers 
a  series  of  w-questions  which  can  be  interpreted  intelligibly  in 
counterfactual terms.
CAUSAL OR NON-CAUSAL?
If the allometric model has intelligible counterfactuals and variables which 
can be interpreted as interventions then should it  be viewed as a causal 
explanation? I believe not; and the reason is to be found in the explanatory 
generalisation  invoked.  In  the  allometric  case  the  explanatory 
generalisation is a mathematical principle: the limit on volume filling due to 
fractals.  There  is  no  sense  of  this  being  a  physical  causal  law  or  an 
invariance  in  the  manipulationist  sense  as  there  is  no  possible  testing 
intervention in Woodwardian terms. We cannot ever intervene on fractals 
to determine if this mathematical rule breaks down for some fractals rather 
than others. We know the rules of fractal dimensions through means other 
than  testing  interventions,  so  the  nature  of  the  generalisation  is  not  an 
invariance.  The explanation as  a whole works because of the interaction 
between causal factors and structural constraints placed upon the system. 
These structural geometric constraints prevent the explanation from being 
purely causal. 
We have then  three  cases.  Firstly  a  causal  explanation:  the  Coulomb 
wire.  Secondly,  a  fully  non-causal  explanation:  the  stability  of  planetary 
orbits in terms of space-time dimensionality. Thirdly, the allometric scaling 
law  case,  which  includes  causal  elements  and non-causal  elements.  The 
Coulomb case uses an empirical law to relate two variables, charge and field 
strength, and we can manipulate charge causally to change field strength. 
The  space-time dimensionality  case  relates  the  dimensionality  of  space-
time to planetary stability. We cannot manipulate causally the dimension of 
space-time to see if the stability changes. The scaling law case relates the 
effective space-filling dimensionality of an organism to its metabolic scaling 
exponent,  using  a  mathematical/geometrical  constraint  and  we  can 
manipulate to answer some of our w-questions along this explanatory axis.
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FURTHER W-QUESTIONS
In the allometric case are we limited to just asking w-questions that relate 
to variables that can be interpreted in interventionist terms? After all, in the 
space-time case we have modal information about what depends upon what 
but no manipulations. The allometric case also provides modal information 
about changes which are not interventions.  We have a model that mixes 
causal  and non-causal  aspects,  and presents  a set  of modal connections. 
Some of  those modal connections,  those answers to w-questions,  can be 
linked  to  interventions,  some cannot.  Yet  the  model  seems  to  make  no 
distinction in  the modal  information it  gives  us  along these  lines.  If  we 
change the fractal limit then the model tells us what the resulting change 
would be for metabolic scaling relationships. This counterlegal alteration of 
a geometric constraint is not an intervention though. 
To anticipate chapter 6,  I  believe the best way of viewing all  three of 
these  examples  is  as  model  explanations.  If  we  define  a  sense  of 
intervention  that  is  de-coupled  from  causal  processes,  that  applies 
internally to models, then all of the modal information we glean from such 
cases can be explicated in terms of interventions internal to a model. The 
set  of  possible  model  interventions  is  very  much larger  than  the  set  of 
causal interventions. We can, for instance in a kind of thought experiment 
alter the fractal limit and observe the modal consequences resulting from 
this change. By viewing all three cases as models they can be unified under 
one explanatory framework, a generalised version of manipulationism. 
The  causal  examples  Woodward  cites  actually  involve  an  implicit 
modelling stage, and hence have a certain degree of internal symmetry. We 
can alter the electric field and derive the wire shape, the asymmetry is only 
added when we step outside of the idealised model wire to a real wire and 
field  in  a  lab  and  ask  what  we  can  actually  manipulate.  Moreover, 
manipulationism itself is a type of modelling. We must divide up a system 
into input and output variables and draw directed graphs to express modal 
connections. In other words the manipulationist account implicitly uses a 
model  representation  of  even the simplest  counterfactual  scenario  to  be 
able to divide the world up in the way it needs. This modelling cuts across 
the causal/non-causal divide and applies to all of these explanations.
The distinction between what is manipulable and what isn't is not clearly 
defined by Woodward. He is clear that what is manipulable is not limited to 
what is possible for human beings or even what is nomologically possible. 
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Causation is characterised in non-reductive terms  as the ability to influence 
a system through interventions, but causally intervening upon a system is 
for  Woodward  the  means  by  which  a  causal  influence  is  identified. 
Woodward straightforwardly accepts this circularity as virtuous, and when 
concerned  only  with  intuitively  causal  cases  it  perhaps  is,  but  when 
comparing causal and non-causal cases something more precise should be 
said. To argue that the scaling law case can be understood in terms of causal 
manipulations depends upon one's intuitions about what is  a reasonable 
extension of actual manipulations we can make. 
We start with those manipulations we can actually perform in a lab, we 
then extend the notion of manipulation to those physical interactions we 
cannot perform but can see in principle as a continuation of the same kinds 
of  physical  interactions  that  we  use  in  the  lab.  For  instance,  consider 
hypothetical manipulations which are scaled-up versions of lab processes: a 
plasma physicist cannot recreate the conditions in the sun in her lab but in 
principle there is a physical continuity between lab plasmas and the sun. In 
fact the logical basis for experimental science is the belief that isolating a 
small portion of the world, and manipulating it, produces results which can 
be assumed (all other things being equal) to hold in distant regions and on 
much different scales. Although in general terms this all seems reasonable 
as  presented  there  seems  to  be  a  rather  fuzzy  boundary  between  some 
causal hypothetical manipulations and the verboten manipulations which 
do not feel causal. 
I argue that a way to circumvent this vagueness is to take the modelling 
aspect  of  cases  like  the  scaling  law  explanation  seriously;  that  we 
understand models  by manipulating them. By allowing this  extension of 
what  can  be  allowed as  a  hypothetical  manipulation  we  can  extend the 
manipulationist  framework  to  many  non-causal  explanations  while 
retaining the essence of the account, that to explain is to place variables in a  
network of modal connections. 
Does an explication of the allometric case study discussed here require 
an  extended  manipulationist  framework?  One  may  contend  that  the 
allometry case is just an example of a structural explanation. Dorato and 
Felline86 have  proposed  purely  structural  explanations  in  the  context  of 
quantum mechanics. They argue that Heisenberg's uncertainty relations are 
correctly understood by physicists as resulting from structural, specifically 
mathematical,  features  of  Fourier  transforms  alone.  So,  it  is  the 
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mathematical  formulation  of  quantum  theory  that  results  in  certain 
features, and these features are explained by reference to formal properties 
of quantum theory. In a similar way one might argue that manipulation is 
completely unnecessary to characterise allometric models. It is a structural 
property alone, the limit on volume filling set by the geometry of fractals, 
that is explanatory and “manipulations” play no role at all. 
My response is to say that the extended manipulationist account is not in 
conflict with Dorato and Felline's structural explanatory account, rather it 
seeks to supplement it.  For instance,  Dorato and Felline do not actually 
spell out what it fundamentally means to explain in their account. (Their 
problem with the DN-framework is that quantum mechanics needs only the 
mathematical  formalism to  account  for  the  exclusion  principle,  not  any 
physical laws. This is quite different from the criticisms of DN advocated in 
this thesis). They do not explicitly contend that explanation is a matter of 
mapping  modal  dependence,  or  spell  out  any  alternative  necessary 
characteristics of explanations in general. 
Once we pin our explanatory colours to the mast, by requiring modal 
information  to  be  given  in  scientific  explanations,  we  must  look  more 
closely at how considering structure provides us with this. If the uncertainty 
relations,  or  allometric  models,  explain  by  giving  us  modal  information 
which is salient to physical systems in some sense, then we have to be able 
to extract  that  modal information. That is  to say,  we have to be able to 
answer w-questions and connect variables. But how are we to explicate the 
way  the  mathematical  formalism  of  quantum  mechanics,  or  allometric 
models, answers these questions? These structures must tell us in what way 
a  structural  feature  made  a  difference,  and  this  involves  assessing 
counterlegals. 
Implicitly,  we are stating that  had Fourier transforms had a different 
mathematical structure (which captured the way physical systems behave) 
then the uncertainty relations would be different. If we cannot say this then 
the structural  feature has not given us any modal information, since we 
cannot  say  how  quantum  systems  would  be  different  with  different 
structural features. However, this modal claim cannot be straightforwardly 
about the structures of the world, since the counterlegals required are ill 
defined at best. If the mathematics of fractals, or Fourier transforms, were 
different what effects would that have on the world? It is impossible to say 
rigorously, there could,  and probably would,  be an enormous number of 
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differences  between  possible  worlds  in  which  such  a  change  in 
mathematical structure had occurred. 
Instead, I contend, it is useful to regard structural features of Fourier 
transforms as  applying within models  that  represent the world.  That  is,  
changes in them are only propagated through the limited worlds of models. 
Such  counterlegals  are  primarily  about  our  representations,  and  only 
secondarily  applied  to  the  world.  We  extract  modal  information  about 
changes  in  variables,  some  of  which  will  be  structural  features,  from 
models, then justify those conclusions in reference to the real world. But, 
what we do not do is simply look at the structures of the world and explain 
through them directly,  since without the intermediate modelling step we 
cannot make the process of modal information extraction understandable. 
So, the mathematics of quantum mechanics is not explanatory unless we 
can  say  how  things  depend  upon  that  structure,  at  least  in  our 
representations. 
Now, one may accept all of this, yet still resist the characterisation of this 
modal extraction process as involving “manipulations”. So be it.  Nothing 
rests on the use of the word manipulation as long as the concepts behind it  
are appreciated: structural explanations are explanatory because they tell us 
how structural features modally connect with other variables of a system. 
Those  modal  connections  are  extracted  inside  models,  through  the 
hypothetical altering of those structural parameters. The account presented 
here  is  not  in  conflict  with  Dorato  and  Felline,  rather  it  clarifies  their 
account in the context of a specific definition of what it means to explain. 
My further contention is that manipulationism is a useful way of thinking 
about this process of altering variables within models. The claim made here 
is  not  that  manipulations  within  models  are  the  same  type  of  thing  as 
manipulations  understood  as  causal  interventions,  but  that,  by  bringing 
parallels  with  causal  manipulations  explicitly  to  the  foreground,  we  can 
developed  analogous  concepts  to  other  concepts  already  defined  in 
manipulationism as one way to understand how such explanations work.
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PART 2 | MODELS AND FICTIONAL EXPLANATION
But what's this I see?
Can such things really happen?
Is it illusion? Is it reality?
 – FAUST, GOETE Faust Part 1
Fiction reveals truth 
that reality obscures
– RALPH WALDO EMERSON
Truth has the structure of a fiction
– JACQUES LACAN
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4 | THE NIHILISM OF MODELLING
 
Most  recently,  the  topic  of  fictional  entities  in  models  has  provided  an 
intriguing challenge to all accounts of modelling. Philosophers, for the most 
part, have been sanguine about idealisations in models since  McMullin.87 
Idealisations are harmless, so the story goes, and a genuinely explanatory 
model  can  be  made  more  accurate  by  de-idealising.  By  replacing 
idealisations  with  more  accurate  representations  of  the  real  system,  in 
principle,  we  can  get  better,  truer,  explanations.  Idealisations  are 
pragmatically useful: they allow calculation, or pick out a salient factor for 
the purpose of understanding. Ontically, they can be removed at any time 
without  destroying  an  explanation.  However,  things  are  not  so 
straightforward when we are dealing with genuinely fictional entities.88
Fictions  proper  are  distinct  insofar  as  the  introduced  entity  is  not  a 
place-holder  for  some  properties  of  real  entities,  but  is  instead  a  pure 
fiction,  i.e.,  an  element  of  the  model  that  does  not  exist,  and  is  often 
recognised  not  to  exist  by  the  modeller.  In  some  senses,  this  rough 
demarcation is irrelevant, since for the discussion at hand what matters is 
how the idealisation/abstraction/fiction functions in a given model.  If in 
principle  it  cannot  be  removed to  leave the  model's  ability  to  represent 
modal structure intact, then we have what I will call a “nihil model”. Nihil 
models are models with genuine fictional elements, or “lies” about the true 
structure of the world that cannot be removed. Batterman89 and Bokulich 
both provide examples of models that seem to have explanatory power yet 
contain  ineliminable  fictions  that  cannot  be  removed  from  the  model 
without destroying this capacity. In these cases, the aims of explanation and 
ontic representation seem at odds with one another: the better we ontically  
represent, the worse we explain.90 
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In the next chapter, a new way forward will be proposed to resolve many 
of  these  puzzles,  by  extending  Woodward's  notion  of  explanation  and 
developing an analogous set of concepts that apply within models. It will be 
argued  that  explanation  is  foundationally  about  representing  modal 
structure  and  this  can  be  achieved  by  many  means,  sometimes  even 
fictions. Unlike other accounts that seek to ground model explanation in 
counterfactuals  alone,  it  will  be  argued that  we  must  take  seriously  the 
notion of manipulation, and that manipulation is the key to understanding 
the  conceptual  logic  of  representing  modal  structure.  This  is  contra 
Bokulich, and even Woodward's own extension of his theory to non-causal 
and model explanations. Manipulation is a keystone concept that cannot be 
done away with. Moreover it will be argued that if models themselves are 
understood  as  a  type  of  fiction,  then  this  deflates  the  special  problems 
posed by fictional entities within them, and it allows a fully intelligible way 
of  extending  the notion  of  manipulation  to  model  explanations  where  a 
physical  experimental  manipulation  could  not  ever  be  possible.  Viewing 
models  as  fictions,  when  combined  with  an  extended  version  of 
Woodward's  manipulability  theory  of  explanation,  provides  a  middle 
ground  between  the  semantic  and  pragmatic  accounts  of  models.  The 
explanatory  properties  of  models  are  found to  be  grounded in  objective 
properties of the world and the modal structure it possesses. Yet that modal 
structure is revealed through different mechanisms: isomorphism, analogy, 
similarity, inference, and denotation. The consequence of this resolution is 
a reformulation of  the indispensability  argument  and a  more attenuated 
sense of  realism licensed  by it  than has  previously  been  suggested.  The 
remainder of this chapter will  be dedicated to understanding the puzzles 
around models and how current accounts fail to adequately resolve many of 
them.
HUGHES, ISING AND THE DDI ACCOUNT
Hughes' DDI account is an influential pragmatic explication of models in 
which there  are three elements to a model which proceed chronologically: 
denotation,  demonstration,  and  interpretation.  The  denotation  phase 
occurs at the beginning of the construction of a model: terms are denoted in 
relation to physical quantities, or in Woodwardian terms, output and input 
variables are defined. Next comes the demonstration phase in which the 
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model is “run” and outputs obtained, and conclusions are drawn within the 
framework of the model. Finally these conclusions from within the model 
are  interpreted  in  physical  terms  with  reference  to  the  target  system. 
Models possess an endogenous dynamic, or a set of relations, which allow 
conclusions to be obtained, but these conclusions are also endogenous. We 
discover  things  about  the model  itself  by  playing  with,  and I  will  argue 
“manipulating”, it, and any conclusions that are made need interpretation 
when applied to the physical world. One case study that Hughes discusses 
at  length  is  that  of  the  widely  applicable  Ising  model,  which  although 
originally created for one specific purpose, and deemed a failure, has since 
been used to represent and explain across many different systems.91
The  diaspora  of  the  Ising  model  poses  a  difficulty  for  Hughes'  DDI 
account. Since such a widespread and diverse set of physical systems are 
modelled using Ising's scheme, it is difficult to say that the terms in Ising 
denote a specific set of physical parameters. Hughes suggests that we need 
to use a generalised canonical form of the notion of denotation instead. We 
must  extract  the  common  features  of  all  these  systems,  such  as  the 
dimensional considerations that give rise to universal behaviour, and ignore 
the detailed micro-physics which changes from system to system, but does 
not alter  the universal  behaviour.  In effect,  what Hughes is  arguing for, 
although he doesn't employ this language, is that abstraction plays a crucial 
role in explicating models and explanations of these kinds. Systems must be 
translated into an abstracted set of properties which can then be denoted by 
the model, i.e., the model is only applicable to these abstracted elements of  
the target system. Ising can denote all of these systems because it does so in 
a  suitably  abstract  way.  The  Ising  case  has  many  parallels  with  the 
allometric case study discussed in chapter 3. Both cases seek to unify a set 
of behaviours of systems that appear in other respects to be very different. 
They also abstract away from causal details, to offer a statistical explanation 
in  the Ising case  or  to  offer  a  geometrical  explanation  in  the allometric 
scaling law case.  These model explanations supervene on top of detailed 
concrete  causal  explanations,  but  they  do  not  reduce  down  to  those 
explanations,  since  they  identify  general  features,  constraints  and 
symmetries which are multiply realised.
The Ising case is illustrative of the dangers of conflating representation 
and explanation when trying to understand how scientists use models. As 
Hughes says:
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[F]rom  the  fact  that  a  model  M  provides  the  best 
explanation  of  the  behaviour  of  a  system S  it  does  not 
follow that M is a faithful representation of S. (Hughes, 
2010: p. 195)
Or  to  put  it  another  way,  some  aspects  of  the  system  must  be 
represented, but not necessarily in a straightforward way. The features that 
are necessary in the representation are those tailored to provide answers 
to  explanatory  requests. We  must  only  capture  the  modal  information 
necessary to answer w-questions, and including irrelevant representational 
details  can  pollute  this  ability  to  determine  what  depends  upon  what. 
Representation is then sometimes a pragmatic consideration which bends 
to the demands of the explanatory purpose of a model, not the other way 
around. 
In summary, what we should seek to take from the DDI account is the 
notion that models have their own internal machinery and they operate in 
parallel  with  the  real-world.  When  we  use  models,  we  make  inferences 
internal to a particular model and we then seek to interpret these inferences 
and justify them with reference to the target phenomenon. 
HIDDEN MODELS
The role that modelling plays in explanation is more widespread than might 
be appreciated. General Relativity was an important inspiration for Hempel 
in  developing  the  DN  account  of  explanation,  yet  even  in  Einstein's 
explanation of the anomaly in the precession of the perihelion of Mercury, 
Hughes  finds  implicit  modelling  steps  which  the  DN framework  cannot 
accommodate.  Hughes suggests that the explanation for the precession in 
the  perihelion  of  Mercury  provided  by  Einstein  does  not  fit  the  DN 
scheme.92 
As Hughes puts it, Einstein faces the problem of applying a foundational 
theory  to  a  physical  system,  and  to  make  this  possible  he  first  must 
construct a “theoretical model” or an idealised abstracted model, and apply 
the theory to the model. The inferences drawn from this model must be 
applied to the system. Even in a case study that is supposed to follow the 
DN scheme of deductively producing an explanation from a theory, there is 
another  phase:  that  of  model  construction.  Although  this  step  is  often 
unacknowledged, I propose that it happens in nearly every case of advanced 
scientific explanation. Often the model may be so naturalistic and close to 
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the target system that it does not seem like any modelling actually goes on, 
just as Hempel  et al. did not see the modelling steps even in an intricate 
case such as the perihelion of Mercury. The model mediates between the 
target  system and the  theory,  allowing  the  resources  of  the  latter  to  be 
applied, indirectly, to explain the former. It is only the combination of the 
theory and the model that  is  an adequate representation of  the physical 
system. 
NIHIL MODELS, PUZZLES & DISUNITIES
So the use of models is widespread in scientific theorising; models are not 
simply  a  means  of  thinking  about  the  world  that  abstracts  away  from 
specific details, they often also tell falsehoods about the world. Idealisations 
are common in models: planes are regarded as frictionless, planets as point 
masses, and so on. McMullin's now classic analysis suggests that we should 
adopt  a  sanguine  attitude  to  such  idealisations;  they  are  merely 
pragmatically  useful  approximations  and  can  be  removed  in  principle 
through  a  so-called  Galilean  strategy.  Whereas  abstraction  removes 
unnecessary details to reveal patterns and constraints, idealisations allow 
problems to be more tractable. They make up for our limited analytic or 
computational power. When we idealise we simplify in a harmless manner 
that allows problems to be solved more easily. These “white lies” of science 
work so well precisely because they can be removed, sometimes in practice, 
but always in principle. Laplace's infamous demon would have no need for 
idealisations,  nor would they form any part of Railton's ideal  text.  If  we 
wished,  we  could  restore  friction  to  our  plane  and  see  that  our  model 
became  even  more  accurate  at  representing  real  planes.  Once  we  have 
prescribed the level of precision that we wish to have in our representation 
or explanation, we can idealise in ways that do not make us fall short of our 
required level.
While McMullin's analysis is true as far as it goes, I think it gives too 
simplistic a view of the role idealisations play in models. There is something 
conceptually  inverted  about  saying  that  idealisations  are  explanatory 
precisely  because  we  don't  need  them.  After  all,  as  abstraction  shows, 
irrelevances  can  also  be  removed  from  models  without  destroying  their 
explanatory power. Rather, idealisations are explanatory in virtue of what 
they preserve, not what they leave out,  and what they preserve is modal 
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information.  Furthermore,  it  seems  that  not  all  idealisations  can  be 
removed  even  in  principle  from  models  without  destroying  their 
explanatory power. 
Recent  work by Batterman and Bokulich has highlighted examples of 
such cases. Batterman presents examples of applied mathematical models 
where no de-idealisation is possible because the qualitative behaviour in the 
model  is  fundamentally  different  in  the  singular  limit.  This  is  both  a 
challenge  to  the  mapping93 account  of  mathematics  and to  the  Galilean 
strategy.  Bokulich  presents  cases  of  physical  fictions,  ineliminable  lies 
crucial to a model, some of which use the properties of entities we know do 
not exist in explanations. Batterman and Bokulich both present two sides of 
the  same  problem.  These  nihil  models  tell  “fibs”  about  the  world 
foundationally,  not  as  a  result  of  a  pragmatic  limit  on  our  ability  to 
calculate. Although puzzling, I believe we can make sense of these fictions 
by construing them in the same modal terms as causal explanations.
BATTERMAN AND THE SINGULAR LIMIT
Traditionally, debates about the nature of mathematics in explanation have 
focused on the ontological question of whether mathematical objects can be 
said  to exist.  If  it  can be shown that  they play  an indispensable  role  in 
scientific  explanation  then  a  scientific  realist  is,  supposedly,  rationally 
compelled  to  reify  such  entities  and  take  them  existentially  seriously. 
Batterman's  focus  is  different:  he  is  concerned  with  how  the  use  of 
mathematics explicates the nature of explanation, not primarily with what 
explanation has to tell us about the nature of mathematics.
Batterman94 rejects  the  traditional  mapping  account  of  mathematical 
explanation and instead focuses on the use of asymptotics in explanations.95 
Asymptotic explanations, it is claimed, do not focus on an abstract structure 
realised  by  a  target  system,  rather  they  are  concerned  with  processes: 
mathematical operations such as the taking of singular limits (that is having 
variables  that  blow  up  to  infinity,  “singularities”).  A  whole  category  of 
mathematical explanations result from the taking of such limits, not from 
the explicit referral to structural continuities with mathematical objects. 
A different class of qualitative behaviours can be seen when singularities 
are present, but these behaviours do not emerge as approximate behaviours 
as  we  approach  the  singular  limit.  No  approximation  is  possible  in 
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principle. In cases where there is a radical discontinuity across the singular 
boundary, a wholly different region of parameter space is opened up for our 
representation  of  a  system  to  explore  that  it  cannot  reach  without  a 
singularity.  The  state-space  of  the  system  flips,  and  the  set  of  possible 
behaviours varies discontinuously. It is like being in the kitchen of a house: 
no matter how close you stand to the door, the set of qualitative behaviours 
possible  in  the kitchen  is  different  from those in  the garden,  and those 
behaviours  can  only  be  reached  by  crossing  a  threshold.  The  mapping 
account does not capture this aspect of mathematical explanation. 
As a toy example, consider this quadratic equation:
When k is small, we have two solutions to this equation, but when k is 
exactly  zero  this  equation  is  no  longer  quadratic  and we  have only  one 
solution. The two solution case does not approach the one solution case as k 
approaches  zero.  This  equation  cannot  be  de-idealised  to  recover  a 
quadratic.  McMullin's  Galilean strategy will  not  work as  the idealisation 
alters  the  solution  space  essentially.  There  is  a  fundamental  qualitative 
difference between the two solutions, we cannot tell what the k = 0 solution 
will  be  from a  k ~  0 solution.  A system described  by such an  equation 
crosses a boundary in its available state-space when k is set to zero and the 
two solution regions are entirely separate islands with no bridge linking 
them. 
Singularities  of  this  sort  appear  in  a  variety  of  different  models  of 
physical  systems.  For  example,  in  thermodynamics  by  setting  particle 
numbers to infinity, we have divergences in correlation lengths. There is a 
loss of characteristic scale and similarity solutions that cannot be re-created 
in finite systems are possible.  We also explain the shape of rainbows by 
using geometric optics in the limit of zero wavelength light. This asymptotic 
limit  is  crucial:  the  limiting  case  plays  an  ineliminable  role  in  the 
explanation.  It  is  only  by  using  ray-theoretic  structures  that  such 
explanations work. Models containing singularities are Galilean-inhibited,96 
and they are also representation-inhibited.  The mapping account doesn't 
work for them:
k x 2−x+b=0
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The limiting idealization is  essential for the explanation 
because  for  a  finite  number  of  particles  the  statistical 
mechanical  analogues  of  the  thermodynamic  functions 
cannot  exhibit  the  non-analytic  behaviour  necessary  to 
represent the qualitatively distinct behaviour we observe. 
(Batterman 2010 p. 7)
Kadanoff also states: 
The  existence  of  a  phase  transition  requires  an  infinite 
system. No phase transitions occur in systems with a finite 
number of degrees of freedom. (Kadanoff, 2000, p.238)
In  these  cases,  explanation  does  not  appeal  to  the  correspondence 
between a real and a mathematical structure. Rather it is a mathematical 
feature,  which  is  not  directly  interpretable  in  physical  terms  –  i.e.,  the 
singularity  – that  is  explanatory.  Or  to  be  more precise  the role  such a 
mathematical fiction plays relationally in the model allows the whole model 
to capture modal information.  The universality  of  behaviour  in systems 
makes  idealising97 in  this  way  a  useful  method  for  uncovering  general 
features  that  are  explanatory.  In  Batterman's  terminology  we  have 
degenerate micro-realisers, that is to say, there are many different ways for 
the phenomenon to happen at a concrete level but with the same coarse 
grained outcomes. Since Batterman is primarily concerned with asymptotic 
solutions,  differences  in  micro-realisers  manifest  themselves  on  short 
scales,98 but the long term behaviour is  governed by much more general 
parameters and an explanation of these long term trends does not have to 
pay  any  attention  to  the  specific  micro-realisers.  For  instance,  in  heat 
diffusion along a metal bar we can find the long term functional form of the 
heat  distribution  from  dimensional  analysis,  and  the  specifics  of  the 
conductor do not matter. The same is true in many other situations, such as 
pillars buckling, shock solutions etc.99 
An example Batterman uses is the formation of a drop of water dripping 
from  a  tap.  Through  hydrodynamics,  an  analytic  treatment  is  possible 
which applies universally to liquid drop formation. The analytic solution is 
highly  abstract  and  includes  a  singularity  when  the  drop  forms.  The 
singularity  is  necessary  to  characterise  the  universality  of  these  drop 
formation events. At the point of singularity the qualitative behaviour of the 
system switches: it enters a different region of possibility space and cannot 
return. The analytic solution identifies a universal class: all drops form in 
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the same way with the same dynamics when viewed in a certain abstract 
sense. In the numerical computer model things are not so straightforward: 
each drop that forms forms in a different way, there is no singularity and no 
definite time or place where the drop has formed since molecular exchange 
takes  place  across  a  wide  time-frame.  We have  a  version  of  the  Sorites 
paradox:
[A]t the molecular level, no such singularity exists. We can 
follow  the  individual  molecular  dynamics  and  we  will 
never be able to identify the place and the time where the 
drop  breaks  (Batterman  2010  p.  22/23, emphasis  in 
original).
Different levels of descriptions seem to lead to different explanations, 
and we cannot necessarily ask the same sorts of questions across distinct 
levels.  The case  studies  Batterman  presents  form  a  set  of  nihil  model 
explanations, in his case the models are non-mapping mathematical ones in 
which we have different qualitative behaviour in the asymptotic limit.100 
COUNTERFACTUALS & CLASSICAL ORBITS
Alisa Bokulich has also brought to light several cases of model explanation 
that involve seemingly explanatory fictions.101 Many of the case studies she 
analyses are taken from research into the use of semi-classical methods in 
quantum systems whose classical counterpart would be a chaotic system. In 
these  cases,  researchers  often  build  models  partly  using  a  classical 
conception of how subatomic entities behave which, according to quantum 
mechanics, is a false picture of reality. The classical fictions in these semi-
classical  methods  are  different  from  ineliminable  idealisations  in  the 
asymptotic limit. Classical mechanics is not simply an asymptotic limiting 
case of quantum mechanics and the elements of classical  theory used in 
building  these  models  are  not  a  function of  taking  such limits.  Instead, 
these  chimeral  models  are  a  blending  of  concepts  from  two  separate 
theories: parametrisations from classical chaos theory are incorporated into 
models of pseudo-chaotic quantum systems. 
Bokulich's contention is that by using these classical elements we gain 
new physical and explanatory insight into these systems. The semi-classical 
explanations  of  these  phenomena  do  not  replace  fully  computationally 
derived  explanations,  but  neither  are  they  just  a  convenient  analytic 
calculational short-cut.  Bokulich is an explanatory pluralist and both the 
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fully  quantum  and  semi-classical  explanations  are  genuine  explanations 
and  complement  one  another.  The  semi-classical  models  bolster  our 
understanding of  the quantum world and allow connections to  be made 
between phenomena that would otherwise go unnoticed. 
Bokulich rejects the Heisenberg-Kuhn tradition and embraces the Bohr-
Dirac tradition, in which quantum theory comes out of a generalisation of 
classical  concepts.  Taking  inspiration  from  Dirac's  conception  of  theory 
interaction,102 Bokulich  proposes  that  both  quantum  and  classical 
mechanics  be  regarded  as  open  theories  that  continue  to  inform  one 
another. The two theories can dialectically fuel discoveries in each other's 
frameworks. Chaos theory is a prime example of this. After the advent of 
quantum theory,  classical  techniques which were developed to deal  with 
chaotic systems have been applied to quantum systems which in turn help 
researchers reassess how those classical concepts are used.
Periodic orbit theory is  one such semi-classical treatment of quantum 
chaos. In this theory, particles are supposed to follow closed classical orbital 
trajectories.  Gutzwiller's periodic orbit method in quantum chaos involves 
calculating  the  quantum  density  of  states  in  terms  of  a  summation  of 
classical periodic orbits,103 a quantum property is determined in terms of a 
classical one. This clearly raises questions about how both theories interact 
and what their relationship is.
[Classical structures] provide new physical insight into the 
dynamical structure of […] quantum system[s] in a way 
that  purely  quantum-mechanical  solutions  do  not 
(Bokulich 2008a, p 105).
Notice that Bokulich's claim is that it is the dynamical structures of these 
systems that allows the semi-classical treatment to provide physical insight; 
a structural correspondence between the quantum and classical dynamics is 
at the heart of the usefulness of this approach for her. This contrasts with 
my contention that a fictional model can be explanatory because of its wider 
virtues. The overlap of dynamical structure is just one example of a means 
by which a fiction can ultimately represent modal structure.104 
Another  example105 Bokulich  uses  is  that  of  so-called  wavefunction 
scarring. This is a phenomenon exhibited by systems, such as a quantum 
billiard,  where  the  corresponding  classical  system would  exhibit  chaotic 
behaviour. A billiard can be imagined as a snooker table, sans pockets, in 
which a ball is set in motion, doesn't lose energy in collisions with the sides,  
and instead bounces around the confines of the table infinitely. This system 
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is chaotic: the pathway of the ball does not repeat and the ball ergodically 
explores all of the table. However, out of all the possible pathways, there are 
a few rare ones which are periodic, and if the ball travels in one of these 
pathways it will return to where it started and simply follow that path over 
and  over  again.  These  periodic  pathways  are  not  stable,  any  tiny 
perturbation to the angle at which the ball strikes the side or to the pathway 
will result in the particle changing to one of the much larger set of non-
periodic,  non-repeating,  pathways.  As  the  name  suggests,  a  quantum 
billiard is an analogous situation in which a particle is confined to a plane 
and trundles around. 
From quantum mechanics, one would expect that the quantum billiard 
would simply be a superposition of all the plane wave solutions for each 
path, where no one path is expected to be more likely than any other and 
the result should be an evenly spread out superposition. However, Heller 106 
showed in  numerical  simulations  that  the  probability  density  is  actually 
strongly localised around the rare classical periodic orbit trajectories. He 
dubbed this anomalous enhancement of the wavefunction intensity at the 
location of corresponding classical periodic orbits “wavefunction scarring”. 
As Bokulich says: “the quantum dynamics seems to retain the imprint of the 
classical dynamical structures”.107
The ghost of classical orbits seems to be guiding wavefunction density. 
The wavefunction has a larger intensity along the periodic orbit, this is the 
“scar”. The classical structures play a part in making this intelligible: they 
explain why a wave-packet has an enhanced chance of a recurrence when it 
is launched along one of these classical trajectories, but does not when it is 
launched  at  other  points.  A  classical  concept,  the  Lyapunov  exponent, 
which is a constant used to describe the stability of periodic orbits is used to 
describe the degree of wavefunction scarring. 
[I]t is not just that the quantum behaviour is mimicking 
the  classical  behaviour  in  the  mesoscopic  domain,  but 
rather that particular classical structures are manifesting 
themselves in surprising ways in the quantum phenomena 
(Bokulich 2008a p. 131).
This is not a matter of correspondence in the limit of large scales, nor is 
it  an example of asymptotic correspondence.  This is,  for Bokulich,  about 
particular systems that exhibit classical dynamics fundamentally. 
The reason why classical concepts are so useful in quantum systems is 
due  to  a  similarity  in  the  dynamical  structures  described  by  the  two 
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theories. It is this continuity of structure that allows, for instance, classical 
periodic  orbits  to  be  built  into  semi-classical  models  of  quantum 
phenomena. Given that these classical orbits don't exist, in what way can 
models that use them be explanatory?
The fertility of using classical concepts to model quantum 
phenomena lies  in the fact  that  there is  a  continuity of 
dynamical  structure  between  classical  and  quantum 
mechanics, and it is this dynamical structure, common to 
both theories,  which is  manifesting itself  in these semi-
classical  experiments.  Although  there  is  no  particle 
following these classical closed and periodic orbits, these 
trajectories  nonetheless  legitimately  model  certain 
features  of  the  quantum dynamics  in  the  semi-classical 
regime (Bokulich 2008a p. 139).108
Bokulich,  following in the tradition of Hughes,  Morrison and Railton, 
proposes  a  structural  framework  to  account  for  these  explanations.  For 
Bokulich, these semi-classical models are an example of structural model 
explanation: it is the continuity of structure between classical and quantum 
theories that allows the former to be explanatory with respect to the latter. 
Bokulich combines this structural notion of explanation with Woodward's 
emphasis  that  providing  modal  information  is  the  key  component  of 
explanatory practice. Counterfactuals and answering w-questions are key, 
but  these  semi-classical  models  do  not  causally  explain.  Given  that  the 
classical  components  do  not  exist,  they  cannot  cause  anything!  Since 
manipulations cannot be said to occur for the same reason, Bokulich deems 
them unnecessary for understanding the explanation in these cases: all we 
need are the parts of Woodward's account sans manipulations. Woodward 
himself  suggests  a  similar  approach  in  speculating  about  extending  his 
account  for  other  non-causal  cases,  such  as  spacetime  explanations  of 
planetary  stability.  Bokulich  goes  further  and  implies  that  the 
counterfactual  structure  is  all  that  is  required  in  causal  and  non-causal 
cases:109 
[I]t  is  precisely  this  manipulationist  construal  that 
restricts Woodward's account of scientific explanation to 
specifically causal explanations (Bokulich 2008, p 226).
A  “justificatory  step”  is  also  required.  This  additional  component 
specifies the domain of applicability of the model and shows that the target 
system  falls  within  that  domain.  For  Bokulich,  there  are  two  types  of 
justificatory step. Top down justifications proceed from theory, where the 
background theory used to generate/inform the model itself specifies that 
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the target system falls within its domain.  Bottom up justifications, which 
are much more common according to Bokulich, involve a de-idealisation 
procedure.  Idealisations are removed and the model becomes closer and 
closer to the target system, and is still shown to give similar results, which 
indicates  that  the  original  model  can  be  trusted  to  represent  the  target 
system. For this to work, however, the model and target system must be 
linked smoothly via idealisation.110 For Bokulich, the justificatory step plays 
a  crucial  role in  marking  out  those  models  that  are  merely 
phenomenological from models that are genuinely explanatory.
I  believe  there  is  a  third  procedure  of  justification:  bootstrapping 
between models. In this we calibrate one model in terms of another model. 
We demonstrate that parts of our new model are reliable and reproduce 
expected results from the previous model, and then apply the new model to 
a more complicated system where no de-idealisations are possible or occur, 
and  where  there  is  no  top-down  automatic  veridicality  from  theory.  In 
essence, there is a “gearing up” process of demonstration, where a simpler 
system  is  chosen,  a  model  constructed,  which  is  demonstrated  to  be 
applicable, then the same construction apparatus is used to build a more 
complicated model whose target is itself a more complicated system and the 
continuity  of  building  technique is  used  as  a  justificatory  step.  This  is 
particularly  common  in  modelling  areas  where  analytic  models  and 
computer simulations are combined.111 
BOKULICH'S STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION
Bokulich calls this type of explanation “structural explanation”:
A structural model explanation...is one in which not only 
does the explanandum exhibit a pattern of dependence on 
the elements of the model cited in the explanans, but in 
addition,  this  dependence  is  a  consequence  of  the 
structural features of the theory (or theories) employed in 
the model (Bokulich 2009, p.8).
For  Bokulich,  the  origin  of  the  counterfactual  dependence  is  from 
structural or mathematical features of the theories being employed in the 
model. 
[C]lassical trajectories, even though they are fictions, can 
genuinely  explain  the  morphology  of  quantum 
wavefunctions and the anomalous sequence of  peaks in 
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the absorption spectrum of diamagnetic Rydberg atoms. 
They  do  so  by  providing  part  of  a  structural  model 
explanation of these phenomena (Bokulich,2008a, p23).
Bokulich argues that the existence of periodic orbit theory justifies (in 
the  top-down  sense)  modelling  quantum  systems  like  these  as  classical 
systems, and since we can answer a wide range of w-questions with these 
models they are not merely phenomenological.
Rather  these  classical  structures  are  yielding  genuine 
physical insight into the nature of the quantum dynamics- 
a  physical  insight  […]  that  is  missing  from  a  purely 
quantum-mechanical  deduction  of  the  phenomena  of 
wavefunction  scarring  from  the  Schrödinger  equation 
(Bokulich,2008a p. 181).
This is an interesting statement, what does Bokulich mean by physical 
insight? It is not, according to modern quantum theory, that periodic orbits 
actually do exist after all.  How can this insight be physical when we are 
discussing fictions? Bokulich does not provide an answer to this. I suggest, 
there is a category of explanatory information, “surreal information”, which 
is  information  about  how  the  world  appears.  The  fact  that  the  world 
behaves as if X exists can be used to answer w-questions. It is in this sense 
that classical orbits are explanatory and in this limited sense in which it is 
physical  insight.  This  surreal  information  does  not  preclude  other 
questions, such as why does the world look as if X exists? These questions 
are perfectly legitimate, but that does not prevent explanations that cite X 
from being explanatory, both epistemically and in a certain circumscribed 
manner, ontically. 
As  an  example  of  counterfactual,  or  modal,  explanation  without 
manipulations, Bokulich cites Bohr's model of the hydrogen atom, in which 
electrons  are  confined  to  fixed  discrete  orbits.  The  quantum  dynamical 
picture  cannot  be  recovered  from  Bohr's  atom  by  a  process  of  de-
idealisation. In Bohr’s atom the orbits are fixed points,  not  smeared out 
collections of wavefunction density, and the intrinsic probabilistic nature of 
these orbits cannot be put back in. No parameter can be changed to recover 
the  quantum  mechanical  model,  since  Bohr's  model  is  built  upon  the 
foundation of these precise orbitals that trap the electron. The two model 
descriptions are not related in any continuous way. 
Bokulich characterises Bohr's  atom as “fictional”  by which she means 
that  the orbits  are  not idealisations;  they are not  limits,  rather they are 
inventions. The orbits Bohr characterises the hydrogen atom in terms of 
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simply do not exist. However, is Bohr's atom still explanatory nevertheless? 
The  counterfactual  structure  captured  by  Bohr's  model  is  isomorphic 
with the spectral phenomena observed. Bohr can answer w-questions, such 
as how the spectra will change if the orbits are elliptical and not circular, or 
how spectral  lines will  change in  an electric  field (the Stark effect).  The 
Bohr model is not an ad hoc fitting of a model to experimental data, it offers 
new conceptual insights and answers a range of w-questions beyond the 
data. 
For Bokulich, the justificatory step is top-down and comes from modern 
semi-classical mechanics:
Modern  semi-classical  mechanics  provides  a  top-down 
justificatory  step  showing  that  Bohr's  model-despite 
failing as a literal description-is nonetheless a legitimate 
guide  to  quantum  phenomena  in  certain  domains 
(Bokulich,2009 p 11).
It is clear from this that Bokulich is not discussing the justificatory step 
for Bohr. Rather, this is a reconstructed justification for continuing to teach 
and use the Bohr model. This is in some sense curious. It implies that for 
Bohr, because he didn't know any better, his model is a valuable model, but 
in  the  advent  of  quantum  mechanics  it  ceases  to  be  explanatory.  Yet, 
subsequently, with the advent of modern semi-classical mechanics and the 
connections between quantum systems and classical systems, largely borne 
out of quantum chaos studies which Bokulich bases a lot of her conclusions 
upon, the Bohr model becomes explanatory again! This is a curious state of 
affairs. 
Instead it is more plausible that whatever made Bohr's atom explanatory 
then is the same thing that makes it explanatory (or not) now. That is, as 
Bokulich identifies,  it  answers  w-questions,  but  more than that,  it  is  an 
abstract representation of deeper physics. To borrow from Weslake's sense 
of  abstraction,  Bohr's  atom  is  multiply  realisable  across  many  possible 
worlds where quantum mechanics could be different.112 It gets the modal 
structure correct and is compatible with the claim that to a certain degree of 
coarse graining and for some explananda the hydrogen atom looks as if it 
has the Bohr atom's structure. Just as gases look as if they are ideal, or light  
rays look as if they are straight lines for certain systems, by using fictions 
the Bohr atom captures some aspects of how the world appears to us. The 
point  is  that  the  dynamical  similarities  between  classical  and  quantum 
phenomena are one example of a reason why a specific use of a fiction in a 
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model works, but the practice is much more widespread than that. 
In  other  semi-classical  models  manipulations  are  also  unnecessary 
according to Bokulich:
[I]t does not make sense to talk about intervening in the 
classical  trajectories  to  change  the  quantum 
wavefunctions. Rather, one intervenes in or manipulates 
the physical system in some way, such as by changing the 
shape  of  the  billiard,  and  then  both  the  classical 
trajectories and the quantum wavefunction morphologies 
change (Bokulich 2008a p. 148).
This,  I  contend,  is  a  confused  picture.  To break  it  down,  Bokulich is 
saying that:
1) interventions  are  only  explanatory  when  the  object  of  modal 
information (the part of the model related to the counterfactual that 
answers our w-question) is itself manipulable directly
2) these manipulations are physical manipulations
3) a  physical  manipulation  in  the  target  system  somehow  changes 
indirectly  the  quantum  wavefunction,  but  also  indirectly  changes 
something which does not exist, the classical trajectories!
So  if  one  accepts  1,  then  we  are  left  with  2  and  3.  Accepting  2  is 
unproblematic for 1; manipulations are physical only and are perhaps partly 
explanatory in some causal explanations, (or perhaps not) but not crucial  
either way, and in cases like this where manipulation is not directly possible 
clearly  irrelevant  to  the  explanation.  3  is  more  of  a  source  of  worry, 
however. If manipulations are physical operations and operate only upon 
physical things, then how can non-existent objects be indirectly altered by 
them? If one is a wavefunction realist, it makes sense to argue that although 
it cannot be directly manipulated, it is related to things that can be, but the 
classical trajectories don't exist, so what can Bokulich mean by saying they 
are altered indirectly?
I believe the source of the contradiction is the conflation of two different 
processes: physical manipulations of experimental set-ups to alter or test 
outcomes  of  those  manipulations  and  the  theoretical  altering  of  model 
parameters  and  concepts  to  test  the  outcome  of  those  within  a  model. 
Woodward's  account  does  not  delineate  the  two  (or  acknowledge  a 
difference)  and  nor  does  Bokulich's  account.  How  does  this  separation 
help? In order for it to help, 2 has to be abandoned, “manipulations” are 
central to how we extract explanatory information and cannot be done away 
with.113
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PROBLEMS WITH BOKULICH'S ACCOUNT 
It is unclear exactly what Bokulich means by claiming that nihil models give 
us  understanding.  Her  notion  of  explanation,  like  Hughes',  is  firmly 
epistemic and suffers from the same potential conceptual vagueness (for 
instance,  she  discusses  measuring  directly  non-existent  classical  orbits). 
Understanding is potentially a psychologically, culturally, and historically 
relative concept, and even if a consistent definition can be given in terms of 
intelligibility, which I doubt, it isn't clear that understanding something is 
the  same  as  explaining  it.  Often,  pedagogically,  truth  is  sacrificed  for 
simplicity  to  aid  understanding.  It  seems  that  understanding  and 
explanation  are  distinct,  if   related,  concepts.  One  could  constrain  our 
definition of what can be a source of understanding by restricting genuine 
understanding  to  those  phenomena  that  can  be  ontically  explained,  but 
then this  sense of  understanding cannot  possibly  help us explicate  nihil 
models, since the challenge is to accommodate them in an ontic sense to 
begin with.
Furthermore, Bokulich is very specific in locating where the explanatory 
power comes from in semi-classical  models:  the continuity of dynamical 
structure. However, whilst this continuity is not in doubt, it cannot be the 
whole story. For instance, only some of the possible periodic orbits allowed 
classically are explanatory in the quantum billiard, and the rest are not. It is  
not just a matter of plugging in the classical result to a quantum system. 
Dynamical continuity in the equations applies to all the classically allowed 
trajectories, but only some are used by the hybrid classical/quantum model 
to  characterise  the  system.  More  broadly,  there  are  many  instances  of 
continuity of structure of all kinds between quantum and classical theory: 
linguistic, algebraic, axiomatic. Some of these continuities, which manifest 
themselves in  the semi-classical  models,  are  apparently  explanatory,  but 
many other continuities are not deemed so. Why are continuities in some 
aspects  of  the  dynamical  structure  deemed  explanatory,  while  other 
structural continuities between the theories are not?
The  second  problem  with  Bokulich's  structural  model  account  is  her 
“pick-&-mix”  attitude  to  manipulationist  theory.  This  attitude  is 
understandable, after all Woodward's own solution for how to proceed in 
non-causal  cases  of  explanation  is  simply  to  excise  manipulations  from 
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manipulationism.  Things  are  not  that  easy  though:  we  cannot  simply 
appropriate Woodward's scheme but remove manipulations as they are a 
foundational  component  of  the  framework.  For  structural  model 
explanation  to  be  viable  Bokulich  owes  us  an  alternative  theory  of 
counterfactual explanation, and our understanding of the role fictions play 
will change depending upon what that theory is. For instance, in Strevens' 
kairetic account114 fictions could only ever be explanatory heuristically as 
components  in  black  box  explanations.  As  his  account  is  explicitly 
reductionist  there  could  never  be  any  fundamental  explanatory  role  for 
nihil models.
If we remove manipulations from Woodward's account then we lose its 
power to capture many of the facets of explanatory practice. For instance, 
we  are  unable  to  account  for  the  asymmetry  of  explanations.  If  a 
counterfactual  is  applied  within  a  model  without  manipulation  then  we 
have an entirely symmetrical relation between two structures: why then can 
the  quantum  dynamics  not  explain  the  classical  orbits?  The  source  of 
asymmetry in manipulationism is the manipulations! It is the fact that one 
variable can be intervened upon while others cannot that provides a causal 
explanatory  arrow.  In  Bokulich,  all  we  have  are  structural  model 
explanations without manipulations. Naively removing manipulations, but 
leaving  the  rest  of  Woodward's  account  alone  simply  re-introduces  the 
problem of symmetry. Railton115 has suggested a means of finding a source 
of asymmetry in some structural explanations which relies upon the notion 
of propensities, but Bokulich does not offer any such account. 
Symmetry is not the only problem removing manipulation precipitates: 
without manipulations Woodward's notion of invariance simply cannot be 
used. Recall that an invariance is Woodward's alternative to laws of nature 
in explanation. Invariances are more subtle and plastic;  they are able to 
accommodate  much  explanatory  practice  where  constraining  factors  are 
cited  as  explanatory,  but  which  are  nowhere  near  the  universal 
exceptionless standards required of laws. Invariances handle this perfectly, 
they do not need to  be exceptionless  or universal.  In fact,  being able to 
identify  the  boundary  of  applicability  of  them  is  one  of  their  greatest 
utilities.  They are especially  useful  as a concept for understanding many 
explanations in biology and the social sciences. For Woodward, invariances 
are defined in terms of testing interventions, which are a special kind of 
manipulation, whose aim is to break the invariance. If manipulations are 
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airbrushed  out  of  the  picture,  then  invariance  becomes  an  ill-defined 
concept  which  cannot  be  applied,  a  feature  which  neither  Bokulich  nor 
Woodward have addressed when applying manipulationism to non-causal 
cases.
In  chapter  6,  I  hope  to  make  invariance  well  defined  without  causal 
manipulations. The basic challenge is to say what an invariance is invariant 
with respect to if not testing interventions. What is the difference between a 
law and an invariance if invariances are just nomic conditions that relate 
changes in one variable to another? Part of the success of invariances is that 
they  can  be  bounded,  but  how  are  these  boundaries  discovered  if  not 
through testing interventions? The answer will  be an extended notion of 
intervention  internal  to  models,  so  relationships  between  variables  are 
unchanging under these “model-manipulations”. The point I wish to stress 
is  that  without  some spelling  out  of  how the definition  of  invariance  is 
altered,  without  manipulations,  the  non-causal  extension  of 
manipulationism sans manipulations has a conceptual lacuna. The lesson is 
clear: manipulations are so intertwined with other concepts in Woodward's 
scheme that isolating them to remove them is not straightforward. One may 
be tempted to say that this is all the worse for manipulationism; if it cannot 
work without causes then perhaps it is inapplicable to these types of model 
explanations.  This  may  be  the  case,  but  Bokulich  explicitly  cites 
Woodward's  manipulationist  framework  without  manipulations  as  her 
preferred counterfactual framework. If Woodward's theory is abandoned, 
then  Bokulich  must  provide  an  explication  of  how  to  understand 
counterfactuals and law-like dependencies in science.
If the quantum chaos case studies Bokulich cites really are an example of 
her structural model explanations, what is the nature of the dependencies 
in them? If they are laws, then we have imported all of the problems that 
nomothetic  accounts  of  explanation  are  dogged  by,  problems  which 
Woodward's  scheme  neatly  side-stepped  by  replacing  laws  with 
invariances.116 
DISUNITIES, CONTRADICTIONS & INCOMPATIBILITIES
Ineliminable idealisations and fictions are not the only elements of models 
that  are  challenging  to  any  adequate  philosophical  examination.  To 
paraphrase Hughes, we have the disunities of modelling practice to account 
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for.  Disunities  in  models  fall  into  two categories:  the  incompatibility  of 
different models of the same system, and the contradictions internal to a 
single  model.  Incompatibilities  in  apparently  explanatory  models  of  the 
same physical system can be seen in cases such as the atomic nucleus. In 
nuclear physics, there are several different models of the nucleus, such as 
the  liquid  drop  and  Fermi  models.  Each  model  captures  certain 
characteristics of atomic nuclei, but the physical representations in each are 
radically different and wholly incompatible. One may be tempted to argue 
that  these  models  are  not  genuinely  explanatory,  and  they  will  be 
superseded by some further representation which captures the properties of 
nuclei in a holistic manner. This may be true, but each of these models has 
many of the characteristics of genuinely explanatory models. Each captures 
modal information, and they each can answer a set of (non-overlapping) w-
questions correctly. The modal landscape they paint is complimentary, but 
the physical picture they give is dissonant and contradictory.
Disunities of the second kind are contradictions within the same model. 
For instance, Einstein's model of Brownian motion uses two contradictory 
modelling  assumptions.  Molecules  of  the  solute  the  particles  are  in  are 
treated  as  a  continuous  fluid  allowing  him  to  use  hydrodynamics  to 
calculate the drag on the particles, but he then goes on to assume that the 
liquid is  homogeneous and exerts no force on the particles.  This skill  of 
knowing how to treat elements of the system differently due to the role they 
will play within the model is part of the modeller's art. To take what would 
normally be the same category of entity, but represent them differentially 
for the sake of explanatory power is  one of  the most creative aspects  of  
modelling. The models described by Bokulich feature both these disunities: 
the  physical  picture  of  the  semi-classical  and  quantum  models  are 
incompatible and within each model there are contradictions about which 
elements are treated classically or quantum mechanically. 
We  are  left  with  a  series  of  questions.  How  are  abstraction  and  de-
idealisation to be explicated? How are nihil models to be understood? Is a 
general account possible or are these models too heterogeneous? How are 
disunities to be reconciled? What is  the link between representation and 
explanation  if  misrepresentation  is  essential?  What  is  the  appropriate 
framework to view these problems from? Can Woodward's manipulationist 
framework  be  used  for  non-causal  explanation?  In  the  next  chapter  a 
positive case will be set out based around producing an analogous set of the 
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essential elements of manipulationist theory for models. It will be argued 
that by doing this we can answer many of these questions and provide a 
general account of the use of fictions in models.
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5 | THE ONTOLOGY OF MODELS
 
Just as Woodward generalises experimental explanation to other forms of 
causal  explanation,  we  can  canonicalise  the  logic  of  manipulationist 
thinking  to  include  non-causal  explanations,  specifically  model 
explanations.  Moreover,  the  key  to  answering  many  of  the  puzzles 
surrounding  nihil  models  is  provided  by  this  extension  of  Woodward's 
manipulationist  framework.  There  is  a  conceptual  overlap  between 
manipulating physical systems and an analogous notion of "manipulating" 
variables  in  models.  Variables  in  models  are  manipulated  in  order  to 
discover the modal information contained in the model which, if it  is an 
explanatory model, is also modal information salient to the world. A series 
of analogous concepts from manipulationism can be developed which apply 
internally  within  models.  That  is,  we  can,  in  some  intelligible  sense, 
manipulate models to discover what-depends-upon-what and in doing so 
uncover previously unknown invariances within models. Part of the way we 
lock onto a causal explanation is to manipulate variables: we change the 
value of an input to see how an output variable alters, it is in this way that 
we can sort  unexplanatory  correlations from causal  explanations.  In  the 
same sense,  when a modeller  changes values in a model to discover the 
consequences  of  those  changes,  they  are  discovering  modal  information 
about the model world and explaining things within it.
CONNECTING  VARIABLES:  THE  MODAL  TOPOLOGIES  OF 
MODELS
The  necessary  condition  for  a  model  to  explain  is  that  it  replicates  the 
modal structure of the world.117 Or, to be precise, for a given explanandum, 
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a model must recreate a certain salient section of the modal "topology"118 of 
the  world.  We can  think  of  explanations,  as  Woodward does  for  causal 
explanations,  as  a  series  of  directed  graphs,  linking  input  and  output 
variables.  For a given system, the multiplicity of lines connecting all  the 
relevant  variables  form  a  network  of  modal  connections  in  terms  of  a 
particular set of variables. The idea is then that if we shift to another set of 
variables,  all,  or  at  least  some,  of  the  topology  of  this  network  of  lines 
connecting variable "nodes" must be carried over into the new explanation. 
What the nodes are can be changed, new intermediate nodes added, and the 
network  of  connections  bent  and  twisted,  but  connections  cannot  be 
severed. A true  explanation119 identifies genuine modal connections which 
must be preserved under a translation. It is for this reason that I use the 
term  topology,  metaphorically,  to  emphasise  that  simply  talking  about 
modal  structure  is  potentially  ambiguous  as  to  which  elements  of  that 
structure must be preserved in any translation. 
What is  required is  to  recreate  the bifurcation nodes for the apropos 
variables that are chosen to categorise the target system.120 Not all of the 
modal structure has to be carried over, but some essential connections must 
be. We can add intermediate variables and processes, such as things which 
may for instance allow a more fine grained teasing out of modal intricacies, 
but we must also keep the global modal connections of the previous model.  
For  instance,  when we move  from the ideal  gas  treatment  to  a  van der 
Waals model, we have many of the same input/output variables to connect 
modally  in  the  models  and  each  must  agree  on  which  variables  are 
connected to which others. The van der Waals case adds new variables, new 
axes of modal variation as it were, extra nodes that can be linked in a modal 
map. The word topology is used loosely to convey the flexibility in how the 
modal structure of  an explanation and a successor explanation can each 
display modal information differently, but keep in common some essential 
connections that represent what-depends-upon-what. To use the analogy of 
Beck's  map  of  the  London  underground,  new stations  can  be  added  or 
subtracted and the shape of the lines changed, but the stations cannot be 
moved  from  one  line  to  another  if  an explanation  has  really  got  some 
essential modal connections correct. 
The  explanatory  power  of  the  model  comes  from  getting  the  modal 
connections  between  the  members  of  a  variable  set  correct,  but  it, 
minimally at least, only has to get the topology of the network of connection 
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correct. In other words it can misrepresent how the variables are connected 
as  long  as  that  misrepresentation  preserves  this  aspect  of  the  modal 
structure.  If  the  system is  cashed  out  in  terms  of  different  variables,  a 
different set of modal connections between those variables will be relevant, 
and we will  have a different network. Of course for any two explanatory 
models of the same system there should be continuity between the modal 
topologies they present. There should be no contradiction between the two 
networks once each is translated into the variable set of the other. Often 
models of the same system will be aimed at capturing different segments of 
the same whole modal structure. For instance, the various different models 
of the atomic nucleus discussed in Chapter 4.121 
As an example, think of West's allometric scaling law model. Details are 
deliberately abstracted away from, the "over ground geography" is ignored 
as  it  were.  West  characterises  the  system  in  terms  of  these  abstracted 
variables. It does not undermine the explanatory power of the model that 
there  are  alternative  sets  of  variables  that  could  have  been  chosen, 
appropriate  for  capturing  the  causal  details  of  how  the  organisms' 
metabolisms work, for instance.122 The causal interactions that lead to the 
optimisation of space filling are overlooked, these steps jumped across by 
the choice  of  variables,  but  this  does  not  matter  for  reproducing  modal 
information. The modal topology is what matters. It is irrelevant to a given 
explanation if steps outside the chosen set of variables are overlooked, just 
as  it  doesn't  matter  if  between two stations  in  the underground a  train 
passes a third disused one. In terms of the modal topology the third station 
might as  well  not  exist.  Obviously  as  a  holistic  picture,  an "ideal  modal 
text",  the  intermediate  steps  that  fill  in  the black-boxing of  a  model  do 
matter, but for a given specified explanandum they do not. Modal facts may 
be multiply realisable by intermediate steps and those steps overlooked in 
this way.123
This  idea  of  modal  topology  fits  nicely  with  explanatory  pluralism, 
especially  multi-level  explanation.  Being able  to  say what  depends  upon 
what is in part a function of a choice of variables, these variables reflect a 
certain perspective on the world.  The topology of the modal connections 
between these variables will differ depending upon this choice. The modal 
structure is objective once this choice of variables is made: we are not left 
with a hopelessly relativised picture of scientific explanation, far from it. 
Each perspective is analogous to specifying the range of serious possibilities 
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in Woodward's account. Once we have a perspective, a choice of variables, 
the modal topological connections between those variables are an objective 
feature of the world, and the aim of a model is to accurately recreate that 
topology.  At  different levels  we have different perspectives/variable sets. 
Different models at different levels of explanation will have overlaps and 
bridging principles that establish that the modal topology of one level of 
explanation is not incompatible with a different level of explanation. Each 
level  of  explanation  produces  its  own  modal  map  and  although  not  all 
variables in one level will be translatable into another level, the ones that 
can be should result in a matching of modal structure.124
If theories are viewed as families of models, then theory reduction, in the 
explanatory  context,  becomes  a  matter  of  demonstrating  an  equivalence 
between the modal topologies of two families of models at different levels. 
To re-cap, explanatory models get modal bifurcation points correct, they 
identify what could have been different and what couldn't have been. It is 
worth being clear at this juncture that explanation is always relative to a 
degree  of  precision,  it  is  not  absolute.  The  degree  of  precision  in  the 
explanatory request bounds the range of w-questions we use a model to 
answer. A given model of a system is not designed to answer all possible 
counterfactual  questions about  a system. When a model captures modal 
information this information is always partial, it captures a segment of the 
modal network as a whole. 
There is an absolute threshold for something to be explanatory: it must 
answer some w-questions correctly, but above this minimum we can rank 
explanations on the basis of how much modal information they can give, 
both on the number of w-questions they can answer and the  salience of 
those w-questions to our specific explanatory purpose. This is in agreement 
with  the  pragmatic  intuition  that  a  modeller's  aims  and  intentions  are 
important for understanding explanation: simply counting the number of 
w-questions answered is not enough, a particular explanatory request may 
privilege some questions over others and what is deemed our best available 
explanation will vary with these pragmatic considerations. Crucially though, 
the threshold does not vary with pragmatic considerations. An explanation 
must  provide  genuine  modal  information.  The  modeller's  aims  and 
intentions matter when we rank explanations, but not if we are determining 
if something is scientifically explanatory in principle.125 For explanations, 
rankings are contextual, but entry requirements are absolute. 
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MODEL MANIPULATIONS
We use models by manipulating them to discover the consequences of those 
manipulations  within  the  model  world.  In  doing  so  we  can  define  an 
analogous  notion  of  Woodward's  causal  invariance126 that  applies  non-
causally and internally within models. We change parameters and thereby 
pseudo-manipulate the input variables in the model by performing model 
interventions  (m-interventions).  In  turn  m-interventions  define  model-
based  invariances:  an  m-invariance  is  invariant  under  a  testing  m-
intervention. We change parameters and see that these changes make no 
difference to output values. 
The notion of model manipulation suggested here is not the same as that 
suggested  by  some  others.  For  instance  Knuuttila  &  Boon127 describe 
manipulating  models,  but  what  they  describe  are  the  physical,  causal, 
manipulations of the concrete manifestation of a model: moving the mast in 
a ship in a bottle or physically changing the ink on a page that contains an 
equation  and  so  on.  These  manipulations  are  simply  examples  of 
Woodward's  interventions:  events  that  alter  manifestations  of  a  model 
causally.  This  is  not  the  sense  of  model  manipulation  advocated  here. 
Rather, m-interventions are conceptual interventions in the values of model 
variables,  they  are  not  causal  events  at  all.  M-interventions  and  m-
invariances are non-causal analogues of the interventions and invariances 
Woodward defines in his manipulationist framework.128
Consider a computer simulation, say of a magnetohydrodynamic shock. 
We  might  change  the  input  value  of  various  parameters  representing 
physical quantities, density, conductivity, etc., and then see how this affects 
the resultant shock shape in the model. By doing this we may discover m-
invariances: insensitivities to these changes of parameter values. We may 
also discover the limits of these m-invariances, by finding the changes to 
variable values that result in them breaking down. These invariances have 
not been explicitly put in the model by hand, rather they are discovered as 
consequences  of  the  nomic  structure  of  the  model.  Changing  the 
conductivity in a computer model is not a causal physical manipulation, it is 
a conceptual change, an analogue to an actual manipulation. Some of the 
m-interventions in a model will have direct causal counterparts in the target 
system,  manipulations  we  could  perform in  an  experiment  for  instance, 
some others will not have such counterparts. 
What can be manipulated in the model world is different from what can 
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be  manipulated  in  the  real  world.  By  developing  an  analogous  set  of 
concepts for models to those used in the manipulationist account we can 
preserve many of the features from manipulationist thinking which are so 
good  for  capturing  the  logic  of  explanation.  For  instance,  model 
manipulations allow for the asymmetry of explanations to be accounted for 
(although the notion is not straightforwardly applicable within models as is 
discussed in the next chapter).
Models  are  explanatory  not  by  representing  a  system  accurately 
necessarily  but  by  recreating  the  modal  topology  of  a  target  system. 
Representing accurately may be one way to achieve this but it isn't the only 
way. Models can distort in any way they like as long as they preserve the 
modal content of the target system. The demonstration of a model may be 
straightforward,  we  may  have  an  experimental  set  up  capable  of 
reproducing directly the model manipulations as actual manipulations. In 
other cases the model must be justified on different grounds. Some of these 
will be the justificatory steps identified by Bokulich, for instance top-down 
wider theoretical justifications for modelling assumptions. There may also 
be further cases in which justification proceeds by bootstrapping methods. 
Recall, a bootstrapping is where one model is used in overlap with another 
model. We calibrate our second model by making sure it agrees with the 
subsection of  modal information our first  model gives us,  this  allows us 
then  to  justify  the  wider  modal  conclusions  of  the  second  model  even 
though they outstrip what can actually by justified by other means, such as 
experimentation or wider theoretical principles.129 
This is in part what justifies many non-causal explanations. The model is 
shown to re-create the correct modal topology in one arena, by comparing 
to  experiments,  observational  data  or other  types  of  models,  and this  is 
used to justify belief in modal statements that go beyond the confines of 
that arena. These conclusions outstrip the observational basis for parts of 
the model.  By verifying a subset  of  the model's  modal answers we have 
(limited)  licence  to  believe  in  the  answers  it  gives  to  a  wider  set  of  w-
questions. For instance, we justify the assumptions that go into a model of 
planetary orbital stability, then m-intervene on the dimensionality of space-
time and see that, internal to the model, stability is not possible for certain 
dimensions. This m-intervention has no direct counterpart that could ever 
be  done  by  us,  or  that  nature  does  for  us,  but  nevertheless  we  licence 
cautious belief in transplanting the dependencies and invariances which are 
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valid in the model to the real world. We show that the model gets some of  
the modal topology of the world correct and then licence belief in the rest of 
the model's modal topology also being correct. That licence is not absolute 
or foolproof, but it  is on a continuum with justifications that licence the 
application  of  experimental  results  on  Earth  to  other  locations  in  the 
universe. In the absence of observational data to the contrary, or theoretical 
reasons to believe in a divergence, a belief in continuity is rational.130 More 
will  be  said  on  manipulating  models  in  the  next  chapter,  before  that 
however, we should ponder some questions of ontology.
THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF MODELS
Given  the  usefulness  of  the  manipulationist  framework  in  explicating 
models one productive way of approaching the question of the ontological 
status of models is to ask what sort of entity must a model be to allow an 
intelligible sense of model manipulation? If models are abstract entities in 
some sense then it begs the question what exactly is going one when we 
"manipulate" them. Models could be physical entities, but I think this leads 
to  the  wrong  sense  of  manipulation.  All  models  have  a  physical 
manifestation of some sort, the ink on a page for instance, but manipulating 
that is not the kind of manipulation we need. The model manipulations I 
am proposing take place in the mind of the researcher. Fortunately we have 
a theory of models which has exactly the characteristics needed to allow an 
intelligible notion of model manipulation, that is the idea that models are 
works of fiction. If models are  ontologically fictional entities of some sort 
then  a  conceptual  manipulation  of  the  kind  outlined  previously  makes 
sense. To manipulate inside a model is to engage in a highly sophisticated 
game of "What-if?".  Frigg and Toon have each separately proposed rival 
views that models are fictions, of one sort or another, best described by a 
modified form of Walton's pretence theory of literature.
A PRETENCE THEORY PRIMER
Pretence  theory  was  developed  by  Walton131 as  a  means  of  explicating 
metaphysical  aspects  of  literary  fiction.  Frigg  and Toon each apply  it  to 
scientific models. They separately propose two different appropriations of 
Walton's  scheme,  coming  to  different  conclusions  about  how  pretence 
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theory applies. I take a deflationary tact and will argue that for our purposes 
there  is  nothing  at  stake  between  their  two  superficially  different 
conceptualisations.132 Pretence theory's central idea is that works of literary 
fiction  are  props  in  games  of  make  believe.  Just  as  a  child's  game  of 
"Cowboys & Indians" may imagine using pointed fingers as sixshooters, so 
too are works of fiction jumping off points for imaginative experiences. A 
novel is a prop for playing make believe. 
Props  are  combined  with  rules  of  generation,  these  are  the  rules  by 
which  the  game  of  make  believe  is  played.  They  bound  the  types  of 
imaginings that the prop can be used for. The rules inform the user which 
imaginings  should  follow  from  which  props  or  combinations  of  props. 
Sometimes they are prescriptive and sometimes they merely lay down rules 
of  combination.  These  rules  form  the  basis  for  a  kind  of  generative 
grammar of the imagination. For instance, in a first person novel a rule of 
generation  is  that  we  are  supposed  to  take  the  text  as  being  the 
thoughts/voice of a character in the book, not as the voice of the author.
Games  can  be  authorised when  the  rules  of  generation  are  publicly 
known and relatively stable,  or  unauthorised when the rules are  ad hoc, 
such as in many children's games. A new person joining an unauthorised 
game will need the rules explaining to them; in authorised games the rules 
are  generally  widely  known among the community  that  plays them. For 
Walton representation is defined purely sociologically, a representation is a 
prop  in  an  authorised  game.133 Frigg  and  Toon  each  highlight  parallels 
between fictions and models. In their view models are also props used in 
games;  jumping  off  points  for  imagining  certain  things  about  physical 
systems. 
FRIGG'S FICTIONS
Frigg134 conceives of models as imagined hypothetical systems which simply 
lack the property of existing.135 A model is a fictional object which defines a 
fictional world. There are explicit statements internal to that world which 
we know are true at the outset, and implied truths internal to the world 
which  are  not  stated  explicitly  but  follow  from  the  rules  of  generation. 
Frigg136 defines three different categories of truth statements.
The first category of truths are intrafictional truths, these are statements 
made within a fiction and we are solely meant to imagine these statements 
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as true in that fictional world. In that sense they are not true statements at  
all,  they  are  only  true  within  the  story.  The  second  species  of  truth 
statements  are  metafictional truths.  Unlike  intrafictional  truths  these 
statements are a genuine set of true statements. When we say " Frodo takes 
the One Ring to Mordor." we are making a metafictionally true statement, it 
is an ellipses for our actual meaning which is " In the novel The Lord of the  
Rings the character Frodo takes the One Ring to Mordor." So even though 
no such entity as Frodo actually exists, statements about him can be true or 
false at the metafictional level. 
The  final  species  of  truth  is  transfictional.  Transfictional  statements 
compare  aspects  of  the  fictional  world  to  the  real-world.  In  Frigg's 
conception we are not comparing fictional entities with real objects, rather 
we are comparing their properties. When someone asks "Does Tolkien have 
hairy feet like a hobbit?", it is not necessary for hobbits to exist to make this 
an intelligible question, we only need the property of hairiness applied to 
feet  to  exist.  One  criticism  of  this  position  may  be  that  it  is  no  less 
unintelligible  to  talk  about  comparing  the  properties  of  non-existent 
entities than it is to talk about comparing them directly, but if we are clear 
about what we mean by comparing properties I believe there is no mystery. 
The properties must already exist and be referable to. We cannot compare 
non-existent  properties  in  a  transfictional  sense.  If  the  property  already 
exists (or can be made of a linear combination of existing properties) then 
we have ascribed that property in our fictional world to our fictional entity. 
We are  pretending  that  if  such a  thing did  exist  it  would also  have the 
property that is already instantiated by real objects.
TOON'S NON-FICTIONS
Toon,137 by contrast,  has  a  very different  take on how to apply  pretence 
theory  to  models.  Toon's  worry  is  primarily  with  abstract  or  fictional 
objects,  and  how  such  objects  can  be  understood  ontologically.  He  is 
concerned with how such fictional entities can be epistemically connected 
to the world.  In Toon's conception models  are not free floating fictional 
entities,  rather  instead  games  of  make  believe  are  played  directly  from 
target  systems.  Toon  makes  a  great  distinction  between  models  being 
fictional  entities  and their  using  fictional  entities.  A  model  is  a  prop to 
pretend things about a  target system directly, we do not create a fictional 
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system and compare the properties of it to a real system. For example, when 
we discuss an ideal pendulum we do not construct a fictional pendulum that 
inhabits a fictional world and compare this pendulum to a real pendulum. 
Instead we use the model as a prop for imagining certain things about a real  
pendulum, we imagine it  swings frictionlessly, or has a  point mass for a 
bob.138 
To say that War of the Worlds makes it fictional that St. 
Paul's is damaged is not to say that there is some fictional 
realm  in  which  it  is  true  that  St.  Paul's  is  damaged. 
Similarly, to say that it is fictional that the bob is subject 
to a linear restoring force is not to say that there is any 
object of which this is true. It is merely to say that we are 
to imagine of the actual bob that it is subject to a linear 
restoring force (Toon 2010 p. 306/307).
Toon  is  clear  that  he  intends  fictional  statements  to  be  of  type  he 
interprets Wells' description of a damaged St. Paul's to be: that is, fictional 
imaginings about real things. He sees a sharp distinction between this and 
Frigg's treatment. Toon places a lot of metaphysical weight on making the 
distinction between games of make believe which concern referring terms 
and games which are inspired by non-referring terms. For instance, Toon 
contrasts the fictional character of Count Dracula with a satirical cartoon of 
a British politician as a vampire:
Point masses or massless, frictionless springs are certainly 
not things we can collect from the lab store cupboard and 
it is tempting to label them as 'fictional entities'. In fact, 
however,  statements  like  these  also  do  not  generate 
problems with fictional entities. At the last British general 
election,  cartoons  were  published  that  depicted 
Conservative Party leader Michael Howard as a vampire. 
Like  point  masses  vampires  do  not  exist.  But,  if  while 
looking at one of these cartoons, we were to remark that 
'the  vampire  has  long  teeth',  our  statement  would  not 
generate the same problem as the statement 'Dracula has 
long teeth'. Like our prepared description and equation of 
motion, the cartoon represents an actual object, namely 
Michael  Howard.  When  we  say  'the  vampire  has  long 
teeth' we may simply take the vampire to refer to Michael 
Howard,  and understand ourselves as  claiming that  the 
cartoon makes it fictional that Michael Howard has long 
teeth.  Similarly,  if  we  say  'the  point  mass  oscillates 
sinusoidally',  I  think  we  may  understand  ourselves  s 
claiming that  our model makes it  fictional that  the  bob 
oscillates sinusoidally and no troublesome reference to a 
fictional entity occurs (Toon 2010, p. 312).
For  Toon,  Dracula  is  problematic,  he  does  not  exist  and  nor  do  his 
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properties,  discussing  the  properties  of  non-existent  entities  is  no  less 
problematic for Toon than discussing the entities themselves. However by 
contrast,  saying  that  Michael  Howard has  long  teeth  is  merely  game of 
pretend about  the perfectly  intelligible  properties  of  the  referring  entity 
Michael Howard. Since Michael Howard is the proper name of a real entity, 
one assumes, that name refers and so there is no mystery for Toon.
A DEFLATIONARY VIEW
I believe there is a false distinction between Toon and Frigg; once examined 
carefully  both  accounts  amount  to  the  same  set  of  ontological 
commitments. The apparent gap between them can be deflated from both 
sides. Toon's worry about fictional objects is a worry imported from similar 
concerns regarding Platonic  ideal  entities  and abstracta  in  mathematics, 
but for Frigg all an imaginary entity is is a series of thoughts, which is not 
any  more  mysterious  than  any  other  type  of  thinking  and  is  perfectly 
consistent  with  a  materialist  view  of  neuroscience.  There  is  nothing 
ontologically mysterious about the fictional worlds that literature creates: 
they exist in our  heads. They are not worlds at all and are not associated 
with worries about the ontology of possible worlds, for instance. Properly 
understood  fictional  worlds  should  not  be  any  more  ontologically 
problematic than any other kind of thought. 
Moreover,  even  if  Toon's  worries  are  valid  his  solution  is  not.  With 
Toon's conception of pretence theory we have a ship of Theseus problem: 
exactly how many properties of a real entity are we allowed to imaginatively 
alter before it becomes a fictional entity? Toon does not provide a recipe for 
which imaginative leaps are allowed and which are not, and I don't believe 
such a prescription is sensible. Without providing such a metric, what is 
there to stop us imagining that Michael Howard's name is Count Dracula 
and that he (un)lives at Carfax Abbey? How many elements can we alter 
and yet still claim that we are tethered to a real-world entity? Unless the 
allowed props and rules of generation are circumscribed in some manner 
then one can imagine all the properties of a real object to be exactly the 
same as the properties of a fictional object. Imagining properties of a real 
object are changed so drastically it bears no resemblance to its real self and 
it  appears  utterly  fantastical  is  no  different  from imagining  that  such  a 
fantastical entity exists, as long as “exists” is suitably understood as being 
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bookended by appropriate scare quotes. There is nothing at stake between 
these apparently rival takes on pretence theory, whether one prefers Toon's 
emphasis or Frigg's, as their ontological commitments are identical.
MODELS AS EPISTEMIC TOOLS
Knuuttila  &  Boon139 offer  an  interesting  perspective  on  the  interaction 
between representation and explanation. They suggest that models are not 
primarily concerned with reference at all, instead they are epistemic tools 
for  answering specific  questions.  Knuuttila  &  Boon stress  the  pragmatic 
nature  of  models,  they  are  sociological  devices  with  specific  aims,  they 
answer questions but also drive new research. Just as Hughes does, they 
envisage  models  as  being  co-constructed  with  prepared  descriptions  of 
systems.  There is  a dialectical  interaction between the ways systems are 
described, partitioned, categorised, abstracted and modelled. I think we can 
go further and say that this co-construction helps build modal topologies. 
Remember  that  the  modal  topology  of  a  particular  system  is  in  part  a 
function of the variables we choose to categorise that system in terms of. 
What depends upon what depends upon what we are expressing what in  
terms of.  I  will  argue in  the next  chapter  there is  a  defensible  sense of 
objectivity  in  these  choices  but  the  dialectical  nature  of  the  way  modal 
information is extracted and presented within the process of construction of 
models shouldn't be overlooked.
Approaching models as epistemic tools we rather wish to 
stress their use. Nor do we wish to dispute the fact that 
models  often  are  used  to  represent  some  real  target 
systems. Rather, we suggest that scientific model could be 
usefully approached through their artefactual dimension 
as  constructed  entities,  that  give  theoretical 
interpretations  of  some  target  phenomena  in  view  of 
specific  epistemic  purposes  (Knuuttila  &  Boon  2011 p. 
310).
By  conceiving  models  as  artefacts  which  are  constructed,  the  act  of 
modelling becomes of central importance. During this stage new theoretical 
ways of viewing phenomena are formed, which in turn can justify modelling 
assumptions. In this way justificatory steps are intertwined with the act of 
modelling.  Modal  theory  can  account  for  this.  It  is  counterfactuals  that 
matter, but pragmatics can sometimes dictate that some counterfactuals are 
more  important  than  others,  especially  if  the  model  is  constructed  to 
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answer  some  specific  w-questions.  Modal  theory  allows  a  context 
dependent ranking of different models of the same target system, as well as 
giving  an  absolute  measure  of  success  in  the  number  of  w-questions 
answerable. 
In other words, model building is a form of bootstrapping. It dialectically 
interacts with how questions are formed and how background concepts are 
understood: at each stage new elements of the model are built out of the old 
and new ways of  seeing the target  system are  formed.  Models  are  often 
quite malleable in the sense that the same conceptual scaffolding can be 
appropriated by different communities in a form of explanatory exaptation. 
An example of this would be the Ising model: the same basic framework is 
applied  to  many  different  systems,  with  the  elements  of  the  model 
representing  different  things,  and  aspects  of  it  modified  to  particular 
inquisitional  needs.140 Another  example  is  the  many  techniques  shared 
between quantum field theory and solid state physics. These models are like 
old  ships  attracting  different  species  of  representational  barnacle 
depending upon exactly which explanatory seas they sail in. 
CARNOT'S HEAT ENGINE
This process of construction gives us new theoretical insights. Knuuttila & 
Boon cite Carnot's model of an ideal heat engine as an example. Carnot was 
motivated by a practical purpose, his model was created not to represent 
any actual steam engine that existed at the time but to answer a theoretical 
question concerning the ultimate limits on the efficiency of such a device. 
Carnot's model is highly abstract and gets away from many specific details 
of  real  heat  engines,  such  as  construction  materials  and  other  design 
specifics. 
Carnot  aggregates  and  systematises  experimental  knowledge,  but  by 
modelling  in  such  a  highly  abstracted  way  he  is  able  to  make  new 
conceptual leaps that go beyond simply observing what real heat engines 
do. One of these conceptual leaps is the notion of a reversed process, which 
he uses to close his eponymous cycle.141 
Carnot  uses his  model  heat  engine as  an epistemic  tool  for games  of 
make believe, he imagines processes which were not easily accomplished at 
the time (or thought of even). Carnot did not justify his model by direct 
empirical  comparison.  Not  only  was  a  heat  engine  such  as  Carnot's 
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impossible to build but many of the variables he used/manipulated in the 
model were not well defined enough at the time to quantify experimentally 
(examples include temperature and the amount of caloric).
Carnot also made use of a fictional element in the model (although he 
didn't know it), namely the caloric. This was the leading theory of heat at 
the  time  and  Carnot's  model  was  constructed  with  caloric  as  its 
fundamental ontological underpinning. Yet, despite this ontological mistake 
Carnot's  model  worked  in  its  own  terms,  it  correctly  provided  modal 
information and described the limits of the efficiency of heat engines. This 
lesson from history is instructive: Carnot got the modal structure correct 
but the ontology wrong and indeed Carnot's model can be reconfigured with 
modern concepts of heat playing the role of caloric. 
The only fundamental difference between this case and those from semi-
classical chaos theory is that Carnot didn't know he was using a fiction by 
employing  caloric.  Viewed from an  ahistorical  perspective  both types  of 
model  are  explanatory  in  the  same way:  by  getting  the  modal  topology 
correct, not by getting (all, at least) of the fundamental ontology correct.  
The implications this has for our attitudes to realism will be discussed in 
chapter 8. 
Models  are  tools  for  enquiry  to  answer  w-questions  not  to  simply 
represent. We can see this in the allometric scaling law case discussed in 
chapter 3. The model of fractal-like space filling applies to many different 
species, in fact West reduces organisms to a very abstract set of dimensional 
parameters  and  network  connections.  Clearly  they  are  not  aiming  to 
represent (in any intuitive sense) real trees, cats and dogs.  Instead what 
they are motivated by is a particular explanandum. They are probing the 
limits of the efficiency of energy transport in a theoretical organism, just as 
Carnot's heat engine was a theoretical construct for probing the limits of 
efficiency of heat and work. There are no organisms that use actual fractals, 
but there are those that use fractal-like structures, and by examining the 
limits of the ideal pure fractal case the model discovers the limits of real 
world  systems  which  cannot  exceed  that  efficiency.  Like  Carnot's  non-
existent heat engine, West et al.'s abstract organisms are used to probe the 
constraints that apply to real biota. 
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OBJECTIONS TO FICTIONS
There may be some worries about describing models as fictional entities. 
For instance Teller142 points out that just because models contain fictions 
does not mean that they themselves are fictions. He compares models to 
works of non-fiction in which certain details have been changed, such as the 
names of participants, but which are still essentially true representations. 
For  Teller  models  are  veridical  as  long  as  they  get  the  parts  we  are 
interested in correct. Giere143 is equally unhappy at models being described 
as  fictional.  Giere  has  no  problem  with  contending  that  models  are 
ontologically fictions, they are conceptual entities, but they should not be 
branded as fictions because of the way they are used. Fictions tell stories 
and scientific models aim at telling us something true about the world. For 
instance,  there  is  a  clear  distinction  between  a  scientific  model  that 
proposes a means of faster than light travel and an episode of Star Trek in 
which the Enterprise travels at warp speed. The latter is a work of fiction in 
its use, it is intended to entertain. The former is intended to examine what 
is possible in reality. If models are dubbed fictions then distinctions of this 
kind become harder to make.144 
There a few things to say in response to these criticisms. Firstly, as has 
been argued the reason for viewing models as fictions is not solely that they 
contain  fictions,  rather  it  is  to  make  intelligible  the  claim  that  we  can 
manipulate  them.  In  that  sense,  what  I  am claiming is  that  models  are 
ontologically fictions, conceptualisations of the imagination. Teller is quite 
wrong to suggest that models only idealise as a means to ease computation. 
There are many case studies in which the modelling assumptions cannot be 
removed  and,  as  Morrison145 argues,  where  modelling  abstractions  are 
actually necessary for the definition of quantities we wish to parametrise 
the world in terms of. Giere's criticisms hold more weight: he is correct that 
the pragmatics of models makes them very different from literary fictions, 
the intentions of the users are quite different. However, for the purposes of 
extending  manipulationism  this  does  not  matter.  Models  are  highly 
constrained  fictions. They  are  constrained  by  having  to  recreate  modal 
structure. This addresses a concern raised by Frigg of his own account, what 
is  the  difference between the types  of  representations  in  models  and in 
fictions. Models "t-represent" systems but how is that different from literary 
representation? The answer is that t-representation is modally constrained 
representation whereas literary representation isn't.  If  one wishes to call 
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them  something  other  than  fictions  to  delineate  them  from  genuine, 
modally unconstrained, entertainments then so be it. The view of models 
presented  here  is  that  ontologically  they  are  the  same kind  of  entity  as 
works of fiction and that in pragmatic terms they are modally constrained 
games,  the use of the word fiction to describe models here shouldn't  be 
taken as implying anything more.
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6 | MANIPULATIONISM
RESURRECTED
 
To explain  is  to  recreate  a  section  of  the  modal  topology  of  the  world. 
However,  recreating  the  modal  topology  of  the  world  is  not  a 
straightforward matter of reading off a representational structure from the 
world.  There is  a certain perspectivism at  work: the modal topology will 
depend upon the choice of variables that we express facts about the system 
in terms of. This is what is at work in the co-construction of models and 
prepared descriptions: the “natural” variable basis is often discovered by 
the process of modelling itself. Of course, sometimes the choice of variables 
will be obvious or seem natural in some sense, but that does not mean that 
a choice has not been made.146
James Woodward's manipulationist theory is  a modal account of how 
causal explanations work; when we manipulate a system and answer What-
if-things-had-been-different? questions  then  we  explain.  Bokulich  and 
Woodward have each suggested that  to extend manipulationism to non-
causal  explanations  requires  dropping  manipulations  and  instead  just 
concentrating  on  bare  counterfactuals,  but  as  shown  in  chapter  4,  this 
cannot straightforwardly work.147 
However, by providing formal analogues of all of Woodward's technical 
apparatus for models it  is  possible to keep, and extend, the successes of 
manipulationism.  Rejecting  manipulations  risks  losing  these  successes. 
This  canonicalisation  of  manipulationism  to  non-causal  explanation 
involves  a  synthesis  of  concepts.  If  we  combine  the  idea  of  models  as 
fictional  objects  with  the  notion  that  models  are  tools  for  epistemic 
investigation we can make intelligible a version of manipulationism applied 
to  models.  Models  are  pseudo-objects  to  which  the  logic  of 
manipulationism also applies. Scientists construct models to play games of 
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sophisticated, target driven, make believe. At the beginning of construction 
the  props  and  explicit  rules  of  generation  are  set.  The  props  are  the 
idealised, fiction filled, abstracted models. The rules of generation are the 
invariances of the informing background theory, or theories, that the model 
comes  out  of,  as  well  as  the  rules  of  the  “medium”  of  the  model.  For 
example, the rules of mathematics or of a particular computer algorithm 
etc.148 
These  models  are  manipulated  conceptually.  Scientists  perform  m-
interventions  on  input  parameters  to  ask  and  answer  w-questions.  Of 
course  what  counts  as  an  input  parameter  will  be  a  function  of  the 
particular model's construction. Since this is a game of make believe, the 
manipulations are not real manipulations or subject to the rules associated 
with actual causal manipulations. Instead m-interventions are constrained 
by  the  fictional  world  they  take  place  in.  They  reveal  unknown  m-
invariances resultant from, but not explicitly put in by hand to, the model 
set  up.  M-interventions are a  means of  exploring the consequences of  a 
particular  model  and  of  determining  what  depends  upon  what  in  that 
fictional world.
Once we are liberated from the constraint of causal manipulations new 
ways of thinking about manipulation open up. Novel types of manipulation 
are possible within a fictional world. We are no longer constrained by the 
limits  Woodward places  upon when manipulations  are  intelligible.  Each 
fictional world has its own rules and its own limitations on m-interventions. 
As such, impossible, arguably unintelligible, counter-legal manipulations in 
the real-world become perfectly viable in the game. Consider the allometric 
scaling  law  case:  it  makes  no  sense  in  the  real-world  to  talk  about 
manipulating  the  mathematics  of  fractals  and  what  consequences  that 
would  have  for  allometric  scaling,  however,  internal  to  the  model,  it  is 
possible and intelligible.149 
NEW MODELS, NEW WORLDS
As stated, m-interventions allow m-invariances to be discovered, that is we 
can discover invariances inside the fictional world that were not explicitly 
put in by hand. These m-invariances themselves can subsequently form new 
rules of generation. For example returning to our magnetohydrodynamic 
shock, we may find that the shock in the analytic model is vulnerable to 
123
linear perturbations at some parameter values but not others. The unstable 
values may be inputted into our computer model of the same system to see 
how the perturbations grow and change with the evolution of the shock. 
This type of research strategy is not uncommon; nested groups of models 
producing rules of generation for one another. The notion of the fictional 
world is central to explicating how modal information can be captured in 
these cases.150 
Remember within the framework of capturing modal topology variable 
choice is crucial to producing those topologies: the variable basis chosen 
constrains and limits  the possible  modal  topology that  can be captured. 
Once one variable base is chosen certain aspects of the “ideal modal text” 
will be inexpressible in that base. A different base could give us access to 
different  modal  information,  although  two  different  bases  for  the  same 
system must agree when there is overlap of modal information and have 
compatible  bridging  conditions.  In  other  words,  some questions  are  not 
even askable at  certain levels of  ontology hence are not answerable.  For 
instance, Batterman's tap droplets cannot be discussed in the same terms at 
the  molecular  level  as  at  the  fluid  element  level.  Laplace's  demon  may 
theoretically have the maximum amount of modal information possible but 
this  is  illusionary,  without  the  ability  to  step  back  and  choose  an 
appropriate variable set the demon cannot answer questions about what 
depends  upon  what  in  terms  of  certain  variables.  Just  as  viewing  the 
evolution of organisms as a summation of causal events will never provide 
the  section  of  modal  topology  that  tells  one  how  such  organisms  are 
constrained by the limits on space filling. 
The fictional world of  a model is  not a complete possible world,  it  is 
much  more  circumscribed  and  has  no  ontological  commitments;  it  is 
imaginary after all. Because these fictional worlds are not fully realised we 
only have to propagate changes in them through the limited space that is 
necessary to construct the fictional world, not through a complete alternate 
reality. Entities and concepts that exist in the real world but play no part in 
a  fictional world simply do not exist in that fictional world and we don't 
have  to  worry  about  how  our  m-interventions  affect  them.  In  an 
evolutionary  biology  model  we  do  not  need  to  worry  how  our  m-
interventions would affect the possible formation of stars, say, or anything 
else that is outside the model.151
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MODEL  EXPLANATION  &  SYMMETRY:  THREE  ROUTES  TO 
ASYMMETRY
One of the key features of explanation is asymmetry.  Often models display 
structural  covariance,  two elements vary in correlation but one does not 
cause the other.152 How do models then obtain asymmetry in explanations?
THE FIRST ROUTE: PARALLEL T-INTERVENTIONS
The  first  route  to  asymmetry  is  parallel  target  interventions  (t-
interventions). A parallel t-intervention is  when we have an  actual real-
world causal manipulation counterpart of the model m-intervention. Since 
we have these analogues and because  only some of  the m-interventions  
have  analogue  t-interventions,  the  symmetrical  model  explanation  is 
turned into an asymmetrical explanation when applied to the target system. 
Some  models  display  symmetry  within  the  model  with  respect  to  m-
interventions. That is, fictional manipulations do not pick out asymmetries. 
Internal  to  the  model  then  we have a  symmetrical  covariance.  We gain 
asymmetry from the asymmetry in carrying over m-interventions into t-
interventions. So, for instance in the case of a pendulum inside a model we 
can manipulate period to find the length or length to find period, but in the 
target system we can only perform one of these manipulations. Hence, the 
symmetry of the model is broken when applied to the target and we gain an 
asymmetrical and now causal explanation.153 
THE SECOND ROUTE: M-INTERVENTIONS
M-interventions pick out asymmetry directly. That is, in some models the 
fictional manipulations themselves pick out asymmetries. Remember that a 
fictional world still  has its  own rules,  not  every manipulation is  allowed 
within a given fictional world (different fictional worlds have different rules 
for which variables can be m-manipulated). Imagine a computer model of 
galaxy formation in which the mass of neutrinos is  a free variable to be 
altered,  and  different  resultant  galaxy  formations  found.  There  is 
asymmetry  in  the  explanation.  Internal  to  the  fictional  world  an  m-
intervention on neutrino mass picks out different outcomes. This is not the 
same kind of model as the pendulum in which internal to the model there is 
merely  a  deductive  symmetrical  relation.  We  cannot  manipulate  galaxy 
formation rate to see the effect on neutrino mass. Even though we have no 
parallel t-intervention our m-intervention picks out an asymmetry internal 
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to our particular model.
To  pick  out  asymmetry  manipulations  must  be  constrained.  In  the 
pendulum  case  the  manipulations  are  only  constrained  external  to  the 
model  in  experimental  conditions.  In  Woodward's  causal  explanation 
manipulations  are  not  constrained  by  what  can  actually  be  performed, 
manipulation is not historicised to the technology a community has or to 
their  physical  abilities.  Instead  manipulations  (t-interventions)  are 
constrained  by  wider  conceptual  considerations,  Woodward's  so  called 
“serious  possibilities”.  For  instance  an  explanation  of  the  resultant 
observable  consequences  of  two  galaxies  colliding  would  involve  the 
manipulation  of  the  galaxy  trajectory,  a  manipulation  which  cannot  be 
performed by any human. 
I contend that m-interventions are similarly constrained, (they have to 
be constrained to provide asymmetry) but the rules  that  constrain them 
depend  upon  a  particular  model  conceptualisation.  Creating  a  fictional 
world expands the range of serious possibilities and redefines them internal 
to that fiction. Manipulations are still constrained inside that world though, 
there are elements of the model that are not manipulable internal to the 
model.154 
Think of it this way: in the fictional world of Middle Earth there are laws 
which cannot be changed and those which can. We can ask what would have 
happened if Frodo had not reached Mordor, and try and answer this, but we 
cannot ask what would Frodo have done if Superman had come to help him. 
The latter question requires building a new fictional world with new rules, it  
cannot be accommodated in the former because it is not consistent with the 
rules of generation for that particular world. This aspect of the constraints 
on the rules internal to a fictional world allows disunities in models to be 
understood.  Different  elements  can  be  allocated  different  roles  and 
properties  within a  model,  the natural  kinds  of  the real  world need not 
translate to the fictional world and different partitionings are possible. The 
internal logic of a model can have what in the real world are fundamentally 
the same kind of entity perform different roles internal to the model.
As with the case of the Coulomb wire we can see how this should affect 
our  understanding  of  Woodward's  t-manipulations.  When  we  discuss 
manipulating  galaxy  trajectory  we  are  actually  model  building  and  m-
intervening.  There  is  no  real-world  t-intervention  we  could  actually 
perform, but there is a continuity in conceptualisation between the two. The 
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t-manipulation is a scaling up of the actual real-world manipulations we 
can perform.  Just  as  a  lab  might  conduct  plasma physics  research then 
apply it to astronomical bodies under very different circumstances. Some of 
the experimental results will translate over, some will not, it is a matter of 
judgement.  So  we  have  a  hierarchy  involving  the  translatability  of  m-
interventions. M-interventions that translate directly to t-interventions are 
those we can perform, actual interventions as it were, as in the pendulum 
case.  M-interventions  that  translate  to  t-interventions  that  we  cannot 
perform (but are still interventions in Woodward's defined sense), altering 
pathways  of  galaxies  and the like,  are  a  set  of  t-interventions  that  have 
conceptual  continuity  with  actual  interventions.  For  instance,  they  only 
have local effects in spacetime. M-interventions that don't have parallel t-
interventions exist only in the model. The logic internal to models of these 
types of intervention is the same, we change a variable to see what depends 
upon it keeping other variables constant
THE THIRD ROUTE: STRUCTURAL HIERARCHIES
Sometimes there will be a structural hierarchies of constraints, so we will 
have  a  nested  hierarchy  of  constraints  that  provides  explanatory 
asymmetry. For example, the dimensionality of space-time is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for planetary stability, but not vice versa.155 
Another example is the allometric scaling law case presented in chapter 
3. We identify a constraint, in this case geometrical, upon what an organism 
can  do.  Fractals  are  ideal  mathematical  objects  representing  the  upper 
boundaries of how efficiently a volume can be packed. Biological organisms 
using  pseudo-fractals  cannot  exceed  this  limit,  but  if  evolution  has 
optimised  their  energy  transport  structure  then  they  will  approach  this 
limit, so the limit can be explanatory. It answers why certain aspects apply 
generally  to  all  organisms.  In  the  same  way  the  ergodic  hypothesis  in 
statistical  mechanics  operates  as  a  limit.  The  ergodic  hypothesis  is  not 
strictly  true,  but by assuming a system does explore all  of  its  possibility 
space  we  can  answer  certain  questions  as  long  as  we  can  show  it's 
reasonable to expect it to explore a sufficient fraction of its possibility space. 
Constraints limit this possibility space and explanations often amount to 
saying what the limits of systems are.
These constraints  are hierarchical;  we have asymmetries in them and 
some are prior to others. Again, returning to the allometric scaling law case,  
the  maximum  efficiency  of  ideal  fractal  space  filling  constrains  pseudo-
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fractal  filling  by  organisms,  but  not  vice  versa.  If  organisms  had  never 
evolved to reach the limit of their space filling it would not alter what the 
theoretical  maximum  of  such  a  process  is.  In  the  same  way,  the 
dimensionality of space-time may be a necessary condition for planetary 
stability  but  it  is  not  a  sufficient  one.  There  may be many reasons  why 
planets are not stable, or do not even form, and yet this would not change 
the number of space-time dimensions we need for stability in principle. In 
deciding what depends upon what, using what is logically prior to what is a 
source of explanatory asymmetry.  In Noether's  theorem it  is  shown that 
several  conservation  laws  are  the  result  of  more  basic  symmetry 
assumptions. For instance, conservation of linear momentum results from 
the  assumption  of  linear  space  translational  invariance:  a  physics 
experiment colliding ball bearings in Leeds or in Seattle ought to have the 
same result all things being equal. This symmetry is a prior conditional. We 
could imagine a sparse universe in which we only have two ball bearings 
that never collide; as such we may never see an example of conservation of 
linear  momentum  but  we  could  still  see  a  homogeneous  universe  with 
translational symmetry.156
In the spacetime geometry case we create a model, a fictional world, in 
which  we  can  m-intervene  on  the  dimensionality  variable  and  see  how 
stability depends upon it.  We answer w-questions internal to the model, 
then because of  wider  justificatory  steps,  we  extend some of  our  modal 
conclusions to the target system even though the parallel t-intervention is 
impossible conceptually. We have a multiple realisability in our hierarchy. 
Our hierarchical intuitions may influence model construction and implicitly 
feed into the rules of the fictional worlds that constrain m-interventions. So 
in the dimensionality case we can m-intervene on spacetime dimensions 
but not planetary stability.  In the topological description of our directed 
graphs  of  influence,  we  have  lines  of  dependence  entering  nodes  of 
variables.  The nodes can be one of three kinds,  a source (lines can only 
leave not enter), a sink (lines can enter but not leave), or a saddle point 
(lines can enter and leave). Whether a node is one type or another will vary 
with the model and the other nodes it is being connected to. 
Woodward (private communication) has suggested all asymmetries can 
be  recovered  from  such  structural  hierarchies  without  m-interventions. 
Although many m-intervention asymmetries may come out of the deeper 
structural  hierarchies  I  believe  they  are  still  useful  as  sometimes 
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dependence will not be obvious in the set up of a system (such as which 
variables depend upon what in a computer model, the links may be non-
causal but the asymmetries not straightforwardly read off from structural 
hierarchies).  They also  allow a  straightforward  application  of  invariance 
under testing m-interventions to be applied to explanatory generalisations. 
Invariance may be able to be articulated in terms of structural hierarchies 
alone but it is not entirely clear how to do so.
RE-EXAMINING CAUSAL EXPLANATION
This proposed extension of Woodward's account may also give new insights 
into aspects of manipulationism as a purely causal theory. One case study of 
manipulationist causal explanation Woodward discusses at some length is 
that of explaining the shape/intensity of the electric field generated by a 
wire  carrying  a  current  of  a  particular  geometry.  Many  specifics  of  the 
electric  field  are  resultant  from  the  geometry  of  the  wire,  yet  in  the 
presentation of the case manipulations seemingly play no role. In the way 
Woodward actually describes the explanation we seem to have a standard 
DN type explanatory scheme, laws and principles are declared and from 
mathematical analysis the field is deduced.157 Saatsi & Pexton158 suggest that 
one  interpretation  of  the  apparent  discrepancy  between  the  theory  of 
manipulationist  causal  explanation  and  the  way  case  studies  like  these 
actually work is that there is a profound difference between explanations of 
generalities and explanations of particular cases. The idea is that general 
explanations identify structural relationships between elements: to explain 
the relationship between the geometry of the wire and the electric field we 
simply  require  a  general  counterfactual  covariance  between  the  two,  no 
manipulations play a role in the deduction. However, once we think about a 
particular wire and a  particular field manipulations do play a role. In an 
experimental set up we can change the shape of a wire to alter a field; there 
is  an  asymmetry  brought  about  by  manipulations.  This  causal 
manipulationist explanation is for that single particular wire, but to explain 
wires and fields in general no manipulations are necessary. 
Although interesting I believe there are some open questions with this 
distinction. Firstly are general explanations always symmetrical? We can 
easily deduce in general the shape of the wire from the field if we wish, but 
does this explain the wire geometry? One potential difficulty in drawing the 
129
distinction between the particular and the general in this way is explicating 
what exactly the relationship between the two is. For example, what does 
the “general” in general explanation actually refer to? One intuition might 
be that the general set is the aggregation of the members of that set, but this 
would lead to a seemingly paradoxical situation. If we have a non-statistical 
explanation of the general set of wires and fields that doesn't apply to any 
one particular wire and field,  then we have a situation in which we can 
explain two wires and two fields, but we cannot explain either one of them. 
What does it mean to say we have explained something about the set of 
wires  and  fields  as  a  whole  if  by  doing  so  we  haven't  also  explained 
something  about  the  members  of  that  set?  Or  to  put  it  another  way,  I 
believe the aggregation of explanations for every individual wire and field 
that exists should be enough to explain the set of every wire and field.159 
There is another possible interpretation. The Coulomb wire as presented 
by Woodward is actually an example of an abstract model explanation. As 
such  through  m-interventions  we  can  vary  parameters  in  the  model  to 
discover the resultant changes in the model world. Internal to the model the 
set  of  m-interventions  is  larger  than  the  set  of  actual  manipulations 
possible, so we can m-intervene on the electric field to answer w-questions 
about the shape of the wire and so on. The parallel set of real manipulations 
possible breaks the symmetry of  the explanation once we take it  from a 
model and apply it to a real wire. As such the distinction is not between 
explaining wires and fields in general and in particular, but in explaining a 
particular  wire  through  a  model  of  it  or  through  an  experimental 
manipulation. This kind of modelling step is often overlooked because it is 
such a natural  shift  into experimental considerations but I  believe many 
causal explanations actually have a subtle intermediate modelling step. 
The distinction to be made is not between wires and fields in general and 
in particular, each requiring a different type of explanation. Rather it is that 
a model of a wire & field and a real experimental wire & field are different 
types of epistemic tool to investigate with. As such we don't need to worry 
as to how we connect the particular to the general in explanations (with the 
general explanation not being sufficient for a particular wire, and the sum 
of  all  actual  particular  wire  explanations  not  being  sufficient  to  explain 
wires in general).160 We need only worry about how to connect models to 
the real world, which was our worry to begin with.161
One advantage of extending interventions beyond the strictly causal is 
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that  we are free to define some other physical  process  as  definitional of  
causation.  This  has  implications  for  negative  causation  for  instance.  In 
Woodward's  scheme  we  can  intervene  to  prevent  something  happening 
therefore  bringing  about  another  outcome.  Woodward interprets  this  as 
causal  explanation,  or  defines  it  as  such  since  it  is  a  difference  making 
outcome of an intervention. Should this be thought of as a causal process 
though? If interventions are not always causal, then in this case we are free 
to say that negative causation does not exist, while still being able to say 
what cases like this have in common with other interventions which we do 
call causal. So, if we wish to believe in physical causation we can hold that 
there is a distinction, but identify why in our modes of thinking the two 
processes are often both described as causal: they involve counterfactuals 
and difference making and interventions. In both cases we build a model of 
the system and m-intervene, it is just that in one model the variables are 
negative.  This  requires  intervention  to  not  be  the  definition  of  a  causal 
process.162 If  we  decouple  intervention  from  causation  definitionally  we 
make intervention compatible with a physical notion of causation. It allows 
negative causation to be regarded as metaphysically different from positive 
causation. Intervention becomes a theoretical tool in explanation not the 
de-facto  process  by  which  causation  is  defined  as  Woodward's  account 
might  imply.  So  whether  an  intervention  is  causal  or  not  is  open  to 
interpretation,  and  if  a  particular  physical  process  is  proposed  as  the 
definition of causation then interventions that instantiate that process will 
be causal, while interventions that do not will not be causal but a tool for 
counterfactual explanation. 
Real manipulations are not a subset of model manipulations, they are a 
parallel process, each reflecting different epistemic access routes to modal 
information.  There  are  three  categories  of  manipulations.  The  first  are 
actual manipulations that we can perform, in experiments etc., this category 
is  historically  contingent.  The  second  category  is  model  manipulations, 
which  are  a  parallel  category  to  actual  manipulations.  They  are  not 
dependent  upon  what  can  actually  be  done  or  limited  to  causal 
manipulations, only constrained by the rules inside a model world, counter-
legal manipulations are allowed for example. Thirdly we have a subset of 
model manipulations, those which are dubbed causal in some sense. They 
are imaginable as potential manipulations humans may be able to do in the 
future, or more broadly they are on a continuum with those manipulations 
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which we can do, they are localised in spacetime, and involve many of the 
same types of physical interactions etc. This third category in Woodward's 
account is indistinguishable from the first. In his scheme manipulations are 
not relativised to technology or history, rather they are a special kind of 
causal  process.  He does not,  and does not aim to,  tell  us  what a  causal 
process actually is. He presupposes such a notion and describes all similar 
manipulations as causal. 
One difficulty I think with this is that it relies on an intuition of what a 
causal  manipulation is.  By separating these types of  interventions out  it 
allows one to bring a specific definition of cause of one's own. For instance, 
if  one  is  a  physicalist  about  causation,  such  as  Dowe163,  many  of  the 
processes  dubbed  causal  in  manipulationist  theory  (the  aforementioned 
negative  causation)  are  not  properly  causal  at  all.  In  this  generalised 
scheme  there  is  no  need  for  conflict,  since  explanation  is  about  modal 
information,  which we access  through manipulations,  but manipulations 
are no longer exclusively causal. We can divide the model manipulations 
into causal or  non-causal manipulations depending upon one's preferred 
definition of a causal process. One may recover Woodward's demarcation, 
but if one doesn't then it is not a problem for extended manipulationism as 
a theory of explanation.164
MODEL EXPLANATIONS
Models are fictional so non-referring terms within them pose no particular 
problem, as long as the properties of those fictions refer. Because models 
are  fictional  conceptual  entities  there  is  no  mystery  as  to  how  we  can 
manipulate  them:  m-interventions  are  the  conceptual  changes  allowed 
within the rules  of  the  fictional  world.  The m-interventions  are  licensed 
moves in a game of make believe. Which manipulations are possible is not 
set by experimental standards (or some, potentially vague, generalisation of 
the physical processes involved in causation in experiments), but is set by 
the props and rules of generation in the fictional world of the model. The 
logic of experimental manipulation underpins both notions. 
Models  are  props  for  fictional  thinking.  All  that  matters  in  an 
explanatory  context  is  that  models  capture  modal  structure.  The 
explanatory role of models in modern science can be primary in some cases,  
their representational role secondary. Models are epistemic tools, and the 
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means of representation165 and the limits of misrepresentation are set by a 
particular  explanatory  context.  Knowing  which  parts  of  reality  can  be 
misrepresented to facilitate capturing modal structure is a skilled art. The 
modal  connections  between  variables  depends  upon the  choice  of  those 
variables,  hence  justificatory  steps  are  built  into  model  construction, 
demonstrating  that  the  choice  of  variables  will  lead  to  fruitful  modal 
connections. Models may capture modal structure through different means. 
Which properties a system has is in part a matter of perspective. That is, 
viewed  from  certain  perspectives  of  coarse  graining  and 
universality/abstraction certain systems appear as if they have a certain set 
of properties they may not actually possess.  This surrealistic take on the 
properties of systems allows the use of nihil models to be understood. These 
perspectives are not hopelessly relative, they are not cultural, rather they 
reflect the epistemic limits of human minds, just as the arrow of time may 
be an illusion of sorts, an artefact of the way human cognition operates, but 
that does not mean it cannot be explanatory. 
Abstraction  can  remove  unexplanatory  irrelevancies  and  allow 
dependencies to be perceived from the mass of specific details. They also 
allow generalities to be discovered and otherwise diverse phenomena to be 
unified.  Nihil  models  should  be  viewed  in  the  same  terms.  The  non-
removable idealisations of asymptotic explanations allow disparate systems 
to be viewed as sharing common modal topologies relative to a particular 
variable set, even though the concrete micro-realisers of those systems, and 
the short term behaviour, may be very different. In the same way physical 
fictions, such as those used in semi-classical methods, allow common modal 
structure to be explicated,  as we can say what different systems have in 
common.  Two  different  quantum  billiards  may  each  be  described 
numerically in purely quantum terms but we can see the continuity between 
them, a continuity based upon modal structure, by modelling them using 
non-referring classical elements. 
This modal theory of models offers a middle ground between semantic 
and  pragmatic  intuitions.  The  notion  of  models  as  fictional  worlds, 
constructed as tools for inquiry that contain context dependent props and 
user defined rules of generation, allows us to include a lot of the desirable 
aspects of the pragmatic approach. Yet at the same time, we can go beyond 
some of the potential fuzziness of these accounts and say what is objectively 
necessary  in science that  is  not required of  works of  literary  fiction,  for 
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instance. That objective, ontic, component is found in requiring explanatory 
models to capture the modal structure of the world. That modal structure 
can  be  explored  and  investigated  by  pseudo-manipulating  models  to 
discover what  depends  upon what  in  them,  then demonstrating that  we 
have reason to think the model is modally accurate, either by experimental 
confirmation,  novel  prediction,  bootstrapping,  or  top-down  justification 
from wider theoretical considerations.166 
Once  viewed  as  fictions,  having  fictions  within  fictions  shouldn't 
particularly worry us, just as a play within a play in Hamlet shouldn't worry 
an audience. How can a work of literature without referring terms say true 
things about the world? By containing true statements about properties and 
relations between things in the world. Containing a fictional element within 
a nihil model should not worry us in and of itself as any advanced model is  
itself a fiction that recreates modal structure.
SUMMARY
The kernel at the heart of all explanation is capturing modal structure, how 
this is achieved varies greatly from case to case, but once models themselves 
are  viewed as  fictional  entities  fictional  elements  within  them shouldn't 
pose any particular difficulty. If we can provide modal information by using 
fictions then they can be explanatory. The reason why a fictional entity is 
able to capture certain elements of modal structure will vary from case to 
case.167 Often it will involve some kind of structure that the world has, or 
appears to have when viewed from a certain perspective, that is recreated 
by the model. So in the case of quantum chaos, an overlap of dynamical 
structure  is  important  to  understanding  how  these  models  can  be 
explanatory, but the dynamical structure is a means to an end, that end 
being modal structure. In that sense the “structure” in Bokulich's structural 
model explanations should be generally understood as modal structure.168 
By understanding structure as modal structure we see there may be many 
means  to  capture  this,  partial-isomorphisms,  similarity,  analogy  etc. 
Whether fictions are explanatorily tolerable will depend upon the specific 
explanandum. In one explanatory context a fiction may aid in the capturing 
of a section of the modal topology of a system, but in a different context, 
with different explanatory requests, that same fiction may destroy any hope 
of providing the correct modal information.169 
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We are still left with an ontological puzzle, do non-referring explanatory 
terms force  us  to  either  adopt  an  anti-realist  view of  explanation,  or  to 
adopt  a  purely  epistemic  definition  of  explanation?  After  all  the  ontic 
intuition would suggest we may get understanding from nihil models but 
we do not get explanations, the objective facts about the world that tell us 
what is  responsible for what.  In chapter 7 I  will  defend a circumscribed 
form of realism and ontic explanation. A type of ontic explanation that is 
compatible  with  the  canonicalised  manipulationist  framework  presented 
here, a form of modal surrealism that fits nicely with this picture of models.  
Ontic yet surreal facts, can be used in explanations if they are capable of 
reproducing  modal  structure.  It  is  a  sign  of  a  sophisticated  advanced 
scientific  community that they can knowingly use explanatory fictions in 
this way, but it also is an appropriate framework for viewing historical case 
studies, such as in Carnot's, in which fictions were used unwittingly. 
PART 3 | THE CHANGING SHAPES
OF KNOWLEDGE
Language serves not only to express 
thought but to make possible thoughts 
which could not exist without it.
-BERTRAND RUSSELL
I am certain of nothing but the holiness of the 
Heart's affections and the truth 
of Imagination- what the imagination
 seizes as Beauty must be truth- 
whether it existed before or not 
-JOHN KEATS
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7 | PERSPECTIVISM
 
In  the  previous  chapters  it  has  been  argued  that  the  fundamental 
characteristic of explanation is  to provide modal information. Given this 
contention, it is natural to wonder how such a position should affect our 
attitude  to  realist  claims  which  often  result  from  the  explanatory  and 
predictive success of scientific theories. Furthermore, we may also wonder 
how  the  nature  of  explanation  as  presented  here  fits  into  the  broad 
intuitions of ontic and epistemic explanation and whether a synthesis of 
elements from these two positions is possible. In this chapter it is suggested 
that the best framework for incorporating the explanatory power of fictions 
is a form of surrealism. The surrealism defended here is actually a form of 
curtailed realism. The claim is that by providing modal information we can 
say something about  the objective structure  of  the  world even if  we get 
ontological  facts  wrong.  If  we  define  explanation  in  terms  of  modal 
information alone, and allow nihil models to be explanatory, then we need 
to pin down fully the sense of explanation that these cases of using fictions 
embody. I reject the epistemic conception of explanation but will seek to 
capture  what  is  good  about  the  position  in  a  revised  form  of  ontic 
explanation.170
At the heart of the surrealist notion presented here is the idea that if the 
world consistently looks as if a certain entity exists, in a given explanatory 
context, then that can be the basis of providing objective modal structure, 
even  if  ultimately  that  entity  is  merely  a  fiction.  This  of  course  seems 
paradoxical:  a  non-existent  entity  may  facilitate  understanding  but  it 
cannot form part of the network of facts that make up an ontic explanation. 
Yet,  I  will  argue  that  if  ontic  explanation  is  suitably  stratified  this 
paradoxical aspect can be circumvented and fictions can give us much more 
in explanations than the psychological comfort of understanding. Bokulich, 
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for  instance,  implies  that  fictions  function  in  a  form  of  epistemic 
explanation. Semi-classical models give us understanding. I reject this and 
contend that nihil models are a form of ontic explanation.171 
Surrealism is the position that in particular empirical domains the world 
can appear as if certain ontologies exist, and that appearance is all that is 
required for a type of explanation within that domain. That is to say that 
explanations of  phenomena in those empirical  domains can invoke such 
ontologies without implying those ontologies are necessarily real. But this, 
in and of itself, does not imply that ontologies used in explanation are not 
real. Does surrealism collapse into either a form of anti-realism, such as van 
Fraassen's constructive empiricism,172 or realism, such as ontic structural 
realism173 or  epistemic174 structural  realism? No it  doesn't,  since  both of 
these  stronger  positions  add  something  more  to  my  claim  about 
appearances.
Constructive empiricism adds a local realist criterion for observable in 
principle  phenomena.  Constructive  empiricists  may  be  agnostic  about 
unobservables  invoked  in  explanations,  but  not  about  observables. 
Surrealism does not endorse such a distinction between the observable and 
unobservable.  There  is  no  reason  to  judge  explanations  that  invoke 
unobserved  observables  as  having  stronger  proposed  ontologies  than 
explanations that propose unobservable in principle ontologies. (For that 
matter even the actually observed may be suspect in surrealism.) We use 
dinosaurs  to  explain  parts  of  the  fossil  record,  but  that  only  implies  a 
surrealism about dinosaurs, just as the standard model implies a surrealism 
about quarks. In contrast, for the constructive empiricist,  an explanatory 
claim about dinosaurs is fundamentally different from one about quarks for 
reasons that are nothing to do with explanatory power.
Similarly, surrealism does not collapse into structural realism in either 
the ontic or epistemic formulations. For a start, surrealism is unequivocal in 
the endorsement of modal information as being the structure that matters 
during  theory  change,  whereas  structural  realism  can  emphasise  other 
types of structure that are preserved, such as mathematical structure. Of 
course, other features are often preserved, but for the surrealist it is only 
the modal structure that matters. Furthermore, ontic structural realism is 
not agnostic about the ontology of entities used in explanations at different 
levels, rather it seeks to foundationally derive the appearance of all entity 
ontology from structural  ontology alone.  (Again it  is  not  clear  that  it  is 
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modal structure alone that grounds the appearance of other ontology in this 
scheme, rather than, say, the symmetry principles of fundamental physics). 
Surrealism  says  something  different:  there  may  well  be  good  local 
arguments  for  being  realist  about  certain  entities  that  do  not  involve 
explanatory power.  Even if  there aren't  such local  arguments,  the modal 
structure does not ground or constitute entities in any way. One may now 
say that surrealism is in fact simply epistemic structural realism. But again, 
it  is  not  clear  that  all  the  epistemic  structural  realist  is  claiming is  that  
modal structure is what can be known, rather than other types of structure. 
Even  if  that  is  the  claim,  surrealism  does  not  rule  out  local  realist 
knowledge of entities in principle as epistemic structural realism does. 
Surrealism is therefore a distinct position, neither realist nor anti-realist, 
yet  compatible  with  both  if  one  wishes  to  apply  other  arguments  to 
strengthen it in either direction. One can supplement it with a principled 
distinction  between  observable  and  unobservable  to  turn  it  into 
constructive  empiricism.  Or,  one  can  supply  other  arguments  for  the 
privileging of structure over entities, and turn it into a form of structural 
realism.  But,  for  better  or  worse,  these  extra  arguments  do  not,  in  my 
opinion,  come out  of  an  analysis  of  explanatory  practice  alone,  whereas 
surrealism does. 
The  world  when  suitably  abstracted,  coarse  grained  and  idealised 
appears as if certain entities and structures are in it even though they are 
not. Yet we can explain using these fictions because they reliably track a 
certain  epistemic  perspective.  The  explanation  is objective  once  the  
perspective is fixed and the surreal facts that flow from a perspective are 
the basis for a type of ontic explanation. This surrealistic explanation allows 
many of the virtues of epistemic explanation to be incorporated into a form 
of ontic explanation. For instance, being an explanatory pluralist is not only 
consistent but necessary from this viewpoint, but we still have a minimum 
standard  for  explanation  and  an  objectivity  otherwise  lacking  in  the 
epistemic tradition. Notions like understanding, that the epistemic tradition 
is usually explicated in terms of, are highly historically, sociologically and 
psychologically relativised.175 By contrast, modal information is only relative 
to a variable set. A species of perspectivism is inherent to the process of 
building scientific models and in defining modal topologies. It is in these 
perspectives that epistemic notions can be contained without spilling over 
into  the  objective  ontic  modal  structure;  they  allow  us  to  discover  and 
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represent.176 
MAKING A CASE FOR PERSPECTIVISM
There is no Archimedean point from which to view the world. Humans are 
epistemically  curtailed and as  such we have particular  perspectives.  The 
aim of science, in part, is to take us beyond such limited perspectives, but 
there are boundaries to this process and epistemic attitudes are ultimately 
built  into science.  Because we have limited epistemic access our vantage 
point shapes our very concepts of explanation. 
As  much  as  science  strives  to,  and  should  strive  to,  take  human 
perspectives  out  of  theories,  we  cannot  completely,  since  our  epistemic 
attitudes are informed by such perspectives.177 We are meso-level creatures 
that experience the world at a certain level of coarse graining,  and these 
perspectives are not just artefacts of culture. 
As an example consider the arrow of time. Post General Relativity many 
physicists  and philosophers speculate  that  we live  in  a  so called “block” 
universe. That is, the present is an illusion, and has no special status. The 
past and the future co-exist with it and our perceived arrow of time is a 
projection  of  human  experience,  an  epiphenomenal  construction  of  our 
minds.178 This human perspective is plausibly not subjective in any but the 
most extreme sense. It  is  quite possible that neurologically humans, and 
other animals, have brains that must perceive temporally ordered events. 
That is to say, that brains such as ours cannot step outside  some kind of 
temporal  ordering.  Our  cultural  attitudes  to  time may  vary,  as  will  our 
perception of how quickly or slowly time is flowing. But no human has ever 
had  a  brain  that  perceives  the  distant  future,  distant  past,  and  present 
simultaneously atemporally. (Or if they have it is a very atypical experience 
difficult  to objectively  verify).  So,  for  us,  it  seems like  a  commonly held 
objective perception that  time has some sort of  ordering and this  is  not 
solely a culturally derived concept. So despite the true state of the world 
perhaps being very  different,  temporal  ordering is  part  of  our  epistemic 
perspective and it can be used in explanations. We would not cease being 
able to give modal information using the fact that time looks as if it flows if 
it turned out that it didn't.  It may well be that certain interpretations of 
physics  are  correct  and there is  no arrow of  time,  but it  can still  be an  
explanatory fact that time flows for us. It is a perspective that shapes the 
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way we connect  the world modally.  (For  instance,  a distinction between 
past  and  future  is  necessary  for  a  definition  of  causation.)  But  not  a 
hopelessly relative one.179 (I am not arguing for the block universe, merely 
using it as an extreme example of a perspective.)
As well as these “natural” epistemic perspectives, we may also construct 
scientific  perspectives.  That  is,  frameworks that  partition the world into 
certain  variable  bases,  which  then  allow  us  to  answer  particular  w-
questions. Some of those w-questions may only have intelligible meanings 
when  expressed  in  terms  of  how  a  particular  variable  base  is  modally 
structured. If we ask why dogs bark, but we have a framework in which dogs 
have no definable meaning then we cannot turn “dog” into a variable which 
forms  part  of  a  modal  structure.  This  is  an  inherently  anti-reductionist 
account  of  explanation,  not  all  frameworks/perspectives  will  have  all  of 
their w-questions translatable into a different framework. (The burden of 
proof is on the reductionist to established principled reasons why all modal 
connections  between  variables  could  be  translated  fully  upon reduction, 
since in practice this is not possible.)
GIERE'S PERSPECTIVISM
Perspectivism is an idea with a long history and many incarnations. The 
leading account of scientific perspectivism today is due to Ronald Giere.180 
Although developed independently the perspectivism advocated here has 
many overlaps with Giere's account. The main difference being that the role 
of purpose, which is sometimes left open in Giere's framework, or suggested 
to be representational accuracy/similarity, is instead filled by the needs of 
explanation.  That  is,  our  “purpose”  is  specifically  to  represent  modal 
structure even if that means distorting other elements of a representation.
Giere's  perspectivism  is  a  third  way  between  objectivist  realism  and 
constructivist anti-realism. Based around a visual metaphor the basic idea 
is that just as there can be many different ways of visually perceiving so too 
there can be many different ways of scientifically representing the world, 
and  these  need  not  be  incompatible.  Humans  have  certain  epistemic 
perspectives  which  scientific  theories  arise  out  of.  Science  allows  us  to 
transcend the limits of these perspectives, to define new perspectives.
Brown181 notes  significant  parallels  with Paul  Feyerabend182 and  John 
Dewey183 in Giere's perspectivism and breaks it down into a series of claims. 
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A perspective  is  an  asymmetrical  interaction between observers  and the 
world. Perspectives are of partial accuracy. No one perspective is  uniquely 
true.  Truth  claims  are  relative  to  a  perspective,  they  are  about  the 
appropriateness of a perspective. Representation is a quadratic not dyadic 
relation, it has four components: O uses X to represent Y for purpose P. The 
link between this last point and the perspectivism advocated here is that if P 
is  explanation  then  we  need  a  special  kind  of  representation:  modal 
representation. 
One of Giere's  motivating examples is  colour vision. Some people are 
what is known as trichromatic, they can see the usual spectrum of colours, 
while  others  are  colour  blind.  These  individuals  experience  a  different 
perspective of certain events due to this epistemic limitation. Neither way of 
viewing the electromagnetic spectrum as colours is objectively correct. Both 
perspectives are produced by an interaction between the visual  system a 
person  has  and  the  nature  of  light,  and  these  perspectives  are  not 
incompatible. 
[T]he  robustness  I  sought  is  provided  by  the  fact  that 
colour  vision  is  a  species  specific  trait,  but  with 
noteworthy  exceptions...Within  philosophy,  common 
sense  objectivism about  colours  has  been  elevated  to  a 
metaphysical  doctrine...Among  colour  scientists, 
subjectivism  is  the  default  position.  Both  assume  that 
colour  must  be  a  monadic  property  of  something  they 
differ on the something, perspectivism portrays colours as 
being  relational,  with  both  objective  and  subjective 
components. (Giere 2009 p. 223)
Giere  goes  on  to  extend  this  idea  to  scientific  observation.  When 
astronomers view a  galaxy with an optical  telescope they can get  a very 
different picture than when they view the same object using X-rays. Each 
observational  'perspective'  gives  a  different  set  of  information  about  the 
object, and the perspectives can be richer or poor depending upon purpose. 
The  next  extension  Giere  makes  is  to  scientific  theorising.  Theories 
themselves are perspectival. They are partial and used to represent aspects 
of the world through models.  Unlike visual  observations theories can be 
incompatible  for  Giere,  whereas  for  Brown incompatibilities  are  entirely 
resolved by having different purposes for different theories. These theory 
perspectives  are publicly shared,  they are agreed upon by a community, 
individual subjectivity doesn't play a large role. (Or in Frigg's terms they are 
authorised games). Brown's criticism of Giere is that he doesn't spell out the 
role of user intentions sufficiently. 
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Brown's suggestion is that there is a great deal of overlap between Giere's 
perspectivism and Feyerabend's discussion of the uses of perspective in art 
in  Renaissance  Italy.  Feyerabend  cites  a  painting  by  Brunelleschi  of  a 
Florentine church, The Baptisterium. The painting represents the building 
but  only  from  a  certain  viewing  angle.  The  building  is  accurately 
represented from this angle but not necessarily from any other.
Brunelleschi  produces  an  aspect of  the  building  just  as 
scientific  instruments produce one or  another  aspect  of 
the Milky Way, and these, not the objects themselves, are 
compared to the model. (Brown 2009 p. 217)
In Feyerabend's terms we have a stage upon which the model/painting, 
observer and aspect of the building are all brought together, and it is only 
on  this  "stage"  that  the  relationship  works.  For  Feyerabend  what  gets 
compared in science are two artefacts, the theoretical representative of an 
aspect  of  a  system  and  theory  laden  data  models  which  represent 
observations.  As  ever,  purpose  matters:  for  Giere  the  overall  guiding 
purpose  is  to  represent  the  world  accurately.  For  Feyerabend  there  are 
many purposes aside from imitation:
Without  an  idea  of  the  purpose  or  interest  one  has  in 
constructing a representation, it is...a kind of game...We 
need  to  know  what  distinguishes  pointless  from 
significant  representations,  arbitrary  from  useful 
similarities...As Giere says an object is similar to any other 
in  countless  respects  (Giere,  2006,  p.  63).  Giere  and 
Feyerabend haven't given us the resources to distinguish 
significant from insignificant representations, and this is 
because  of  a  relative  neglect  of  the  guiding  role  of 
purpose. (Brown 2009 p. 218)
It is this nature of purpose that is provided in this account: the purpose 
of  some scientific  models  is  to explain.  Once explanation is  our  guiding 
purpose,  not  imitation,  then  we  can  say  much  more  about  what  is  a 
significant  representation  or  insignificant  one.  There  are  two equivalent 
ways of spelling the idea out:  one is  that  representation itself  is  not the 
primary focus  of these models but explanation is. What can or cannot be a 
significant representation is judged relative to a set of w-questions and the 
answers  it  can  provide,  that  is,  the  modal  structure  it  recreates. 
Alternatively  one  can  think of  this  as  a  special  kind  of  representational 
relationship,  that  of  modal  representation.  To  explain  is  to  accurately 
represent the modal structure of the world, and if this modal structure is 
represented  accurately  then  other  aspects  of  the  world  can  be distorted 
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greatly without difficulty. So our models are modal representations of the 
world but not representations of the ontology of the world necessarily, and 
this  is  the  key  aspect  that  constrains  them,  not  notions  of  similarity  or 
accuracy in recreating the world.  In explanation one aspect is  privileged 
above all others: modal representation. 
If we are to represent the modal aspects of the world then we need to be 
able to state variables to connect modally and perspectives are part of this 
process, they help us define partitions of variables. In this sense, as with 
Giere,  the  visual  metaphor  of  perspectives  perhaps  gives  the  wrong 
impression; that there is a passivity to a perspective, like seeing a different 
side of a building. Giere denies visual perception is so passive, but there is a 
danger that the dialectical  co-constructive aspect of scientific theories as 
perspectives is downplayed by the visual analogy. In scientific explanation 
new perspectives are  constructed, they are built and justified dialectically 
with their  ability  to  answer  w-questions.  As  such they are  more akin to 
creating a  new  gestalt rather  than the more intellectually  passive visual 
analogue. 
Brown’s  answer  to  the  problem  of  purpose  is  to  advocate  Dewey's 
response, that the purpose of an inquiry is to solve a problem, to remove 
doubt  and  hence  to  remove  conflict.  We  begin  with  “ideational”  or 
theoretical, resources and use these to generate theoretical principles which 
interact  dialectically  with observational  data  models  to  produce  a  set  of 
factual  claims  that  allow  an  audience  to  remove  doubt  and  come  to 
judgement.  Of  course  this  has  some  of  the   problems  that  using 
understanding as a basis for explanation has. What will or will not remove 
the  doubt  of  an  audience  is  a  subjective  matter.  For  Dewey  there  is  a 
constructivist aspect to facts through the projection of perspectives. So for 
Dewey,  Giere  and  Feyerabend  projection/construction  is  an  important 
aspect of scientific enquiry.
Giere responds to Brown's comparison with Feyerabend and the crucial 
role of different perspectives for different purposes:
Nevertheless, it seems we can still ask about the nature of 
water apart from such intended applications. And we can 
do  this  without  invoking  the  idea  of  there  being  an 
objective truth about water. We need only be able to make 
a comparative judgment as to which perspective generates 
the  overall  best  fitting  models.  Here  the  molecular 
perspective  is  clearly  superior.  We can understand how 
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large  numbers  of  small  molecules  might  behave  like  a 
continuous fluid. We cannot understand the phenomenon 
of  diffusion  from  a  fluid  mechanics  perspective.  That 
asymmetry is all that perspectival realism requires. (Giere 
2009 p. 222)
Overall  best  fit  seems  like  a  vague  question  begging  criterion  for 
judgement since what is at stake is different representations for different 
purposes.  That said if  explanation is  our purpose we can specify Giere's  
notion  precisely.  The  wider  the  domain  of  an  explanation,  the  greater 
number of w-questions it can answer, the better it is. Relative to a set of w-
questions we can privilege one perspective over another. Batterman's liquid 
drop  cases  show  that  there  are  examples  of  types  of  w-question  which 
cannot be answered by our intuitively more fundamental,  more accurate 
representation. Giere's overall best fit when made precise in terms of modal 
structure allows for counter-intuitive examples based around the precise 
aspect of modal structure we wish to capture. If we want to answer general 
questions about the conditions for liquid drop formation we need to use the 
course grained perspective of fluid mechanics.
PERSPECTIVES & OBJECTIVE MODAL CONNECTIONS
We have two sources of perspectives, or gestalten. Firstly from our limited 
innate  ways  of  perceiving  the  world,  and  secondly  from  our  scientific 
conceptualisations,  which  arise  out  of  our  need  to  escape  our  innate 
perspectives.  Rather than delivering a view from no-where science offers 
us a multiplicity of views from somewhere which we triangulate to discover 
the  real  world.  Both  types  of  perspectivism  overlap  in  the  process  of 
defining variables and linking them modally.
Once the perspective is set the modal connections are objective, this is 
why  we  are  not  just  explaining  epistemically.  Let  me  reiterate,  these 
perspectives are not cultural they are epistemic. They concern the way the 
world reveals  itself  to us,  and even though the world sometimes reveals 
itself to us surrealistically it still does so in a consistent manner than allows 
us to explain ontically.
Modal  facts  do not  come to  us raw.  They must  be filtered through a 
particular  gestalten,  without  an  intellectual  framework  for  defining 
variables modal facts conceived of in terms of those variables cannot be 
captured or expressed. This is not to say that modal facts are a projection of 
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humans onto the world, far from it, it is simply that without partitioning, 
categorising,  abstracting and idealising to  define  variable  sets  and same 
kind classes such modal structure cannot be extracted.184
Perspectives  may  be  fixed  by  coarse  graining.  Consider  a  scientific 
reductionist, she might contend that macroscopic objects do not exist in a 
fundamental sense, yet even if we granted such a contention would it be 
reasonable to suggest that such appearances of objects do not play a role in 
explanations of the world? Explanations that even the reductionist would 
use themselves in an everyday context?185 Tables may not be fundamental 
but they can be explanatory, and not just epistemically. Tables do not give 
us understanding of table-like events. Rather they can be used as a variable 
in  a  modal  topology:  to  capture  modal  information  in  a  consistent  and 
objective way.
Scientific  thinking  forms  in  part  as  crystals  around  these  seeds  of 
perspectives.  Dialectically  it  shapes  new perspectives  as  it  advances.  By 
striving for viewpoints outside of the merely human, science creates new 
gestalten. Scientific thinking helps define new categories of variables which 
can  be  modally  connected,  new  ways  of  partitioning  data  and  new 
properties to measure, all of which allow new perspectives to be defined. 
These properties are not just free choices, or more precisely they may be in 
the  fictional  worlds  constructed  in  models  but  ultimately  they  are 
constrained modally. Only the perspectives possessing a certain degree of 
modal utility will be developed further and be deemed worthwhile by the 
scientific community for explanation.
ABSTRACTIONS & IDEALISATIONS
Part of the function of certain abstractions is to allow perspectives to be 
defined.  Similarly,  idealisations  and  fictions  can  be  necessary  for 
connecting variables modally once a perspective is fixed or to allow bridging 
principles  to  be  established  between  two  perspectives.  For  instance,  in 
statistical mechanics the assumption of the thermodynamic limit, in which 
particle numbers go to infinity, is necessary to recover the discontinuous 
phase changes seen in thermodynamics (both theoretically and in practice 
from our meso-level phenomenological perspective of such phase changes). 
In other words we need this unrealistic assumption to make up for the fact 
that phase transitions are only  definable from a certain perspective.  The 
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idealisation  of  infinite  particle  number  is  essential  for  bridging  the 
perspectives:  only  by  putting  this  in  do  the smooth  curves  of  statistical 
mechanics produce the sharp boundaries in our variables that we need. The 
modelling assumption is not just convenient, it is absolutely essential! The 
sharp  boundaries  of  phase  transitions  are  in  the  bulk  variables.186 The 
assumption is  crucial  to reproduce the modal topology we want,  to both 
define variables and to allow them to be modally connected. This is a key 
feature of the nature of perspectives, they allow variable choices to be made. 
Those variable choices may require certain abstractions and idealisations 
but  once  these  choices  are  made  the  resultant  modal  connections  are 
objective.187 
We  can  see  the  perspectivism  at  work  in  these  abstractions  and 
idealisations  by  noting  how  such  “essential”  assumptions  become 
inessential  once  we  shift  the  explanatory,  and  not  necessarily  just 
representational,  context.  Consider  hydrodynamic  shocks:  at  the  human 
phenomenological  level  we  observe  a  discontinuity,  a  shock  wave.  For 
example, a sonic boom is a sharply defined thing and it can be modelled as 
such.  The  so  called  upstream  and  downstream  jump  conditions  can  be 
found as solutions to a set of simultaneous equations representing basic 
conservation laws that ignore the micro-physics in the shock front. We use 
these  basic  conservation  principles  to  calculate  how  variables  will 
discontinuously “jump” across the shock. However we are not obliged to 
adopt  this  abstraction,  we  can  shift  perspectives,  as  researchers  in  a 
different explanatory context do. They have different w-questions to answer 
and to do so must put the physics of the shock region back in to find the  
smooth curves which link the variables. Both models are representations of 
the  same  target  system,  but  whether  the  shock  is  abstracted  as  a 
discontinuous front or not depends upon the explanatory demands placed 
on the model.  Both representations capture different parts of the modal 
structure of shocks. This is a good illustration of the spirit behind modal 
topology. In both cases the upstream and downstream variables are linked 
modally,  but  in  the  detailed  micro-physical  case  intermediate  modal 
connections  are  added,188 while  the  jump conditions  show how the bulk 
variables are linked across the shock and how this modal information can 
be extracted by ignoring the micro-physics. In both cases the same variables 
are  ultimately  connected,  the  basic  shape  of  the  topology  of  the  modal 
network  is  the  same,  but  how they  achieve  this  is  completely  different. 
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Whether the shock is abstracted or not depends on the explanatory use of 
the  model.  Representations  are  sometimes  qualified  by  the  explanatory 
context we place the target system in.
DIALECTICAL GESTALTEN
Abstractions play  a  role in capturing modal  information in  part  because 
they can be necessary for the definition of terms in a given perspective. By 
abstracting we can define new classes of same-object kinds, so that we can 
see universality in phenomena that otherwise seem disparate. This can be 
seen in the physics of phase changes: lots of seemingly diverse systems can 
be shown to have universal features once they are abstracted. It can also be 
seen in the scaling law case of chapter 3. Here, by abstracting, we see that 
the vast range of organisms, from a certain point of view, are all essentially 
the  same kind of type and their differences do not matter. West's model 
does not work with obvious natural kinds but by abstracting it creates new, 
modally legitimate, ways of partitioning the world.
The process  of  building these perspectives,  in  modelling for instance, 
involves a kind of modally constrained interpellation.189 Once an abstraction 
is defined scientists begin to see the world in those terms. This is in the 
spirit of the dialectical co-construction of models and prepared descriptions 
advocated by Knuuttila.190 This  interpellative  aspect  captures  part  of  the 
historical legacy scientists leave to one another as a community,  not just 
theories  and  models  but ways  of  seeing  the  world: a  multiplicity  of 
gestalten  and  partitions.191 Language  both  allows  new  thoughts  to  be 
possible and constrains how thoughts are expressed. Perspectives are also 
like this, and by picking a perspective a modeller opens up the possibility of 
making  new  modal  connections  but  also  shuts  off  making  other  modal 
connections. 
What stops all this talk of perspectives being a post-modern free-for-all? 
Simply  put  it  is  the  modal  constraints.  If  we  were  only  concerned with 
representation  in  isolation  then  this  perspectivism  may  be  hopelessly 
relative,  but  representation  in  this  context  plays  "second  fiddle"  to 
explanation. In science we are free to come up with any parametrisation we 
like, but it will not be recognised as explanatory unless that parametrisation 
is able to link variables in a way that produces putative representations of 
modal structures which are consistent with the observable modal aspects of 
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the  world.192 Perspectives  are  not  hopelessly  relative  because  they  are 
constrained  fundamentally  by  the  need  to  engage  empirically  with  the 
world.
PSEUDO-FORCES & PSEUDO-ONTOLOGY
The ontological status we ascribe to different parts of an explanation will 
change  in  accordance  with  our  perspectives  and  as  we  shift  between 
theories. Consider Newtonian classical mechanics: since Newton's laws are 
defined in the context of an inertial reference frame when one applies them 
in a non-inertial frame it is often convenient to describe processes in terms 
of so called pseudo-forces, a common example of which is the centrifugal 
force. Strictly speaking within Newtonian  mechanics there is no such thing 
as the centrifugal force, there is only the inertia of a mass and a rotating 
reference frame which makes it seem as if a force is acting. This piece of  
surrealism  is  entirely  objective  and  is  also  explanatory.  We  explain  by 
invoking  pseudo-forces:  convenient  fictional  forces  which  nevertheless 
summarise and capture modal information. If we view a rotating reference 
frame as an inertial one then such fictional pseudo-forces are necessary to 
capture modal information within a perspective. 
Now of course, the realist might respond something like this: we have 
created  a  fiction,  pseudo-forces,  because we have  fundamentally  got  the 
situation wrong. When we realise we are not in an inertial reference frame 
we can see such pseudo-forces are fictitious and distinct from real forces, 
such as gravity for instance, after all  that is why they are called pseudo-
forces!  However,  if  we  more  radically  shift  perspectives  and  define  a 
different variable base to capture modal information, such as that used in 
General  Relativity,  then  from this  perspective  gravity  itself  is  a  pseudo-
force.193 So moving between Newtonian mechanics and GR gravity ceases to 
be a force and the apparent distinction between the “real” forces and the 
“pseudo” forces seems to weaken. 
By shifting perspectives we change which variables we have to connect 
modally,  but  the  modal  connections  must  express  the  same  empirical 
information  in  the  domain  for  which  Newtonian  mechanics  and  GR 
overlap, i.e. for the domain in which Newtonian mechanics is explanatory 
(or as I shall argue in the next chapter quasi-explanatory). That is, defined 
relative  to  an  explanandum  for  which  both  can  form  an  adequate 
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explanans, they must both agree. Modal disagreement is one way of finding 
the boundaries of a domain in which a theory is explanatory. So pseudo-
forces are both unexplanatory in some sense, since they don't exist, yet also 
explanatory in some sense, by being a means of capturing and expressing 
modal information. The two contradictory intuitions about explanation can 
be  reconciled  by  allowing  fictions  to  be  an  essential  part  of  some 
perspectives,  but  requiring  that  the  modal  connections  captured  once  a 
perspective is fixed are fully objective. We have incorporated the flexibility 
of the epistemic account into the formation of perspectives, but retained the 
robustness  of  the  ontic  account,  in  the  objectiveness  of  the  modal 
constraints  on  which  perspectives  are  able  to  be  explanatorily  useful  in 
which domains. We require our scientific theories and models to produce 
consistent and objective modal connections that, in the domain for which 
they are explanatory, must match up with empirical observations. 
Within  each  perspective  a  set  of  variables  is  definable  and  modal 
information in terms of those variables can be provided. The perspective 
informs  models  and  modelling  assumptions  and  provides  a  resource  to 
explicate how nihil models can be explanatory. Singularities in liquid drop 
formation do not exist, but when the class of phenomena is viewed from a 
particular  perspective  (the  conceptual  framework  of  hydrodynamics  and 
fluid elements) they appear as if they do. That is singularities appear in the 
equations  and  allow  those  equations  to  capture  modal  information, 
especially about the general class of liquid drops.  The perspective allows 
liquid  drop  formation  to  be  viewed  as  a  unified  class  whereas  from  a 
different  perspective,  say  molecular  simulation,  universalities  cannot  be 
seen. It is this consistent fact about the world, this surrealist fact that the 
world “looks” reliably as if  they exist,  that  allows singularities and other 
fictions to operate in models in an explanatory manner, even though a more 
fundamental model shows that no singularity exists. 
Once perspectives are fixed certain questions are possible which are not 
possible from other perspectives. This perspective surrealism reveals itself 
in  different  levels  of  explanations  and  different  levels  of  abstraction.  It 
allows  hierarchies  of  explanation,  each  aimed  at  a  version  of  the  same 
explanandum but phrased in the vocabulary of that perspective.
Quite often a shift in explanatory perspective introduces a wholly new 
variable set to explicate modal structure in terms of. When this happens for 
two explanations with overlapping domains we need to establish bridging 
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principles  between them that  demonstrate  that  the  modal  pictures  they 
paint  are  not  contradictory.  We  establish  how  variables  from  one 
perspective link up with another. This is not to say that one explanation 
reduces  to  the  other.  This  thesis  defends  explanatory  pluralism  and  a 
hierarchy of valid explanatory perspectives, but these perspectives cannot 
be in fundamental modal conflict if they are genuine explanations. 
Consider two different explanations of Mendel’s famous results from pea 
breeding. One is the phenomenon expressed in terms of classical genetics, 
the  other  is  a  more  recent  explanation  in  terms  of  molecular  genetics. 
Although  both  explanations  invoke  “genes”  they  actually  constitute 
different explanatory frameworks, different perspectives since the concept 
of  gene  used  in  each  is  very  different.  One  intuition  may  be  that  the 
molecular explanation is  simply better, it  answers more w-questions and 
hence the old classical explanation was not an explanation at all. I think this 
interpretation is  inadequate.194
 While one can see that the molecular explanation is indeed better in 
many ways I do not think that this makes the classical genetic explanation 
unexplanatory,  even  if  we  decide  that  the  classical  gene does  not  really 
exist. This is precisely because if we adopt a certain perspective the classical  
gene  allows  modal  connections  to  be  made,  modal  information  to  be 
captured and transmitted, using an explanatory fiction. To put it another 
way,  the  world  surrealistically  in  many  domains  behaves  as  if  classical 
genes  do  exist  and  that  fact  about  the  appearance  of  the  world  can  be 
explanatory.  Bridging  principles  when  comparing  the  two  explanations 
need  to  be  established  showing  the  points  of  intersection  between  a 
molecular gene and a classical gene: each explanation overlaps in the modal 
domain, but each perspective also facilitates different sets of w-questions as 
well.195 For an evolutionary biologist classical genetics is very much alive 
and explanatory and allows the salient modal connections between some 
variables  to  be  captured  in  a  way  the  complexity  of  molecular  genetics 
would obscure. Also the classical genetic picture for evolutionary biology is 
about  a  certain  coarse  graining  of  the  net  effects  of  many  underlying 
molecular genetic processes. Although these processes matter they are not 
necessary for many evolutionary models. A certain degree of black boxing is 
not only convenient but essential to see how these coarse grained variables 
are modally connected.196
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8 | THE PATTERN ON THE CURTAIN:
FICTIONS, FACTS & THE TWO
FACES OF ONTIC EXPLANATION
 
Given the stress placed on the notion of capturing modal structure as being 
foundational for explanation in this thesis, it will be no great surprise that it 
is my contention that the epistemic notion of explanation197 is not robust 
enough for the task at hand. It is simply too vague and relative. If we are to 
define explanations in terms of giving understanding, then we will not be 
sufficiently tethered to the modal  structure of  the world to separate the 
genuinely explanatory from the merely apparently so. None of the standard 
positions  of  epistemic  explanation  can  capture  this  modal  aspect  of 
explanation.198 Yet, at the same time, there is no doubt that the epistemic 
framework  is  extremely  useful  at  capturing  many  pragmatic  aspects  of 
explanatory practice. By contrast, the ontic intuition regarding explanation 
seems  at  first  sight  hopelessly  incapable  of  metabolising  explanatory 
models that use fictions, such as the nihil models of chapter 4. The most 
stringent incarnation of this intuition, which I will  dub hyper-ontic, says 
that to explain must be to give facts, and ultimately nothing but facts, about 
the world. Recall the ontic response to idealisation, the Galilean strategy: 
idealisations  can only  function  in  explanations  when they  are  harmless, 
they are explanatory because we only need them for pragmatic reasons, not 
in  principle.  We  may  bend  the  truth  for  calculational  ease,  but  not 
fundamentally  lie.  An ontic  explanation  explains  by  saying true  things  
about the world.
I believe the resolution to the liminal status of explanations which fall 
between the vagueness of a purely epistemic exposition and the high bar of 
entry  of  the  hyper-ontic  explanatory  club,  is  to  appropriately  demarcate 
different notions of truth. The ontic intuition is correct, explanations should 
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say true things about the world, but we must choose our notion of truth 
appropriately.  Once  some  of  our  intuitions  about  the  notion  of  true 
statements are suitably disaggregated, we can split ontic explanation into 
two categories. In each sense of ontic explanation facts about the world are 
captured, and we have a robust alternative to relying on notions such as 
understanding.  At  the  same  time,  by  incorporating  the  perspectivism 
already argued for into this hierarchy of ontic explanation, we are able to 
include  many  of  the  successes  of  the  epistemic  account  in  relation  to 
pragmatic aspects of explanation. 
THE TWO FACES
Fortunately we already have the resources we need to disaggregate truth 
into the different senses we need. We can avail ourselves of the distinction 
made by da Costa & French199 between Tarskian correspondence truth and 
their notion of quasi, or pragmatic, truth by incorporating this distinction 
into a theory of ontic explanation and thereby make intelligible a notion of 
“quasi-explanation”.  Tarksi's200 formulation  of  correspondence  truth  is 
deceptively  simple.  His  contention  is  that  statements  such  as  "snow  is 
white" are true, if and only if, snow is indeed white. In other words truth is 
a relation between a statement in a language and a fact about the world. In 
model theoretic terms this relation can be expressed as an isomorphism in 
sets. Correspondence truth cannot be assessed internally to a language, one 
must  step  outside  of  the  language  the  proposition  is  expressed  in  to 
evaluate  it.  Tarski's  correspondence  truth  is  the  inspiration  behind  the 
partial  structures account of  quasi,  or  pragmatic,  truth.  Instead of  a full 
isomorphism  between  the  sets  to  express  truth  there  is  a  partial 
isomorphism. Once embedded in an empirical structure, a domain, a theory 
can be quasi-true if it looks as if there is a full isomorphism inside a domain
Da Costa & French state in reference to their notion of quasi-truth: 
[Within a domain] everything occurs as if it were true in 
the correspondence sense of  truth.  (Da Costa  & French 
2003 p. 19)
So for instance, Newton's theory of gravity looks as if it is true in the 
correspondence sense in a certain empirical domain. Why can't we use this 
fact to also explain within that domain? We set the limits of that domain by 
the  limits  of  the  modal  structure  Newton's  theory  can  get  correct.  The 
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modal topology of Newton's theory is limited by the level of precision one 
specifies a particular explanandum to,201 but also by the conceptualisations 
one must  make to  allow Newton's  theory to  connect  variables.  I  believe 
there  is  a  parallel  here  between quasi-truth and the  idea  that  when we 
explain  we  parametrise  the  world  in  certain  ways  which  allows  certain 
modal connections to be seen in those terms. The parametrisation might 
only be valid within a certain domain, or from a certain perspective. Within 
that domain it is a valid explanation because it provides modal information, 
but it is not a true explanation in the correspondence sense. It does not get 
the fundamental ontology correct.  We therefore have a sense of a quasi-
explanation.  Newtonian  theory  expresses  modal  connections  between 
variables which are true and empirically adequate within a domain, but the 
variable set is not a correspondence true set. The ontological commitments 
that variable set requires are not true. 
A quasi-explanation works by being quasi-true in a certain domain, i.e. 
picking out modal facts, which are themselves quasi-true in that domain. 
Just as with quasi-truth the relation is partial, not every w-question will be 
answerable from a particular quasi-explanatory framework. Ultimately the 
quasi-explanation must get things wrong modally as we move outside of its 
domain, just as a quasi-true theory must cease to appear as if it is Tarskian 
true  outside  of  its  domain.  As  with  quasi-truth  a  domain  of  empirical 
substructures is needed to apply the notion, as well as degrees of precision 
in measurement etc. A theory is quasi-explanatory when viewed from the 
confines of a specific explanandum, or set of explananda, which implicitly 
bound the number of w-questions, rank the w-questions in importance, and 
specify the level of precision at which the questions are to be considered. 
TWO SENSES OF ONTIC EXPLANATION
I propose that we split ontic explanation into two aspects, based upon the 
ways in which explanatory theories and models can be true. That is we have 
quasi-explanation and correspondence explanation. Sentences that answer 
w-questions in an explanation which form true statements of the content of 
a true model/theory in Tarski's correspondence sense are components of a 
correspondence true explanation. Sentences which answer w-questions in a 
quasi-true explanation are sentences which are true internally to a quasi-
true theory/model. 
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In correspondence explanation we get the modal structure correct and 
we also get the variable parametrisation correct in an ontological sense. The 
input/output variables really exist and have all the properties ascribed to 
them  in  the  explanans.  In  quasi-true  explanations  we  get  the  modal 
structure correct from a perspective that means that surrealistically a set of 
input and output variables appear to exist. This as if aspect is one of the key 
differences. It can be cashed out in several ways: deliberate fictions put into 
a model to recreate the modal structure we empirically observe or to bridge 
theories,  or  it  can  also  come  from  the  partiality  of  the  domain  of 
applicability of a set of parametrisations.202 So, internal to a perspective, in 
an explanation the entities invoked to provide modal representation exist 
and have  the properties  that  the  explanans  says  they  do.  Moving  to  an 
extrinsic assessment we may see that the choice of variables is not Tarskian 
true,  hence  the  model  is  not  genuinely  ontically  explanatory  in  the 
correspondence sense of explanation. 
When we say something is quasi-true within a domain we are saying that 
it looks as if the theory is true in that domain intrinsically in a Tarskian 
correspondence sense.  Moving to an extrinsic  view we can see that  it  is  
merely  quasi-true.  There  is  no  sense  of  the  ontology  of  a  theory  so 
construed  as  “approximately  existing”.  We  make  a  holistic  judgement. 
Newtonian mechanics is as a whole quasi-true, with reference to a domain, 
but aspects of the ontology of it are wholly false. In essence we have a very 
similar attitude implied in quasi-truth to the surrealism I am advocating. 
Internal to the domain it looks as if the ontology suggested by Newtonian 
mechanics exists. This is exactly the case in these nihil models: they are 
quasi-explanatory  and  they  can  be  so  because  surrealistically  in  certain 
domains it looks as if the fictions they employ exist. The difference is one of  
historical  contingency:  Newton  believed  his  ontology  to  be  true  in  a 
correspondence sense, but the builders of nihil models know they are using 
absolute falsehoods. 
The same is true of quasi-explanation. From an intrinsic perspective we 
have a set of variables and to give accurate modal information about how 
those variables are connected is to explain. We have quasi-explained, we 
have used the surrealistic fact that the world looks as if those variables exist 
in  that  domain,  from  that  perspective,  and  the  modal  connections  we 
attribute to those variables track onto the modal connections of the real 
observable  aspects  of  our  model.  When we say that  a  fiction is  modally 
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connected to something else we mean that it is connected internally to a 
model, but the surrealistic nature of the model means that the observable 
consequences  of  the  model's  modal  structure  are  congruent  with  the 
observable aspects of the modal structure of the real world.
As stated, one of the great advantages of using the notion of quasi-truth 
is that we can allow non-referring terms to be present in quasi-true theories 
without having to say the entities quasi-exist, and the same is true in quasi-
explanation.  For  a  quasi-explanation  it  is  not  required  that  all  of  the 
ontological picture the explanation paints be true (in the correspondence 
sense). It is this that makes it a fruitful basis for understanding nihil models 
and  explanations  in  general  that  include  idealization  and  abstractions 
which cannot be removed in principle.203 
We have a sense of two levels of ontic explanation. One a Tarskian sense 
of actual  correspondence to the world,  where the modal connections are 
true in the correspondence sense, and the entities actually exist. This is the 
ultimate  type  of  explanation.  Below  that  though,  we  have  quasi-
explanations. This is a lesser species of explanation but it is still ontic. We 
are not left with the vagueness of epistemic explanation and the culturally 
relative notions of understanding etc.. Instead we define modal connections 
in  the  world  between  parameters,  the  definition  of  those  parameters 
requires  a  particular  perspective,  but  once  that  perspective  is  fixed  the 
modal connections are objective.204
EXPLANATORY HOLISM
Another great advantage of da Costa & French's notion of quasi-truth is that 
it  avoids the tendency behind the intuition of approximate truth to sub-
divide  theories205 into  the  bits  which  are  “really”  true  and  those  which 
aren't, or suggesting that the difference between “approximately true” and 
“true” is just one of accuracy and a smooth approach from the former to the 
latter  is  found  as  that  accuracy  increases.  Clearly  if  one  has  such  an 
intuition about how approximate truth works then that cannot be the basis 
for  understanding  explanation  through  ontological  “lies”.  We  cannot 
disaggregate  any  of  the  nihil  models  discussed  into  parts,  sorting  the 
explanatory wheat from the chaff, in fact the whole point is that to capture 
modal  information  these  models  must  abstract  and  introduce  fictional 
entities.  The  fictional  entities  gain  their  explanatory  power  from  a 
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structural contextualisation: the whole is quasi-explanatory.
When we say Newton's theory is quasi-true we do not mean that we can 
pick an element out of it as true and a part as not true. What is meant is that 
within a specified domain the theory appears to be true for that domain. We 
can say from the extrinsic perspective that Newtonian mechanics is not true 
(in a correspondence sense) but from the intrinsic perspective it is quasi-
true  as  a  whole.  The  quasi-truth  of  theories  is  represented  as  a  partial 
isomorphism between sets but this does not imply that Newton's theory is 
partially true. Quasi-truth is an all or nothing state, a theory can be false, 
quasi-true or correspondence true.206 
We have the same with explanation: quasi-explanations are explanations 
as a whole. The "quasi-ness" is meant to reflect that they are explanations 
within a domain, and in this account perspectivism forms part of defining a 
domain.  The reason why a quasi-explanation can explain at all  is  that it 
picks out objective modal connections once a perspective is fixed. Or to put 
it another way, from an intrinsic viewpoint the perspective is naturalised, 
and inside this view a quasi-explanation is explanatory. When we move to 
the extrinsic viewpoint, the status of a perspective and variable base which 
connects modally becomes the object of truth assessments, and we can see 
that some perspectives rely on a surrealist ontology, e.g. classical genes do 
not really exist, nor do pseudo-forces, they merely appear to exist internal 
to a perspective,  while other perspectives  lock onto ontologies  which we 
believe are more robust.207
As stated, to say that a model is quasi-explanatory is to make a holistic 
statement. Why is this the case? If we limit ourselves to a piecemeal attitude 
and say that bits of a model are true or explanatory but others not, then we 
collapse into the observational content of the theory/model alone. It is the 
observations which are true in a correspondence sense.  To say Newton's 
theory as a whole, and not just the empirical content of Newton's theory, is 
quasi-true  is  to  implicitly  acknowledge  that  Newton  cannot  unify  the 
disparate empirical components of the theory without the other parts of it, 
which we know are  not  ontologically  correct.  This  is  not  to  say that  we 
cannot  understand  Newton's  theory  in  terms  of  its  parts,  (we  can  for 
instance represent it as a list of partial isomorphisms between the data and 
the theory or between Newton's theory and General Relativity)208 but it is to 
say  that  we  cannot  make  an  intelligible  piecemeal  statement  about  its 
explanatory nature without collapsing into merely a table of observations, 
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which by themselves would not connect anything to anything else modally. 
We cannot remove the foundations of a house, watch it collapse into a pile 
of bricks, and then expect to get much information out about which rooms 
connected to which others. The purely empirical content of Newton's theory 
alone isn't enough.  Newton's theory is quasi-true relative to a domain, it is 
also  quasi-explanatory.  That  is,  it  looks  as  if  it  is  explanatory  in  the 
correspondence sense inside that domain. To say that Newton's theory is 
quasi-explanatory is to make a holistic judgement about Newton internal to 
a specified domain, and the way we define domains contains aspects of our 
perspectivism, e.g. levels of precision, a set of observable “natural” kinds 
etc. We can make relative judgements about which parts of Newton are true 
relative to GR, but again GR is judged in the context of a domain and this 
relative dissection of Newton's theory into parts that are true and parts that 
are not (beyond the observational content) is not possible in isolation.
Just as getting the ontology wrong doesn't prevent a theory being quasi-
true, so too an incorrect ontology (whether through mistake or deliberate 
choice in model building) doesn't inhibit a model/theory from being quasi-
explanatory;  indeed  it  may  facilitate  it.  Again  let  me  reiterate,  quasi-
explanation is a species of ontic explanation. Many of the pragmatic aspects 
of  epistemic  explanation  are  incorporated  into  the  construction  of 
perspectives but the resultant quasi-explanations are ontic, they pick out 
modal structures of the world. From the intrinsic view this delineates the 
boundary for which a theory appears as if it were true in a correspondence 
sense. To say a theory is quasi-true is to make a holistic judgement about 
the  theory  and  a  domain,  a  judgement  which  remains  the  case 
independently of any other theory coming along which we like better. The 
same can be said of quasi-explanation and correspondence-explanation: to 
say something is quasi-explanatory is to say that there is a domain in which 
it  appears  as  if  it  is  correspondence-explanatory,  and this  judgement  is 
holistic and not altered by new explanations.209 
(QUASI) TRUTH & (QUASI) EXPLANATION
The contention here is that the notion of of quasi-explanation is much more 
robust than a purely epistemic notion of explanation. The world internal to 
a perspective has a particular modal structure, and the observable aspects 
of that correspond to the observable modalities in an empirical domain for 
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which the quasi-explanation applies.  These quasi-explanations don't  just 
give us understanding: they pick out modal structure relative to a variable 
set, even if the entities that are necessary to define that variable set don't 
exist. 
The factors that make a theory quasi-true will make it quasi-explanatory. 
Why?  The  answer  is  simple:  the  measure  of  quasi-truth  is  ultimately 
expressed as an empirical adequacy in a given domain, and modal empirical 
adequacy will also follow for all but the most trivial empirical domains. Any 
advanced scientific empirical domain will contain modal elements, different 
versions of the same system that have been observed or experiments that 
have  been  performed.  To  recreate  the  empirical  phenomena  across  the 
observations, the theory will also recreate the modal variations across the 
observed phenomena. Now remember that this thesis claims that to explain 
is to provide some modal information, a significant enough amount to be 
considered  as  explaining  a  phenomenon.  It  is  not  claimed  that  an 
explanation gets all of the modal structure correct. Newton's theory gets the 
modal  situation correct  in  its  domain  but  not  outside  it.  This  failure  of 
modal accuracy is one of the big tests of the shortcomings of a theory, it is a 
guidepost to when a theory is only quasi-true not correspondence-true.210
I  hope  to  make  the  case  that  this  notion  of  the  domain  from which 
internally a theory appears true, but externally we can see it is only quasi-
true, is in sympathy with my emphasis on perspectivism. When we define a 
set  of  variables  and  link  them  modally,  within  a  domain,  internal  to  a 
perspective, we have captured the modal structure of the world. Shifting to 
an extrinsic view we see that perhaps all we have done is express modal 
connections  in  terms  of  variables  which  seem  to  exist  from  a  certain 
perspective but do not carry over to other perspectives.211 
Of course some perspectives are better than others! When we compare 
explanations we can often see why adopting a perspective is able to capture 
modal information.212 My aim is to remove the intuition that a successor 
explanation  renders  its  predecessor  obsolete  and  it  achieves  this  by 
replacing  incorrect  ontology  with  correct  ontology.  The  nihil  models 
discussed in chapter 4 are a good counter-example: in these known fictions 
are put into models, old theories are used to construct such models even 
when new theories are available. It is a mistake to think that the reason why 
something  is  explanatory  is  because  it  is  ontologically  correct  in  a 
correspondence sense. An explanation is quasi-explanatory because within 
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a domain it  gets  the modal structure correct  in terms of  the ontology it 
proposes. For the ontology it proposes to have any pragmatic value that  
ontology must be surrealistically linked to the world, but it need not be  
realistically  linked  to  the  world. So  we  have  a  defence  of  explanatory 
plurality,  GR offers a different set of explanations for phenomena which 
overlap with the empirical domain of Newtonian mechanics, but this does 
not  make  Newtonian  mechanics  unexplanatory  in  that  domain,  not  if 
"explanatory'"  is  understood  as  quasi-explanatory:  both  can  be 
complimentary explanations.213 
ONTOLOGY & MODAL INFORMATION
A successor theory being able to capture more modal information does not 
necessarily imply its proposed ontology is more correct. After all ontology is 
a zero sum game,214 either electrons exist or they don't. What a successor 
explanation does have is more modal information, more w-questions that it 
can answer for which the previous explanation is a subset. This does not 
mean that the perspective from the previous explanation should necessarily 
be  abandoned,  often  the overlap  in  w-questions  will  be  partial,  and  the 
older perspective will inform other models of other phenomena for which 
the  new  perspective  is  not  adequate.  For  example,  the  classical  genetic 
explanation of Mendel's peas may be superseded by a molecular genetic one 
but very few would argue that the perspective of classical genetics is not 
highly useful for capturing modal information in the field of evolutionary 
biology as a whole. The classical explanation occupies a modal subset of the 
molecular explanation, but classical genetics is still hugely useful in other 
explanations  where  the  need  for  unification  demands  a  degree  of 
abstraction  molecular  genetics  cannot  accommodate.  Remember  that 
capturing  modal  structure  is  as  much  about  removing  irrelevancies  as 
anything else.
This notion of perspectives and the surrealistic underpinnings of it, allow 
us  to  see  that  the  reductionist  physical  intuition  can  be  accommodated 
whilst  maintaining  a  hierarchy  of  explanatory  levels.  To  say  what  there 
ultimately is physically is about getting ontology correct, what we do when 
we (quasi) explain is get the perspective correct, and they are not one and 
the same. 
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DOMAINS
In an explanatory context domains are intimately linked to the notion of a 
perspective.  Perspectives  include  the  conceptual  framework  used 
(abstractions to allow the definition of new natural kinds for instance), the 
empirical  domain,  the  level  of  coarse  graining  and  degree  of  precision 
required  in  measurement.  To  say  Newton's  theory  is  true  in  a  domain 
means that the domain is not only the set of systems Newton's theory is 
typically  associated with,  but  that  the  observations  of  those systems are 
prescribed  to  a  degree  of  precision  at  which  relativistic  effects  are  not 
measurable.  The  nature  of  the  domain  of  applicability  is  shaped by the 
perspective.  This  is  partly  why  there  is  a  dialectic  between  models  and 
systems. The empirical domain is not just read off from the world, levels of 
precision  have  to  be  specified  or  are  implicitly  incorporated,  and  the 
perspective can influence the way in which empirical data is collated and 
partitioned. So when the claim is made that a quasi-explanation recreates 
the  modal  structure  of  the  world  from  a  particular  perspective  what  is 
claimed is that that perspective allows the definitions of a set of variables 
which can be linked modally to answer w-questions in an empirical domain 
to a specified degree of precision. So from a certain perspective Newtonian 
mechanics is explanatory, now and forever.
The notion of the domain is a crucial concept. Remember that in Tarski's 
formalism we need to step outside the language a statement is made in to 
evaluate the truth of it. In other words, we need a metalanguage to evaluate 
truth conditions. This is the inspiration for da Costa & French's distinction 
between  an  extrinsic  view  of  theories  and  an  intrinsic  view.  Quasi-true 
theories are correspondence-true in their domain from the intrinsic view. 
If the notion of quasi-truth just meant some parts of a theory were true 
and others weren't  then we would not need the notion of the domain of 
applicability. If we have a list of true and false statements written down in 
the same book the true statements are simply true and the false ones false, 
and  there  is  no  need  to  specify  a  domain  to  assess  the  truth  of  the 
individuated parts  of  the  book.  This  is  not  the  situation with quasi-true 
theories, where we are not individuating in this way.215 
Just as quasi-truth is defined with epistemic notions built into it, so too 
is quasi-explanation. A quasi-explanation is explanatory within its domain 
of  applicability;  its  domain  of  applicability  is  defined  by  the  modal 
information it accurately presents and by the parameter space the quasi-
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explanation is  built  from. The parameter space is  not a free choice,  it  is 
constrained by the empirical requirement of comparing theory with reality, 
by inbuilt ways of viewing the world humans have, and by the need to link 
different  models/theories  of  the  world.  Some  parameter  choices  are 
necessary to even define concepts to then ask modal questions about. Just 
as da Costa and French claim that Newtonian mechanics can be used as if it 
were true, so too is it possible to use some fictional-model explanations, as 
if the terms in them existed and were explanatory, because those models do 
recreate modal structure in the world. 
THE PATTERN & THE WIZARD
The claim here is that if a theory/model is quasi-true then it can be quasi-
explanatory,  but  just  as  the  quasi-truthfulness  of  a  theory  doesn't 
automatically give a measure of external correspondence truth so too quasi-
explanation does not imply the degree of overlap with a correspondence 
explanation. The notion of quasi-truth is irrevocably tethered to the notion 
of a domain of applicability, so a quasi-true theory does not imply much 
about the correspondence true theory outside of that domain other than 
within the domain the two must agree empirically. However, the domain 
can be relatively small, hence we cannot simply make inductive extensions 
of quasi-true theories as being approximately true therefore looking similar 
to the correspondence true theories outside of the domain. The cumulative 
aspect of science comes from amassing a large number of domains. In the 
context  of  explanation this  is  also the case,  because a  quasi-explanation 
captures modal information in a domain does not mean that its ontology 
will be similar to the ultimate correspondence ontology. The pattern on the  
curtain does not tell us what the wizard will look like. 
However,  what  we  do  have  is  an  increasing  network  of  modal 
connections  and  overlapping  perspectives  that  constrain  how  the 
correspondence  ontic  explanations  must  behave  in  those  domains.  We 
should not make the mistake of taking a holistic definition in reference to a 
domain  and  turning  that  into  an  approximation  without  reference  to  a 
domain. Nihil models are not approximately explanatory, they are quasi-
explanatory in a domain and that is why they remain (quasi) explanatory 
even  if  new  explanations  come  along  which  have  wider  domains. In 
discussing  a  model  that  describes  the  electron  as  point-like  da  Costa  and 
French state: 
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It is not the case that the description stands free of the 
theoretical  context,  so that we can talk of  this idealised 
electron  as  a  separate  entity,  existing  in  some  possible 
world  perhaps;  rather,  the  idealisation  is  bound  to  the 
model. (Da Costa & French, 2003 chapter 8)
It is this kind of holism that the account of explanation presented here is 
attempting to capture. Idealisations, abstractions, and fictions are essential 
aspects that result from, and are often necessary for, the construction of a 
gestalt  which allows modal  structure  to be represented.  It  is  the  overall 
model in which the fiction plays a role that is quasi-explanatory relative to a 
domain. 
Fictions in models work because of the way they interlock with other 
aspects of the model to capture modal structure. It is the totality which is 
necessary. This is not to say nothing can be said about the parts of a model 
and how they achieve this feat, far from it, but to understand a fiction the 
perspective must be understood. This holism runs counter to the Galilean 
intuition. It also fits nicely with the idea that models as a whole should be 
regarded as fictions, if the whole fictional model captures modal relations 
then specific fictions within it play their role in their place in the structure 
of  the  larger  fiction  not  in  isolation.  The  fictions  within  a  model  work 
because of their relations to the other parts of the model, but there is no 
ontological divide internal to a given model, rather the whole is a fiction. 
Just as the play within a play in Hamlet is not a different type of thing to 
Hamlet itself, and its significance can only be see in relation to the wider 
play. Plucking it out and examining it in isolation would not reveal its true 
meaning. 
To quote da Costa & French again:
To describe an electron as if it were a point particle is to 
lay down a bundle of properties that have meaning only 
within a model or, more generally, a structure; thus the 
"as if" character of such idealization terms gets shifted to 
that of the embedding context. (Da Costa & French 2003, 
Chapter 8)
Fictions work because of  the structural  context  of a particular model. 
This is why a fiction can be explanatory in one model but not explanatory in 
another  model.  The  fiction  works  to  capture  modal  information  in  the 
contextualising environment of a fictional world, a fiction within a fiction to 
facilitate representing modal structure. This is why the correct ontology for 
models  is  that  of  fictions,  to  avoid  othering the  non-referring  terms  in 
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them. Idealisations and abstractions cannot be understood in isolation, they 
must always be evaluated relative to an explanandum that they play a role 
in addressing. It is only then that we can see in a heterogeneous manner 
how each individual idealisation still keeps some essential property of the 
real-world,  or  surrealistically  represents  some  appearance  of  the  world. 
Structural  contextualisation  of  the  properties  of  entities  within  models  
with reference to an explanandum is essential for explicating the ways in  
which "lies" told in models can get to greater truths. 
This is  why attempts to sub-divide theories and models into the "bits 
that do the work" and the parts that don't will always be inadequate. Part of 
why  we  cannot  predict  which  parts  of  a  theory  will  be  preserved  by  a 
successor  is  that  we  don't  know  the  context  in  which  terms  in  the 
predecessor will be put into in the new theory, and without the structural 
context  of  terms  and  properties  in  models  and  theories  they  are 
meaningless.  One  suspects  that  the  wonderment  at  how idealisations  in 
models  can  work  is  produced  by  plucking  them  out,  de-contextualising 
them from the larger structure and commenting on how curious they look 
on their own. To return to our literary analogy, this is like putting  Count 
Dracula into The Old Curiosity Shop and then remarking how out of place 
he looks. 
CHANGING GESTALTEN AND THEORIES
The notion of perspectives is deliberately intended to be broad enough to 
include this embedding contextualisation. A perspective is a cluster concept 
that includes a range of contexts: the way data is presented to us as meso-
level  creatures,  the  level  of  empirical  precision  of  observations  and 
experiments, the empirical domain a model applies to, the boundary of the 
target  system,  a  set  of  parametrisations  and  abstractions  to  allow  the 
definition of  modally connectible variables,  a framework for partitioning 
“raw” observational data into sets and elements of systems into “natural” 
kinds and universal classes. The notion of perspectives is hard wired into 
the way our brains process the world and the theoretical frameworks used 
to  explain  it.  The  traditional  intuition  that  part  of  the  methodology  of 
science is to avoid humans being the measure of all things and to sit outside  
our  viewpoint  should  be understood not  as  science finding a  view from 
nowhere, a perspectiveless ideal, but as science providing a multiplicity of 
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perspectives.  The “compound eye” of science allows us to go beyond the 
innate coarse grained way the world appears to us as sense data, but what it  
never shows us is a view without a perspective. It does allow us to compare 
perspectives and look for consistencies, overlaps and bridges between them, 
and give us a picture of aspects of the whole. This scientific perspectivism is 
an  outgrowth  from,  but  also  a  means  to  circumvent,  the  perspectivism 
forced on us by our epistemic limitations.
There is a dialectic at work: perspectives facilitate the construction of 
models and making modal connections in them. In turn these models are 
empirically constrained by having to represent the modal structures of the 
world.  A  bad  perspective  will  make  a  very  limited  number  of  modal 
connections  that  can track  onto  the  world correctly,  it  will  apply  to  too 
small an empirical domain to be interesting or useful. Useful perspectives 
track surrealistically, or realistically, onto the world. In some cases we will 
be able to say why the surrealism holds, how it comes to be that the world 
appears as if a fiction exists, in other cases the surrealism will be brute, at  
least  for  now.  That  does  not  render  a  model  that  uses  those  facts 
unexplanatory, any more than a causal explanation which cannot provide a 
full  causal  regression  to  the  big  bang  is  unexplanatory.  Structural 
contextualisation is important. What is meant by saying the world surreally 
looks as if entity X exists is that when that entity and its properties are put 
into a  theoretical  structure  such as  a  model,  the whole  of  that  model is 
quasi-explanatory. That is, X as embedded in structure Y produces a modal 
topology which is empirically adequate relative to the domain Z. 
This  perspectivism presents  a  new way of  restating the intuition that 
during theory change a new entity in a new theory plays the same causal 
role as an entity which has been abandoned in the superseded theory. Of 
course I do not want to say that it plays a causal role, but in these cases we 
can say that the new entity may be identifiable as playing a similar role in 
the structure of a model in one perspective as another entity in a different 
model. The new entity in its relation to its model allows an analogous modal 
topology to be expressed. The conservation of properties is  explicated in 
terms of  the  necessary  features  the  overall  model  needs  to  capture  new 
modal information, whilst preserving the modal information of the previous 
explanation. 
Bokulich's notion of the openness of classical and quantum mechanics 
provides an interesting addendum to the view of theory change presented in 
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the  partial  structures  account.  Here,  theory  change  involves  the 
preservation of elements from the old theory into the new theory, no old 
theory is ever scrapped entirely.216 Bokulich's treatment of quantum chaos 
suggests  that  we  can  go  further  and  say  that  when  new  elements  are 
discovered in an old theory they can then be incorporated into the new 
theory in  a  hybridised set  of  models.  This  chimes  well  with  the view of 
theory change as presented in the partial structures account:
Bluntly put, we never loose the best of what we have, and 
this can be mirrored within our account of what might be 
called the Principle of the Absolute Nature of Pragmatic 
Truth: Once a theory has been shown to be pragmatically 
true in a certain domain,  it  remains pragmatically  true, 
within that domain, for all time. It is this, of course, which 
lies  behind  the  justification  for  continuing  to  use 
Newtonian mechanics within certain limits. (Da Costa and 
French 2003 p. 82)
The same is true for quasi-explanation, once a theory/model is quasi-
explanatory it remains so despite other newer explanations coming along. 
Moreover, the modal topology it provides is preserved. The modal structure 
of the surreal world is accrued through the progress of science, constraining 
aspects of what the true ontological structure can be.
ASYMPTOTICS & CUMULATIVE MODAL SURREALISM
Asymptotics are a way of bridging perspectives. They allow the linking of 
different modal topologies. The move to a different qualitative region of the 
state space of the system corresponds to a change of perspective. If we use 
an explanatory idealisation, such as the thermodynamic limit in statistical 
mechanics, or the use of ray optics to explain rainbows, we enter a different 
region  of  the  space of  available  parameters  as  it  were,  meaning that  by 
taking such singular  limits,  we produce a  different  set  of  partitions  and 
variables  to  connect  modally.  So  when  we  take  an  asymptotic  limit  we 
change the “whats” as well as which of them depend upon which others. 
We can define  a  new sense  of  mereological  emergence  based  around 
explanation. Batterman has argued that asymptotics can provide a basis for 
a definition of non-mereological emergence: an emergent set of properties 
are those in the singular limit which cannot be recovered from the approach 
to that limit. I have sympathy with this view but I think it is too narrowly 
drawn and that some mereological aspect plays a role in emergence as well. 
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I think that  the asymptotic  definition could be subsumed under a wider 
definition of emergence in terms of explanatory emergence. The basic idea 
is that although we may be able to physically see a reduction basis from one 
level to another, we cannot collapse the modal topology from one level onto 
another. Of course, two different modal topologies at different levels cannot 
be in contradiction if they are both adequate explanations, but that does not 
mean that the modal topology of one should reduce to the other. Indeed the 
perspectivism argued for here illustrates why. To define a modal topology 
requires  adopting  a  perspective,  we  should  be  able  to  provide  bridging 
principles  between  perspectives  but  not  necessarily  reduce  them  to  one 
another.  That is,  what-depends-upon-what at  one level can be physically 
connected to  another  level  but the modal  connections  need not  be.  The 
parts  at  one  level  reduce  to  the  parts  at  another  level  but  the  modal 
connections between the parts at each level do not reduce, they merely have 
to be consistent. The two levels should not be in contradiction, and may 
present equivalent modal pictures in some respects, but each perspective 
may be able to capture different aspects of modal structure. The set of w-
questions each is able to answer is different and this ability to distil modal 
information,  that  depends  upon  the  perspective  and  hence  the  level  of 
explanation, need not reduce. 
So we can say in an emergent system what “emerges” is a set of variables 
and partitions of natural kinds that allows a modal topology to be defined. 
The elements in this level are physically connectible to the lower level but 
the same kinds of w-questions are not definable and modal aspects are only 
explicated at the higher level. An emergent property is then a variable that 
can be connected modally at one level but not at a reduced level.
By defending explanatory pluralism, especially across different levels we 
can defend a form of anti-reductionism at the level of explanation. We can 
still preserve the physical intuition that there is physical reduction possible. 
Chairs  are  made  of  atoms  for  instance,  but  what  there  is  not  is  modal 
reduction: some counterfactuals about chairs cannot be expressed in the 
variable base of atoms. In reduction we have physical continuity but not 
explanatory continuity. In modelling terms, different fictional worlds need 
not  collapse  onto  one  another.  Asymptotics  reflects  this,  such  analytic 
techniques provide a crucial role in bridging perspectives, by reducing the 
number of variables in a problem say, but it is this more general feature, 
shifting perspectives that allows a more general sense of emergence to be 
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articulated than only looking at asymptotics can provide. 
The surrealism argued for here is entirely consistent with the notion of a 
cumulative knowledge base in science. Indeed it is deliberately intended to 
borrow aspects from Woodward's notion of science producing cumulative 
dependency relations and French & Ladyman's and others' structural realist 
contention that under theory change modal structure is preserved. When a 
new  explanation  is  produced  that  extends  the  domain  of  a  previous 
explanation the modal topologies must be consistent and bridgeable. Even 
though  they  need  not  reduce  to  one  another  they  must  agree  on  the 
observable consequences of that modal structure and the modal topologies 
must be connectible in some well defined sense. All of this, as Woodward 
argues, adds up to a cumulative set of modal relations that builds up over 
the history of science and narrows down the possibility space of how the 
world can appear to be. Now we must be clear that there is a qualitative 
difference between a quasi-explanation and a correspondence-explanation, 
just increasing the domain of a quasi-true explanation does not necessarily 
pin down how the actual correspondence true explanation must be. What 
greater and greater domains of quasi-explanations can do is narrow down 
the  way  the  correspondence  explanation  must  appear.  So  the  true 
correspondence explanation featuring all the correspondence true ontology 
of the real world may be quite different from that hinted at by our quasi-
explanations  and  their  quasi-true  ontologies,  but  we  have  still  modally 
constrained the correspondence true ontology of the world. Whatever this 
true state is it must recover the appearance of the quasi-true explanations 
in their domain, it must allow us to see how the world looked  as if these  
false ontologies were true. 
This is in essence a structural surrealism, where the surrealistic modal 
structures of past theories are incorporated into new theories. This adding 
up  of  surrealist  aspects  does  not  necessarily  get  us  closer  to  the 
correspondence-true ontology of  the  world,  but  it  does  limit  how it  can 
manifest  itself  at  different  explanatory  levels,  in  different  empirical 
domains and from different perspectives.  So we build up a  collection of 
modal topologies and perspectives, variables and their modal dependencies, 
and  this  menagerie  of  modalities  must  be  preserved  by  any 
correspondence-true  theory.  When  theories  are  shown  not  to  be 
correspondence  true  and  only  quasi-true  this  is  not  a  weakness  of  the 
scientific method, rather it is a strength, as only by finding the limits of the 
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domains in which quasi-explanations operate can we build the patchwork 
quilt  of  these  domains  that  we  must  recover  the appearance  of,  and by 
doing  so  hope  to  find  our  ultimate  goal  of  realist  correspondence 
explanations.
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AFTERWORD
The overarching theme of this thesis has been that modal information is 
crucial for explanation. It is the capturing of the modal connections of the 
world,  the  representing  of  this  counterfactual  structure,  that  marks 
explanations out. Explanation is about saying what depends upon what and 
how things could have been different. Of course, many explanations posses 
other  characteristics:  they  may  unify,  or  identify  mechanisms,  or  cite 
causes, but they  all give us modal knowledge. One may wonder if modal 
information is sufficient for explanation. There is no doubt that different 
communities  may  require  different  additional  features  to  be  added to  a 
definition of explanation, but the claim here is that if scientific explanation 
is to be untethered from sociology and history then modal information is 
the common denominator to all scientific explanations and should be our 
bar of entry for assessing current explanations.
We  tease  out  this  modal  knowledge  through  manipulations. 
Manipulations are not just the things we do but a way of thinking about the 
world. The conceptual extension of manipulations to hypothetical situations 
allows the causal-explanatory relation to be understood. Moreover, this way 
of  thinking  about  the  world  has  crept  into  our  representations  of  it.  In 
models  we  “manipulate”  variables  to  map  the  modal  structure  of  the 
fictional  worlds  we  create.  Models  become  crucial  for  understanding 
advanced  scientific  explanation  and  elements  of  modelling  practice  are 
found  in  lots  of  types  of  explanations.  Models  function  as  ways  of 
representing  aspects  of  the  world  and  as  an  investigative  apparatus  to 
unearth the modal structure of it.
By  thinking  of  models  as  manipulable  tools  of  inquiry  we  can  gain 
insights into their ontological status. Models are fictions, or fictions based 
on a true story at  least.  They are constrained in science by this  need to 
explain  the  world,  to  reproduce  modal  connections.  Manipulationism 
provides a set of resources for understanding how many different types of 
models  can  be  explanatory  despite,  or  because  of,  the  idealisations, 
abstractions, and fictions they employ. 
The emphasis on explanation as an activity, rather than representation 
for instance, presents a different take on issues of realism and cumulative 
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knowledge in science. A new form of realism is implied by this explanatory 
focus. Science preserves modal connections between variables across theory 
change and paradigm shifts. The variables change with the ontologies of our 
theories  but  what  is  preserved,  beyond  merely  a  list  of  observational 
findings, is the modal structure of how those variables must connect in a 
given domain. 
Surrealistically the world looks as if some false ontologies are correct in 
some domains. Any subsequent theory must account for this appearance. 
That is,  it must be able to recreate the modal structure captured by this 
previous  theory,  and be consistent  with  it.  A  new theory will  posit  new 
entities,  structures,  and  relations,  as  well  as  new  variables  to  connect 
modally. Yet, the modal connections it posits must be in sympathy with, in 
some sense,  previous  successful  explanations  with  different  variables  in 
their  domain.  Explanatory  pluralism  and  multi-level  explanation  are 
assured in this framework: the boundaries of their domains may change, 
but old explanations do not stop being explanations because new ones come 
along. 
The need to define variables in order to connect them modally means 
that different areas of science will always require different variable bases, 
different  fictional  model  worlds,  and  will  always  discover  different 
explanatory  invariances  in  terms  of  those  variables.  For  a  materialist 
reductionist there need be no conspiracy that makes the ability of biology to 
find invariances for bunny rabbits mysterious, given that superstrings, or 
whatever,  is  supposed  to  be  the  only  fundamental  entity  capable  of 
supporting  laws.  These  higher  level  invariances  are  inevitable  in  our 
explanatory practice as a consequence of this multiplicity of variable sets 
and  domains.  The  world  looks  as  if  bunnies  exist,  whether  they 
fundamentally do or not, and this appearance can be a source of objective 
modal information.
The surrealistic aspects of the world can be used to explain, when explain 
is understood as mapping modal connections, just as the real aspects of it 
can. Surrealism lends itself to a certain perspectivism: science creates new 
gestalten, new ways of seeing the world. It transcends our limitations, not 
by providing us with a view from no where, but with a multiplicity of views 
from somewhere. The heritage one set of theories bequeaths to another is 
not just a set of modal connections, but a set of perspectives; new ways of 
chiselling the bare marble of the world into conceptual friezes.
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Explanation is stratified into those explanations which are true in some 
deep correspondence sense, and those that are false, seemingly get things 
wrong,  yet  also  get  something  fundamentally  modally  correct.  This  will 
leave some unsatisfied of course. The ontic intuition about explanation is 
strong, and it is natural to want to know how an explanation that lies about 
the  world  can  explain  anything.  How  do  these  surrealistic  models 
containing  fictional  entities  “latch  onto”  the  world?  As  unitary  as  the 
account of explanation is in terms of modal information, the answer to this 
question  will  be  extremely  heterogeneous.  There  will  be  cases  where  an 
idealisation  in  a  model  makes  no  real  difference  except  to  calculational 
ease. The explanation then is getting the basic facts and relationships of the 
world correct. There will be other cases where inferences are made between 
structures,  or  aspects  of  the  entities  in  our  representations,  and  the 
structures of the world. For every type of explanation and every model there 
will be varied specific details of how exactly a certain fiction was able to 
facilitate capturing modal information.  Most frustrating of all,  there will 
also  be  cases  where  the  link  is  simply  brute  and  to  request  more  is  to 
inquire in vain. If the world simply looks a certain way consistently, but is 
not, then we can use that fact, even if we never ultimately understand why it 
looks that way. In these cases, why a certain fiction helps a model to latch 
onto the modal structure of the world may be just a brute surrealistic fact.
In  unifying  causal  and  non-causal  explanation,  as  both  a  species  of 
model explanation, have we undermined what was special about the causal-
explanatory  relation  of  Woodward's  original  scheme?  I  don't  think  so. 
Woodward's  explanatory  scheme  still  exquisitely  exposes  how  causal 
thinking works, we have merely drawn attention that to complete the story 
of causal explanation we need a reductive account of causation itself. If, and 
when,  such  an  account  can  be  adequately  provided  then  the  extended 
manipulationism argued for here provides a method for understanding how 
causal  explanations,  which may not fit  our new definition of  causal,  are 
explanatory nonetheless, and why they were ever thought of as causal in the 
first place. The manipulationist framework teases out the crucial aspects for 
causal  explanation,  but  it  actually  identifies  a  much  wider  set  of 
requirements  of  explanation  in  general.  Woodward's  analysis   is  so 
penetrating in its insight that it should provide the kernel at the heart of  
any account that seeks to recreate our explanatory practice.
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 NOTES
 1 | THE RISE AND FALL OF DEDUCTION
1 The terms epistemic and ontic trace their etymology to Salmon. He defines three schools of 
thought on explanation. Modal: because of the antecedent conditions an event had to happen, 
indeterministic events are taken to not exist or are simply inexplicable. Explanation tells us what 
is necessary and what is impossible. (This is not the sense of modal explanation used in this  
thesis,  modal  explanation  is  about  providing  counterfactual  information,  this  is  perfectly 
compatible  with  statistical  explanation,  and  in  fact  necessary  for  it.)  Epistemic:  the 
explanandum  is  shown  to  be  expected  (DN/IS  models),  there  is  no  difference  between 
descriptive  knowledge  and  explanatory  knowledge.  Ontic:  (SR  models)  once  the  objective 
probabilities of events are determined we have explained. If we reveal the mechanisms, causal  
or otherwise, that lead to the explanandum then we have explained. 
2 Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948.
3 Of course we can immediately see why modelling with all of its abstractions and idealisations is 
impossible to capture within the DN framework.
4 Hughes 2010.
5 Tarski, 1965.
6 That is logic that quantifies over individuals but not properties.
7 Nagel, 1961.
8 Hempel, 1965.
9 Also the Suppes-Sneed-Stegmuller approach, as Hughes dubs it,  is  called “semantic”  despite 
their desire to get away from an over emphasis on language.
10 Hughes  calls  the  Suppes-Sneed-Stegmuller  (Stegmuller,  1979)  approach  the  structuralist 
approach to theories, like Carnap they stress the importance of axiomatic methods but don't 
confine themselves to first order logic, instead considering set-theoretic methods, for instance.
11 As an example of such in classical mechanics a point particle is represented as a set <P, T, s, m,  
f> P= point mass, m= mass, f = forces, s=  position etc.
12 Hughes view of theories is quite different: his approach is closer to literary criticism, he regards  
them as texts which can be analysed.
13 Einstein, 1915, see Hughes 2010 for discussion.
14 For neo-Kantians, for instance, space and time are by their nature outside sensory experience, 
they are synthetic a priori structures.
15 For Reichenbach only once the foundational principles are laid down do empirical principles 
gain content.
16 Hughes 2010.
17 In some ways the ghost of the DN account haunts us like Jacob Marley, but we shall not repent  
our causalist ways. GR is not a typical scientific theory in many ways, but even given this the DN 
account is not up to the task of accounting for specific examples of explanation utilising GR. For 
instance, in explaining the precession of the perihelion of Mercury Einstein builds a model, and 
uses idealisations in that model. We are left with the suspicion then that Hempel is in part trying 
to  define  what  ought  to  count  as  an  explanation,  along  DN  lines,  rather  than  reconstruct 
practice. This is not wholly illegitimate, Hempel's problem is that the DN account is so far from 
even everyday explanation, let alone scientific practice, that it cannot even form a new standard  
for scientific explanation, it is however an extremely useful stating point for clarity of what an 
explanation is, and is not, like. 
18 Salmon, 1989.
19 Coffa, 1974.
20 Inference also requires temporal symmetry but in the opposite direction: we explain effects in 
terms of causes but infer causes from their effects. Salmon's SR account is objective because he 
relies on the existence of objective homogeneous reference classes, not just reference classes 
which are epistemically homogeneous because they cannot be partitioned further due to a lack  
of knowledge. An objective homogeneous reference class cannot be partitioned in principle. If  
such classes exist then the epistemic relativity of IS explanations can be removed, the fact that  
most of our IS explanations are incomplete because the objective homogeneous reference class  
has not been discovered is not a conceptual problem. By contrast Coffa's solution is to include 
an extremal clause in an IS explanation to the effect that no other relevant factors exist, but 
establishing the extremal clause is the same as establishing the objectivity of the homogeneous 
reference class.
21 Railton 1978, 1980.
22 Salmon further distinguishes three types of epistemic school. The inferential to which Hempel 
belongs (explanations are arguments), the information theoretic, and the erotetic stance of van 
Fraassen. Coffa argues that an explication of explanation that is acceptable to an instrumentalist 
or  a constructive empiricist,  such as  DN, is  in principle  flawed since causal  mechanisms in 
science  require  unobservables.  As  such  the  account  of  explanation  one  accepts  can  have  a 
bearing on whether one is committed to scientific realism or anti-realism.
23 Achinstein, 1983.
24 Some might hold that such a randomly generated explanation is legitimate,  but it is at least 
debatable.
25 Psillos, 2002.
26 Braithwaite,1953.
27 Beebee, 2000.
28 Psillos, 2002.
29 Elgin, 2006; Hamilton, 2007.
30 Cartwright, 1983.
31 Friedman,1974.
32 Psillos 2002.
33 Kitcher, 1981, 1989.
34 Railton, 1978.
35 As defined by van Fraassen's contrast class.
36 Inspired by Russell's at-at theory of motion, in a body in motion is at a sequentially at a series of 
specified space-time points in and there is nothing more to the concept of motion than that. 
37 Dowe 2000.
38 Of course in the manipulationist framework such definitions are not explanations either.
39 For van Fraassen (1989) all explanations are answers to 'Why?' questions. Explanation is a three  
point relationship between theory, fact and context. Salmon contents that not all questions are  
'Why?' questions, some are 'How possibly?' questions which require one or many potential ways  
in which something could have occurred, not a singular answer as to why in a particular way it 
did.  The  distinction  is  irrelevant  for  an  ontic  conception,  as  mechanisms  matter,  not  the 
phrasing of a question, but for van Fraassen, and an epistemic conception of explanation, the 
phrasing of a question determines the context in which it has to be answered. 
The same group of words can ask different questions depending on the context. All 'Why?'  
questions can be understood as a triple: a topic (the explanandum),  a contrast  class,  and a  
relevance relation. The answer picks out the topic from the contrasts class. The question comes 
with a central presupposition, that the topic is true and that each member of the contrast class 
that is not the topic is false, in this way van Fraassen's account can accommodate rejections of 
questions. However van Fraassen puts no formal restriction on the relevance relation, hence any 
arbitrarily true proposition could count as an explanation because mechanisms and causes are 
not required. The debate about realism directly effects the epistemic and ontic approaches and  
vice versa.
 2 | MAKING, & IMAGINING, THINGS HAPPEN
40 Woodward, 2003; Woodward & Hitchcock 2003a, 2003b.
41 Although Woodward himself describes his account as ontic and not concerned with logic but 
rather with the objective structure of causal manipulations, it is nevertheless better understood I  
believe in terms of the logic of causation since Woodward himself discusses negative causation  
and other non-physical difference makers in causal terms. Woodward mixes ontic and epistemic 
sensibilities often.
42 Modalities are seen as akin to the boolean logic gates of a circuit determining what the value of  
an outcome is given a set of inputs.
43 For continuous variables the same process applies the range of values is discretised via some 
metric. This is an example of what I call adopting a perspective in Chapter 7.
44 X and Y cannot  be directly  linked in  the sense  changing  X automatically  changes  Y  for  all 
possible  interventions.  They  must  be  indirectly  linked,  so  for  a  set  of  interventions  on  X, 
changes in Y are produced as well but not automatically.
45 This  is not  viciously circular.  Remember,  Woodward is not  giving us a reductive account of 
causation. We elucidate one causal process in terms of another special type of causal process 
and suitable correlations between outcomes.
46 Interventions are exogenous changes. An intervention, I, on a variable, X, breaks the previous 
endogenous causal relationship between X and its antecedents.
47 This means that the notion of a direct cause is relative to the particular variable set that is held  
fixed, but this simply reflects that the level of analysis matters. Under a different variable set a  
direct cause may be seen to be an indirect cause with intermediate steps. This relativity is only 
related to the level at which to describe a causal process. This is again another aspect of the 
perspectivism I advocate in Chapter 7.
48 Woodward 2003, pp 127-133.
49 What is viewed as a similar process is therefore historicised and theory laden in some sense.
50 It is only some interventions that are required to bring about a change in a dependent variable, 
not  all  possible interventions,  that would be far too strict.  A ball  can break a window if  its  
momentum is large enough, but not all balls kicked at all windows break them. This does not 
invalidate the causal relationship between window breakage and ball kicking for some balls. 
51 Lewis 1986.
52 Causal pre-emption is said to occur in situations where if one cause of an event had not occurred  
then another alternative cause would have: if Rasputin had not died of drowning the he would 
have died from being shot, or being poisoned, so if we naively ask what made a difference his 
actual cause of death, drowning, apparently didn't since he would have died regardless. 
53 Menzies & Price 1993
54 Woodward's objective account is preferable to such subjective accounts of manipulation, but he 
does not tackle the question of where our epistemic access to causal concepts comes from in the  
first  place.  I  would  argue  that  a  case  could  be  made  that  it  is  from the  very  essence  of  a  
subjective  sentient  experience  that  causal  manipulations  become  embedded  in  our  way  of 
thinking. We all have, from our earliest moments, the feeling of manipulating our own bodies  
according to our desires. It is this primal notion of controlling ourselves that perhaps provides  
the imaginative spark to see the world in manipulable terms in the first place. However, since  
Woodward does not claim a reductive account of causation this task is left open but he does 
claim  a  degree  of  objectivity  in  his  conception  of  manipulability  which  is  not  present  in 
antecedent  manipulability  theories.  Woodward  successfully  argues  that  a  credible 
manipulability theory is not mind dependent in the sense that it is  culturally or doxastically  
dependent, but he does not establish that causal notions make sense outside of a human way of 
thinking. His contention that they ought to, seems at odds with his definition of causation as a 
set  of  counterfactual  dependencies  imagined  by  people,  not  a  matter  of  some fundamental  
physical process. The arrow of time is not dependent upon a particular belief system or culture 
but that does not mean (necessarily) that is is objective in the sense of independent of humans. 
Why should causation be any different? Even the more primitive notion of the counterfactual  
structure may be impossible to be 'objective' if a many worlds Everettian conception of quantum 
mechanics is adopted. What would it mean to assess the truth of a counterfactual that “if X had 
not happened Y would not have happened” if every physically allowed possibility has to happen 
in at least one branch?. The typical counterfactual structure would be an artefact of a perceptual  
bias towards considering each branch as individuated (which they are fundamentally not in an 
Everettian  conception,  they overlap).  That  said  any  scientific  theory  which  undermines  the 
ability  of  the scientific  method to  provide reliable  dependencies,  as  arguably  the Everettian 
framework does, cannot be used an an argument in an explication of the scientific method that  
produced it.
55 Any acceptable philosophical theory of causation should shed light on why it is useful to think in 
causal, and not just correlational, terms at all. The manipulationist account does this. That said,  
Woodward's evolutionary argument is redolent of Kant's argument for the necessity of three 
dimensional space based on our visual perceptions, which of course turned out to be false. It is  
undeniably useful to think in causal terms but it doesn't follow that our causal sense is infallible  
or actually picks out anything other that a particular lamina of reality that might be entirely  
subjective to human cognition. However, this is good enough! In Chapter 7 I argue for a certain  
perspectivism in relation to explanation, a much more objective notion than Nietzsche’s, but 
that nevertheless builds into our very notion of explanation epistemic conditions that humans 
are limited to.
56 Given  Woodward's  conception  of  intervention,  there  is  an  interesting  analogy  with  Hume's 
thoughts on miracles. If a singular intervention were to occur, by definition only once in the 
world, since it would still be conceptually reproducible it actually would not count as a singular 
event! Of course it may well be that we could never make sense of a genuinely singular causal 
claim. Or have any evidential basis for our counterfactual musings.
57 This is again another example of the structural contextualisation argued for in my account of 
explanatory perspectivism in Chapter 7. 
58 Invariance  is  not  concerned  with  stability  with  regard  to  changing  background  conditions.  
Newton's laws still hold for different coloured planets, but this invariance is irrelevant, it is only  
invariance relative to changing the values of the variables in question themselves that matters. 
59 For instance deriving the cosmic microwave background radiation (CMBR) signature of the Big 
Bang in a region of space from its presence everywhere is not explanatory, as an intervention in 
one region will not change it in another distant region and the CMBR may be highly contingent 
of specific initial conditions of the Big Bang.
60 Brad  Weslake  has  challenged  the  basis  upon  which  Woodward  makes  this  claim  for  the 
autonomy  of  higher  level  explanations.  Weslake  contends  that  Woodward's  statements  of 
autonomy cannot be cashed out in the extra modal information the ideal gas law provides over  
kinetic  theory.  Woodward  is  surely  correct  in  the  usefulness  of  these  phenomenological 
descriptions and that it cannot be a requirement of explanation that every cause cited is itself 
provided with its own cause, lest it be deemed unexplanatory. At the same time though, it seems 
unsatisfying somehow to describe a purely phenomenological relationship that  is  discovered 
between two variables as explanatory in the same sense as a mechanistic explanation. If one 
asks how the temperature of a gas changes with pressure then a phenomenological relationship 
is the most useful answer to a set of w-questions, but it doesn't explain how or why temperature 
and pressure are related at all. In that sense the ideal gas law is a discovery of a regularity in the  
world that can be useful for prediction and control but it seems unsatisfying as an explanation  
since it relates quantities that there is no a priori reason for relating in such a way. It is only 
with a statistical mechanical description that the relationship feels explained, because there is a 
reason  for  linking  the  two variables  at  all.  Is  the  usefulness  of  a  purely  phenomenological 
explanation  anything  more  than  the  usefulness  of  a  non  causal  regular  correlation.  Is  the 
manipulation simpliciter what makes one an explanation and the other not, even if absolutely 
nothing could be said about how or why one quantity affects another? Consider for example 
pseudo-scientific  explanations,  the  spoon-bending-psychic  “explains”  the  bent  spoon on the 
basis  of  his  telekinetic  powers,  and  he  may  be  very  skilful  at  providing  demonstrations  of 
manipulations in which it appears as if interventions from his mind really do causally affect the  
silverware. Such explanations are however widely rejected, partly because such claims don't fit 
into  our  wider  naturalistic  framework  but  also  partly  because  there  is  no  mechanism even 
hinted at as to why two totally unrelated things should be causally linked.
61 The  difference  between  higher  and  lower  level  theories  is  that  they  track  different  sets  of  
variables for different contrastive w-questions, lower level theories will not necessarily explain 
higher level theories.
62 Weslake 2010.
63 Weslake 2010.
64 Abstraction  is  to  be  understood  as  subject  to  the  requirement  to  minimise  explanatory 
redundancy. In the ideal gas law example, the microscopic description is hyper-concrete because 
it has to specify a particular set of initial velocities. An abstract micro-physical model could be 
constructed  involving an infinite disjunction of all possible initial states. This description would 
still not be as abstract as the higher level alternative as the infinitely disjunctive micro-physical  
models would depend on a particular set of fundamental physical laws, classical or quantum for 
instance, whereas the ideal gas law can abstract across these different sets of fundamental laws 
and apply equally to worlds governed by classical or quantum physics. Hence, the set of possible 
worlds it applies to is of larger measure. Any time the higher level description supervenes on 
physically, but not logically, impossible systems, then the higher level description will be more 
abstract.
65 Strevens 2011.
66 Noether's  theorem is  a classic  example of  finding independent  theoretical  justification for  a 
symmetry constraint on laws. Consider a symmetry assumption that physics should be spatially  
transnationally invariant. In other words, all things being equal, the laws of physics shouldn't 
alter because we are in Leeds rather than London. Noether was able to show that conservation 
of linear momentum follows from translational symmetry, likewise temporal symmetry leads to 
the principle of conservation of energy and rotational symmetry leads to conservation of angular 
momentum. So when we say both Newton's and Einstein's laws adhere to conservation of energy 
and momentum, we are constraining them via a very basic symmetry assumption.  Similarly 
dimensional explanations offer explanations by locating relational facts about the dimensional  
constraints inherent within a system. 
67 I am grateful to Marc Lange (private communication) for clarification of this point.
68 A similar  point will  be  made in chapter 4 concerning asymptotic models and how they can 
define new universal classes for modal purposes.
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69 Woodward 2003, pp. 187-189, example and formulae are quoted literally.
70 There are many types of non-causal explanation. Identity explanations are not usually regarded 
as  causal,  these  would  include  explaining  why  ice  is  water  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  H 2O. 
Particular instance explanations are also often argued to be non-causal: a space-ship continuing 
to move at a fixed velocity when not accelerated is explained by the law of inertia but not caused 
by it. Other examples include equilibrium explanations or mathematical explanations, or cases 
where a non-causal symmetry principle seems to be essential (as in the degeneracy pressure 
explanation of the non-collapse of white dwarf and neutron stars).
71 Scaling laws started to gain in importance with the attempt to understand equilibrium critical  
phenomena in physics. So called second order phase transitions are continuous transitions as 
opposed to first order discontinuous transitions, such as water to ice. Many systems that display 
discontinuous phases changes (such as liquid to vapour for example) have a critical point, as the  
system approaches this critical point the previously discontinuous first order phase transition 
becomes a continuous, second-order phase transition. A typical second order phase transition is  
the change from ferromagnetism to paramagnetism in a metal.  Many of  these second order 
phase transitions display the same scaling law dependences even though they take place in a 
wide range of different systems and often the power exponents of these laws deviate from simple 
rational numbers. That such diverse systems display near universal behaviour close to critical  
points indicates that very general properties are responsible for the power law exponents.
72 For instance, Kepler's third law states that, up to a constant, a planetary orbital period varies 
with the length of semi-major axis raised to the power of 3/2.
73 Wiesenfeld 2001.
74 Kleiber, 1947.
75 Calder 1984.
76 McMahon & Bonner 1983.
77 Peters 1986.
78 Noujaim et al., 2010.
79 Charnov, 1993.
80 Enquist & Niklas, 2001.
81 West, Brown, & Enquist 1997.
82 West, Brown, & Enquist 1999a.
83 West, Brown, & Enquist 1999b.
84 Mandelbrot 1983.
85 West et al. 1999b.
86 Dorato and Felline 2011.
 4 | THE NIHILISM OF MODELLING
87 McMullin, 1985.
88 What do I mean by genuinely fictional? The terms idealisation, abstraction and fiction in the 
context  of  models  are  some  what  conflated,  and  they  will  be  used  rather  loosely  and 
interchangeably here. Different authors give the terms different meanings. Broad distinctions 
between  the  terms  can  be  discerned  however.  Roughly  speaking,  they  form a  hierarchy  of 
distortions from reality. An idealisation takes some aspect of a real entity and distorts it, the 
Earth is treated as a sphere for example, and often these distortions are harmless, they can be  
removed in principle and leave a model intact. Abstractions are a mezzanine level of fiction,  
typically  abstractions  are  identified  with  so  called  Aristotelian  idealisations,  we  strip  away 
properties of a system until we have isolated the one we are interested in. In an abstraction we 
do not simply distort a real  object along some access of variation, instead we replace a real  
object with a new object, this new object is a representative of the real object with respect to one  
or more of its properties taken in isolation. The complexities of the real object are removed and  
a simplified simulacrum stands in its place. So the 'organisms' of West et al.'s model in Chapter  
3 are not merely idealised organisms, they are fictional objects which posses some properties the 
organisms also posses, but also lack many more qualities that real plants and animals have. 
Clearly there is a fuzzy boundary between an idealisation and an abstraction, and the two 
often go together. If we distort enough properties of a real object we end up with something 
which looks like a brand new abstract object. This is why some authors, for instance Morrison, 
define  abstractions  by their  functional  role  in  defining  new variables.  This  is  an important 
aspect of abstractions but I do not wish to adopt such a narrow definition of abstraction. This  
preserves  the  colloquial  use  of  the  terms  outside  Morrison's  scheme  and  separates  out 
definitions from analyses  of  functions.  Unlike Aristotle I do not  wish to identify body parts 
solely through their functions, or parts of models in the same, potentially circular way. 
89 Batterman stresses the importance of  processes not fictional entities in his case studies,  but 
regardless,  the reason why the mapping account fails  for  these cases  is  because there is  no 
correspondence in structure between the mathematical singularities used and real objects. The 
nihilism of models is not limited to entities that are fictions but to limits that are fictitious as  
well. Chapter 9 will look closely at whether these cases are a challenge to the inferential mapping 
account.
90 Added to these case studies are another set of explanations which are ontically problematic,  
those of genuine mathematical explanation. Mathematical explanation is controversial  in it's  
own right,  but  realists  about  mathematical  entities  have tried to formulate  a  version of  the 
explanatory  indispensability  argument.  The  idea  is  that  if  there  are  cases  of  genuine 
mathematical explanation- that is explanation where the maths is not used in a nominalistic way 
or merely as a shorthand for a fundamentally geometric explanation (which ultimately could be 
explained in terms of physical geometry)– then this licences extrapolating existence to those 
entities in the same way that realists have argued some unobservable physical entities must exist 
because otherwise our use of them in genuine physical explanations is itself inexplicable. For the  
realist  about  mathematical  entities  this  is  not  a  challenge,  but  for  anti-realists  about 
mathematical  entities  this  causes  these  cases  of  mathematical  explanation  to  also  require 
detailed analysis just as cases that  invoke physical  fictional entities.  Leng (forthcoming) has 
proposed an account of mathematical explanation in which mathematical explanation is viewed 
as a species of model explanation that utilise fictions. 
On the  other  hand the  key  role  of  abstractions  that  cannot  be  removed,  also  provides  a 
challenge for understanding models, even when fictional entities are not proposed, putting more 
detail back in can ruin an explanation, as is the situation in the case study of allometric scaling 
laws presented in chapter 3. The scaling law case is like many classic examples of explanation, 
such as  Putnam's explanation of  why a square peg cannot  fit  into a round hole  in terms of 
geometry instead of electrostatic forces. If we put all the detail we could into such explanations 
the higher level general features, in this example the geometrical features, are washed out. It is a  
matter of seeing the explanatory woods instead of the trees.
91 Ernst Ising was aiming in his 1924 thesis to understand ferromagnetism. To do so he confined 
himself to thinking in 1-dimension only, and imagining that the up/down polarisations in the  
atomic  dipoles  of  a  metal  could  be  abstractly  thought  of  as  a  regular  array  of  points  each 
assigned a value +1 or -1. If Si(a) is the value of site i in lattice arrangement a, then SƩ i(a) is the 
difference between +1 and -1 sites in arrangement a. The quantity M which is the sum of S i(a) 
divided by the total number of sites describes how ordered the system is. If M is +1 or -1 then the 
lattice is maximally ordered since all the sites are the same (either all +1 or all  -1) , if M is zero  
then the lattice is maximally disordered since just as many sites are +1 as -1. (The sites on the 
lattice can be visualised as arrows that can point in one of two directions, left or right, if the 
arrows all point left or all point right then it is ordered, if an equal number point left as point  
right then it is maximally disordered). With each adjacent pair of sites <j,k> there is associated 
an interaction energy -JSjSk and the total energy, Ea, is the sum over all adjacent sites, Ea is at a 
minimum in a maximally ordered arrangement. As temperature decreases, if Ea is positive, the 
probability  of  disordered  arrangements  falls  to  zero,  whereas  as  temperature  increases 
disordered states  become more  likely.  The  order  parameter  is  the sum of  all  PaMa,  so  each 
arrangement is weighted by its probability. By counting the number of ways the lattice could be 
arranged and using statistical methods Ising was able to calculate the resultant values of bulk 
properties such as the magnetisation. Ising's model wasn't initially regarded as important or as 
accurately capturing ferromagnetism, in fact Hughes states that it was only cited twice in its first 
ten years 1925-35. Partly this is because Ising had only developed a 1-dimensional model, and 
found no ferromagnetic effects were produced by it. He then erroneously extrapolated that no 
effects would be captured in higher dimensional versions of the model as well, which turned out 
not to be the case. Lars Onsagner saw the potential for Ising's model and used it in 2-dimensions 
to produce a much more accurate representation of ferromagnetism that had previously been 
achieved using mean field approximations. Mean field solutions are those in which each charge 
is assumed to experience an average field due the the cumulative effects of all the others. In 2-
dimensions an Ising system does display ferromagnetism and the use of the Ising model led 
directly to the discovery of scaling laws for a series of critical phenomena. 
In thermodynamic systems there are critical points at which phase changes occur, the precise 
temperatures at which these changes happen may vary from system to system but the power law 
exponents  that  determine  the  variation  of  quantities  with  temperature  are  the  same,  and 
determined by dimensional and symmetry considerations. For instance magnets, liquids, and 
binary  alloys  all  exhibit  radical  changes in  their  properties  at  some critical  temperature.  In 
para/ferromagnetism this temperature is the Curie temperature. The Ising model is used for all 
these systems and despite its seeming simplicity is able to capture and explain many features of 
them. 
The Ising model can capture these diverse systems because they display universal behaviours  
despite their differences. Many different micro-level concrete realisers are used in each system 
but the universal behaviour supervenes upon these and is multiply realisable, hence any model 
of that behaviour does not have to capture accurately the concrete micro-level physics. In fact, as 
the  Ising  model  show,  often  by  abstracting  away  from  particular  details  a  model  can  be 
produced which can account for, or represent, the similarities in diverse phenomena. Now the 
Ising  model  is  one  of  the  most  important,  and  widely  used,  models  in  physics.  Although 
originally developed to model one specific system, it has proved very useful in characterising  
many  disparate  and  dissimilar  physical  systems.  The  Ising  model  is  widely  used  when 
renormalisation groups are used. In representing these critical systems one can can arbitrarily 
renormalise to describe the system at a different level, one can change the size of the lattice and 
the  regions  that  are  regarded  as  discrete.  The  regions  are  represented  by  coupling  terms 
describing their interactions, on the one hand these coupling terms lend themselves to a realistic  
interpretation, each region has a real influence upon another, yet since the length scale can be 
changed with the renormalisation group so too can the coupling terms. Hughes suggests there is  
an analogy with Bohr's notion of complementarity here. No single representation is exhaustive  
of the properties of these systems near their critical points, instead the renormalisation group 
shows how complementary descriptions are related. This is clearly a challenge to a standard 
realist interpretation of the Ising model and the source of its successfulness. 
92 Hughes, 2010, p 3-15. 
Einstein's explanation proceeds by first defining a tensor representing the gravitational field 
in terms of the metric tensor g. The starting point is a null approximation, this tensor is set to 
zero to represent flat space-time. He then perturbs g and evaluates the resulting gravitational 
field tensor, producing a power series expansion, so have g0 + ag1 +a2g2+....where a is small. The 
first  order  approximation tends to the Newtonian correction in  Mercury's  orbit,  the second 
order term accounts for the observed anomaly in this. However, according to Hughes the D-N 
account of this explanation leaves out too much.
For instance, Einstein assumes that the difference in the metric tensor between flat space-
time and the actual space-time around Mercury is small, he then suggests a solution in terms of  
these small differences. Because of this assumption it is not a strictly logical deduction and the  
logical empiricist make no mention of approximations. This is not the only assumption Einstein  
makes, the diameter of Mercury is idealised as zero to produce the equations of motion. Einstein 
does not just apply GR to a target system (in this case the solar system around Mercury), rather  
he constructs a model system. Rather like the difference between a stuntman and an actor he  
fills in for, the model system can be used in ways that a full representation of a target system 
cannot.  The  model  is  simplified  by  abstraction  and  idealisation.  The  entire  solar  system is 
modelled  as  only  two  bodies,  even  though  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  perihelion  of 
Mercury is due to other planets. The Sun is modelled as a point mass and Mercury as a 'material  
point' and these abstract entities play different roles within the model: the point mass is a source 
of gravitational field, whilst the material body has it's motion determined by this field, it is an  
asymmetric interaction (within the model), the point mass does not move and the material body 
does not attract. 
93  Pincock, 2004.
94  Batterman 2010, 2002.
95 The  mapping  account  expresses  the  idea  that  there  is  some  direct  correspondence,  a  map, 
between the properties of mathematical entities and the empirical structures they describe: a 
wheel is,  to some level of precision, a circle.  The challenge is when mathematical  structures 
seem to have no physical  counterpart,  such as  singularities.  Explanatory power comes from 
representational power according to the mapping account. The source of the power of applied 
mathematical  concepts  is  that  there  is  a  correspondence,  or  map,  between the  structure  of  
mathematical objects and the structure of physical systems. Contrary to the mapping position, 
Batterman suggests that there is no need for representation in mathematical explanation.
The mapping account account faces problems with idealisations. It seeks to see mathematical  
models as explanatory because of correspondences in structure between mathematics and the 
target physical system, this correspondence is often described in terms of some kind of partial-
isomorphism (Da Costa & French 2003). As such one would expect that when one de-idealises 
according to McMullin's prescription we should increase the scope of the overlap of structural  
correspondences and make the model a better representation and hence more explanatory. This 
is  often not so however,  for instance in the case study on allometric scaling including more 
details of specific body plans would not make the model any more explanatory, in fact it might 
make it less explanatory. If we view the mapping account from the perspective of Woodward and 
Weslake's accounts of explanation then this is not a surprising feature. Explanations are about 
answering w-questions, they are about providing modal information, and representation as a 
straightforward recreation is not always the best way of achieving this aim. Representational 
power and explanatory power are not the same thing. In some models de-idealising is indeed 
harmless, but in others the representation required has to be suitably abstract to reveal what  
modally  depends  upon  what.  In  other  words  we  must  reveal  universal  structures  through 
choosing  the  most  suitable  representation for  a  given explanatory  purpose,  the mapping  of  
structure through partial-isomorphisms cannot  capture  this.  It  is  not  simply  the  amount  of 
structure we recreate but the qualitative type of structure we need a correspondence in,  the  
structure that is responsible for or captures modal facts about the world. However Batterman's 
case studies point to an even deeper problem with the mapping account, cases where no de-
idealisation is possible at all. 
96 By Galilean-inhibited I mean that they are not open to de-idealisation, a Galilean idealisation is  
a  distortion but  a  'harmless'  one,  in  these  cases  the  distortions  are  not  harmless,  they are  
fundamentally distortions of the world not just convenient pragmatic distortions.
97 Abstracting by Morrison’s definition; the distinction is blurred, in taking the limit we idealise 
but we also define new variables which present an abstracted, stripped down, version of the 
physical system.
98 Precisely what is 'short'  depends upon the particularities of  the system, but at timescales or 
lengthscales that are not large enough for the behaviour to settle down the specifics of starting 
conditions matter. Imagine pouring milk into a cup of tea, after stirring for a few seconds the 
milk has completely spread throughout the liquid and the same ratio of tea to milk will produce 
the same colour. During the stirring however no two cups will be the same, the precise pattern 
before equilibrium will be as unique as a snowflake.
99 The important question to ask is how must the world be for mathematics to adequately describe 
it? The type of mathematics that is explanatory is set by the structure of the world . If we want to 
explain patterns or regularities then that dictates that the mathematics that is explanatory is 
stable under changes of micro-details, either the system is robust to these changes or if  it is 
sensitive  to them we must take limits  and use asymptotics.  For instance Wilson (2010)  has 
looked at  shock  solutions,  in  these  we  have  infinities  in  various  parameters  but  can  use  a  
discontinuity to create an abstract explanatory model. We reduce the number of variables in a 
system through folding  micro-level  details  into  boundary  conditions  and singularities,  what 
Wilson calls “physics avoidance”. In hydrodynamics, shocks abstract away from all the detailed 
physics going on in a boundary and instead use conservation principles- jump conditions- to 
link the values of physical quantities before and after the shock, the so called upstream and  
downstream  variables.  Variables  are  modelled  as  jumping  discontinuously  across  a  two-
dimensional boundary. These jump conditions apply to many different shock types across many 
different sets of micro-physics that take place in the boundary.
100 Batterman contends that mathematics confers its explanatory power by being stable. By taking 
limits  we  can  see  which  details  can  be  thrown  away,  asymptotic  investigations  lead  to  an 
understanding of when a system is stable under perturbations. Batterman criticises Woodward; 
invariances  are  not  the  key  to  explanation,  instead  the  central  question  is  to  explain  the 
invariances  themselves:  "We  need  to  understand  why  we  have  the  regularities  and 
invariances...this  is  the fundamental  explanatory  question....The answer to this  fundamental 
question necessarily will involve a demonstration of the stability of the phenomenon or pattern 
in changes in various details ”  Batterman 2002 p. 21. 
Surely this is to mix up different explananda. We can explain a phenomenon by appealing to a 
general regularity or invariance in the world without explain that regularity itself. Of course it is  
desirable to explain that regularity and often we can go further but some regularities may turn 
out  to  be  just  brute,  Batterman  is  mixing  up  stratified  layers  of  explanation,  explaining 
invariances  themselves  will  often involve  invoking  other  invariances.  However Batterman is 
correct that it is a useful task to understand regularities to look at circumstances where they  
breakdown, such as singularities. This is orthogonal to the structuralist/mapping accounts that 
take explanations to involve unchanging representational maps.
101 Bokulich  argues  fictions  and  idealisation  are  different  things,  and  explain  by  different 
mechanisms. I do not argue that there are differences but they both explain by preserving the 
modal structure, it is this that matters. An idealisation does not explain because it is 10% away 
from the true state rather than 50%, it explains because despite idealisations it preserves modal  
structure. It's ability to explain is judged relative to the explanandum, the set of w-questions we  
wish to answer. This is true in idealisation and fictional explanation: they are both “lies” about 
the target system. For instance, a model which preserves much of the true structure but idealises  
a parameter too much so that the modal structure is not preserved will not be explanatory, it will 
not correctly answer w-questions,  despite getting the true mechanism of the systems mostly  
correct. This is n the spirit of Woodward's take on explanation, there can be gradations but there  
is also an absolute minimum required, but that minimum in model can be destroyed by one 
idealisation just as easily as it can be by lots of fictions, because it is which idealisations that 
matter and which fictions that matter. A system can be idealised in lots of ways not all of which  
are explanatory, so it is not simply some isomorphic measure of how close a target system is to 
the model that matters, a model is like a house, one crucial supporting piece of engineering is 
missing and the whole thing will not work even if the rest of the building follows the 'blueprint' 
of reality exactly, at the same time many elements of the blueprint can be distorted and changed  
completely and the house still stands if the crucial load bearing supports are in place. Models are 
the same, recovering the modal structure bears the explanatory load, closeness to reality is no 
guarantor of this. It does not matter if it is 90% correct if it is the wrong 90%, not a simple 
counting game comparing sets for isomorphisms.
102  Dirac advocates a structural approach; that classical mechanics is the basis for a formal analogy  
with  quantum  mechanics,  quantum  mechanics  is  a  rational  generalisation  of  classical 
mechanics. Dirac points to structural continuity in the theories,for instance the Poisson bracket 
and quantum commutator, or Dirac's version of the Lagrangian for quantum systems. Many of 
the  canonical  classical  concepts  developed  by  Hamilton  and  Lagrange  and  others  have 
analogous quantum versions. For Dirac structural correspondences explain the reduction for 
large quantum numbers to classical mechanics. For Dirac, unlike Heisenberg, both classical and 
quantum theories are open. They are not closed as Heisenberg believed, where each makes no 
reference  to the  other and is  conceptually  set  with nothing  to learn from the other  theory. 
Openness implies that each theory can be revised using concepts from the other as seems to be 
the  case  in  the  new  semi-classical  models  being  developed  for  quantum  chaos  and  other 
phenomena. The discovery of classical chaos theory and its application to quantum systems 
shows that classical mechanics is an open system, capable of generating new insights.
103 In hand-waving terms, it is like a Fourier decomposition, where we build up the overall wave 
from a  succession  of  other  waves,  here  the  wavefunction  is  expressed  as  a  series  of  (non-
existent) classical orbits.
104 She  claims  further,  and  rather  paradoxically:  “[P]roperties  of  these  fictitious  classical 
trajectories can be measured directly from the experimental quantum data.“ (Bokulich 2008a p. 
105)
105 Examples abound: Bokulich also cites the case of  the Rydberg atom. A Rydberg atom is  an 
extremely large atom, in which the outermost electron is so excited that the atom is actually 
about the size of a grain of sand. As the electron is more and more excited it eventually escapes  
and the atom no longer exhibits absorption peaks corresponding to the packets of energy it 
absorbs to raise the electron to a higher and higher energy state. However, if a Rydberg atom is 
placed in a very large magnetic field the picture is more complicated. In a high magnetic field 
absorption peaks in the spectrum still continue even above the ionisation level, these peaks look 
irregular and do not seem to form any sort of pattern. The mesoscopic nature of the Rydberg 
atom leads naturally to semi-classical methods, and when the Fourier transform of the irregular 
spectra are taken (shifting from frequency to time) the peaks now fall very regularly indeed, at 
the values of time that correspond to values of the classical allowed closed periodic orbits. Each  
peak  in  the  quantum  spectrum  corresponds  to  a  different  closed  classical  trajectory,  but  
according to quantum theory,  these classical orbits do not exist.  A fully quantum numerical  
solution exists, but by modelling the Rydberg atom using fictitious classical concepts we seem to 
have gained some explanatory insight into why absorption peaks fall where they do. 
“[T]he explanation of these anomalous resonances and their regular organization seems to be 
intimately tied to the fictional assumption that those Rydberg electrons,  instead of behaving 
quantum mechanically, are following definite classical trajectories. “ (Bokulich 2008a p. 198)
As an example consider the helium atom: Wintgen et al. calculate a ground state energy value  
by making the fictional assumption that electrons orbit the nucleus confined to classical fixed 
planetary-type orbits.  Famously  Pauli  and Heisenberg failed to calculate  the correct  ground 
state energy of helium, although it has been thought this is because they did not characterise the 
quantum  dynamics  correctly,  Wintgen  et  al.'s  analysis  suggests  Pauli  &  Heisenberg  failed 
because they did not get the classical dynamics correct. They failed to included certain conjugate 
point  features  of  classical  orbits,  known as  Maslov indices.  Wintgen correctly  modelled  the 
helium atom  by  producing  a  new  solution  to  the  classical  3-body  Coulomb  problem  using 
Maslov indices and then applied this to the quantum system. So it seems fruitful new research 
can come from applying  refined classical  techniques  to  quantum problems,  moreover  they 
produced a model of the helium atom that utilises fictional structures, i.e. classical fixed period  
orbits  which  do  not  exist  within  the  ontology  of  quantum  theory.  If  quantum  theory  has 
superseded classical mechanics then it at first seems strange that jettisoned ontology from the  
latter is explanatory within the former.
Of all possible allowed closed orbits only 65 are relevant to explaining quantum spectra. Hans 
von Baeyer states: 
“ [T]he survival of some of these quantum mechanical waves and the cancelling out of others 
result  in  only  certain  trajectories  being  allowed  for  the  electron  in  its  classical  comet-like 
ramblings  far  from  the  nucleus......Once  Delos  established  that  only  some  trajectories  are 
produced, he had effectively explained the new mechanism that caused the mysterious ripples 
[in absorption spectra]. The Rydberg electron is allowed to continue to absorb energy, so long as  
that energy is precisely of an amount that will propel the electron to the next trajectory allowed 
by the interference pattern. “ (Von Baeyer 1995, p. 108)
It  is  also  possible  to  take  spectroscopic  data  and  perform  a  Fourier  transform  and  get 
information about closed orbits, in Bokulich's terms they 'experimentally measure' these non-
existent  orbits.  They are  many orders  of  magnitude away from the limit  of  the uncertainty  
principle so don't undermine it. Of course they don't, not really; what they measure is the square 
amplitude of resonances in the wavefunction. What is really going on is two levels of description 
interacting,  a quantum mechanical model and a classical model and elements from both are 
used, as with all models they then need to be interpreted with reference to the world. The world 
of quantum chaos is mesoscopic and forms a nice example of a trading zone, in which different  
meanings of concepts have to be negotiated and a common language agreed upon.
106 Heller 1980.
107 Bokulich 2008a p. 127
108 I think that this common structure is a by product of the more general analysis in terms of 
surrealism, the world looks classical, hence develop a way of modelling its dynamics in the semi-
classical regime can use this fact to build models. It is not that there isn't a common dynamical 
structure it's just that this is a particular example of a general pattern of surrealist modelling.
109 She shares this worry with Saatsi in regard to causal explanations of general patterns , Saatsi & 
Pexton 2012. 
110 This smoothness requirement is very problematic in asymptotic cases, such as those discussed 
by Batterman, where certain solutions only exist in certain regions of parameter space, e.g. a  
quadratic equation has two solution no matter how small the coefficient of the square term gets, 
but once that coefficient  is  zero is  discontinuously becomes a linear equation with only one 
solution, there cannot be a smooth linking in principle. Many physical models have this feature: 
there may be a conceptual smoothness to the physical intuition behind the idealisations but in 
mathematical terms there is no de-idealisation possible in practice.
111 For instance in constructing a computer simulation of a magneto-hydrodynamic shock,  it  is  
common to apply the code used to a simple target shock system for which analytical solutions 
are  possible.  The  hydrodynamic  code  is  shown to  reproduce  the  same shock  curves  as  the  
analytical treatment, the target system is then changed to a much more complicated one for  
which analytical solutions do not exist and the hydro-code is used to produce solutions. The 
hydro-code, or to be precise the coding algorithms, grid resolution, the equations governing the  
system and the initial conditions together, form a model of a hydrodynamic system. (As will be 
argued later in these kinds of models various parameters are “manipulated” to answer model 
based w-questions). In this case the justificatory step is not a process of de-idealisation or a top-
down  theory  based  process,  instead  it  is  justification  through  intermediary  models  and 
continuity of modelling technique.  
112 To be clear this possible worlds claim, is not for me at least, a claim about possible physical  
worlds, but conceptual worlds only.
113 Bokulich thinks (like Hughes) that understanding is a central concept in explanation. She cites  
Friedman  (1974)  as  providing  a  perfectly  objective  notion  of  understanding.  Semi-classical 
models are explanatory because they allow understanding but Bokulich doesn't spell this out. At  
times she suggest that there is more modal information in the semi-classical treatment. With the 
semi-classical treatment we can: 
“[A]nswer  a  wider  range  of  w-questions  about  how  the  system  would  behave  if  certain 
parameters were changed....By providing an underlying picture of the quantum dynamics, these 
semi-classical models can reveal important structural features of the quantum dynamics that 
would otherwise remain unobserved.” (Bokulich 2008a p. 154) 
“[S]emiclassical model explanations.,.turn out to be deeper than quantum explanations, insofar 
as the semi-classical models allow you to answer more w-questions about the system of interest“  
(Bokulich 2008, p232).
“The deeper understanding that these classical structures provide is further evidenced by the 
fact they are able to make a variety of successful predictions about the behaviour of the quantum 
system. In sum, although reference to classical structures is in some sense eliminable from the  
explanation  of  phenomena...such  an  elimination  comes  at  the  rather  high  cost  of 
understanding.” (Bokulich 2008, p 233)
114 Strevens 2011.
115 Railton, 1980.
116 Moreover by locating the source of explanatory power in these systems in common dynamical 
structure Bokulich is unable to unify these models with other types of nihil models such as those 
described by Batterman. Of course it may be that heterogeneity rules, and Bohr's model of the 
hydrogen  atom  and  Batterman's  asymptotic  case  studies  are  just  fundamentally  different. 
Perhaps, but I am an optimist in this regard and believe a unitary account of nihil models is  
possible. As such, the overlap of dynamical structure is a particular instance, a means to an end,  
but this shouldn't obscure the task of unifying all nihil models that Bokulich, Batterman and 
others have identified. 
       5 | THE ONTOLOGY OF MODELS
117 Whether this is a sufficient conditions will be discussed in Chapter 8.
118 This  may  seem  an  odd  inflation  and  conflation  of  terminology  at  first,  but  I  believe  to  
understand nihil models as an explanatory pluralist we need to be clear about what a phrase like  
'modal structure' means. For instance, is there only one modal structure of the world? There is  
one material world but what I think is in doubt, is that our model representations of the world 
pick  out  the  one  unique  modal  structure  of  the  world.  The  reason  is  straightforward,  that  
different  models  connect  different  variables  together  modally.  So  viewed  as  a  family  of  
representations, each perspective, that is set of variables, has its own map of linkages. Of course 
these  different  modal  structures  must  all  be  compatible,  in  domains  for  which  they  are 
representative,  and  when  we  shift  from  one  explanation  to  another  in  terms  of  different 
proposed entities and variables we have to have continuity of modal structure, but not all of that  
modal structure. Some of it must be translated, that is the places where things could have been  
different or couldn't have been different when expressed in common empirical terms must be 
agreed by the two explanations. Two maps in two different languages must agree upon which 
street will take you home and which to the train station.
119 The nature of 'true' will be explored in chapter 8, the basic idea will be that relative to a domain 
an explanation can be quasi-true, even if it is not true in a Tarskian correspondence sense.
120 For an analogy, consider Henry Beck's map of the London underground. In it counterfactual  
information  is  given,  the  nodes,  i.e.  stations,  are  represented  and  the  user  can  discover 
bifurcation points in lines, but also modal bifurcation points,  they could get off at St. Pancras 
rather than Mornington Crescent. Yet the map does not recreate the accurate distances between 
the stations or the features and obstacles one would encounter walking overground, or even the 
length and shape and changes of direction in the track that the train runs along. The map gets 
the topology of the underground correct when the underground is expressed in a salient set of  
variables, that is in terms of stations, but ignoring other variables with their associated modal  
structure. So too with models, they give us information about bifurcation points, how things 
would have been different if a variable had had a different value. For a given target system, a  
model will categorise the system in terms of a set of variables {x1...xn}, these are the 'stations'. 
As another example consider a model of the phenotype of Mendel’s peas. We have one model 
in terms of classical genes, these are our variables and they are modally connected to phenotypic 
traits  as  outcomes.  The  we  have  a  more  recent  explanation  of  the  same  system,  a  model 
involving molecular genes not classical genes. In this model new 'nodes' have been added, that is  
the classical gene has been replaced by a whole cluster of variables relating to the molecular  
environment of the cell, this has added much modal subtlety, we can now identify intermediate 
stages  in  which  things  could  have  been different,  bifurcation points,  that  the classical  gene 
model is blind to. So in the map analogy, we have added nodes and connecting lines between 
those nodes, but we have added them along the previous lines. We have not cut the lines of the  
classical model, instead we have translated the map into a new network. The lines bend and split  
at  different  points  but  the  overall  destination  is  left  unchanged,  the  modal  'topology'  is 
preserved in the translation.
121 Of  course  translating  from  one  set  of  model  variables  into  another  may  be  very  difficult,  
sometimes a different set of model variables implies different conceptualisations or levels of  
description and some modal questions will simply cease to have meaning in the translation. For 
instance the comparison between molecular models of liquid drop formation and hydrodynamic 
ones shows that a question of a universal time of when the drop forms is meaningless in the 
molecular view. But nevertheless, if both models are adequately explanatory then where their  
modal topologies overlap there should be agreement about the outcome of variable changes, or 
at least an intelligible continuity about how the variables in each conceptualisation relate to the 
output variables counterfactually. 
122 Indeed West does develop other more specific fractal based models in terms of other variables. 
123 This position is similar in outlook to Strevens' noting of framing an explanation.
124 Consider an explanation of Mendel's famous peas in terms of classical genetics or molecular  
genetics. The classical gene as a concept is, arguably, not reducible to the molecular concept. If  
this is the case then each description will have its own  set of variables, different 'nodes', which 
will be connected modally to form a different topology of how these nodes interact. When we  
translate these nodes. the modal topologies must be in agreement for each level to be an actual 
explanation. The modal topologies cannot be incompatible if both are actual explanations.
125 Also, we have a contrast between representation and explanation: in the epistemic tradition of 
Hughes models as representations are like art, they are not true or false just better or worse in a  
given context. With this modal topology conception of models we can see why. The salience of a  
set of w-questions answerable by a model varies with the context of the explanandum. Which set 
of variables to categorise the system varies with context and hence so does the resultant modal  
topology we choose to express the modal facts about the world in. These topologies must all be 
consistent with one another: the representation is not true or false but the modal topologies are. 
Once we have picked our representational apparatus the modal connections we can express in 
terms of  that  set  are  objective  and true or  false.  We can make mistakes and compare rival 
explanation  and  rank  them  on  the  accuracy  with  which  they  correctly  reproduce  modal 
information.  A  representation  as  a  means  to  an  end  for  explanatory  purposes  is  context 
dependent,  but the modal information we use that (mis)representation to express is true or  
false. An explanatory fiction falls into the former category, it is representationally false, but the  
modal connections it establishes in the model are true, in the sense that they are consistent with 
the true modal structure of the world.
126 Recall  that  Woodward's  notion  of  invariance  is  a  generalisation  linking  two  variables  that  
remains  unchanged  under  a  special  type  of  intervention,  a  testing  intervention,  that  is  an 
intervention designed to try and break the invariance. In this way invariances are disaggregated 
from accidental generalisations but fall short of the requirements traditionally associated with 
lawhood. Recall also that invariance for Woodward is defined by a causal manipulative process, 
the testing intervention.
127 Knuuttila & Boon, 2011.
128 Of course these conceptual changes will supervene trivially upon some physical manipulation, a 
pen moving, a computer code changing, a neuron firing, etc.
129 Returning  to  our  magnetohydrodynamic  shock,  the  shock  is  categorised  by  a  set  of  time 
dependent equations that embody a set of conservation principles, mass, momentum, charge 
etc. The time independent versions of those equations can be solved analytically to provide a 
model of the shock. Solving the equations amounts to finding a means of connecting two points,  
one upstream of the shock-ahead of it, the other downstream- behind the shock, and providing a  
smooth transition for the 'jump' in the values of the physical variables through the shock. The 
jump conditions imagine a shock as discontinuity in which the variables simply jump in value, 
but at a finer level of precision the time-independent equations can be solved analytically to 
provide a continuous shock profile through this jump region to connect smoothly the upstream 
and downstream values. 
Using  computational  methods  more  can  be  done.  The  time-dependent  equations  can  be 
solved by numerical  integration in a hydrodynamic code. As a test of  the veridicality of  the 
numerical code the time independent profile it produces is compared to the analytically derived 
profile,  if  they agree,  and agree  about  the  result  of  m-interventions,  such  as  changing  the 
upstream fluid density, then the code is used to generate solutions the analytic methods cannot  
and show how the shock develops in time. Once the hydro-code model has been calibrated with  
the analytic model it  can then be used to solve the time-dependent  equations and the time 
evolution of the shock- for which there is no analytic solution- is investigated. Parameters are  
changed, input variables 'manipulated', to see the effects on output variables and the results are  
explanatory. There can be multiple sources of justification, the hydro-code may be compared to 
different research groups, or its answers to specific questions about observable consequences 
compared to observational data, but one component of the justification is that it recreates the  
analytic model's modal structure. 
130 It is not really a distinction between causal intervention versus non-causal in this respect. For  
instance  even  if  we  can  imagine  a  direct  causal  counterpart  to  the  m-intervention,  if  this 
manipulation cannot  be  performed by humans  and  there  is  no circumstance  in  which  it  is  
performed by nature, then  there is no observational hope of detecting the outcome of such a 
causal  process.  However,  we still  have the  same type  of  model  based inquiry  available.  We 
manipulate inside the model and draw modal conclusions from it that we apply to the world.
131 Walton 1990.
132 Just as with the partial structuralists, Frigg and Toon are primarily interested in using pretence  
theory to understand the representational aspects of models. I on the other hand, am interested 
in the explanatory aspects of models. The two concerns may inform one another but they are not  
the  same,  many  models  are  primarily  focused  on  explanation,  and  as  such  a  proper 
understanding of the practice of representation for these communities cannot proceed without 
an understanding of the principle of explanation they use.
133 Of course one could ask deeper questions , all games at some point were unauthorised but some 
become authorised, perhaps this is because the props they use are in some sense a more natural 
set of representations, perhaps this naturalness could be understood as an isomorphism of some 
sort. The practical utility of a representation for capturing modal information may well be linked 
to recreating structures found in the world.
134 Frigg 2009.
135 Whether existing is a property something can lack in the same sense as another property seems 
questionable to me, or at least to invoke the same objections as the ontological argument for the  
existence of God.
136 Frigg is concerned with the representational relation not the explanatory one. Is this fictional 
take  on models  incompatible  with  the  partial-structures  account  of  Da  Costa  & French?  It 
depends on what the partial structures claim is. If it is that in any representation there will be  
some morphism between suitable abstracted structures then this is perfectly compatible with 
models as fictional entities. However, this partial structural claim is very weak, our intuitions 
about morphisms suggest that to be a good representation one must have more than a trivial  
overlap of structure, whereas in pretence theory representation is defined entirely sociologically 
and  no meaningful  isomorphism is  necessary.  Or  to  put  it  another  way in  pretence  theory 
representations are not representations in virtue of a partial isomorphism.
However  Frigg  himself  makes  the  distinction  between  so  called  p-representations,  those 
props used in literature, and t-representation, those props aimed at representing target systems. 
For Frigg it is an open question how models t-represent. This open question could be answered 
by partial-structures. To t-represent rather than p-represent a meaningful partial isomorphism 
must  exist  between  the  representation  and  the  system,  but  how  are  we  to  understand 
meaningful in this context? Again I believe the representational questions can be informed by 
considering the requirements for explanation, meaningful is then provided a definition, which 
varies with context, by the needs of a particular explanandum. It is the explanandum, and more 
specifically the parts of the modal topology that need to be captured that determines which 
aspects must be isomorphic and which aspects need not be. I believe the interaction between 
representation and explanation has been inverted in the philosophical literature. Rather than 
models representing as an end in itself, which explanations then supervene upon, models often 
seek to explain and so choose a  particular  representational  apparatus that  fits  the needs of  
explanation. Or to put it another way, representing modal structure is often more important that 
representing physical structure. Explanatory demands inform the types of representations we 
use and the ways in which we judge them. The different between scientific representation and 
literary representations is that scientific representations are often, if not always, built to explain 
things.  One idea may be that  to represent  accurately involves  a partial  isomorphism, but  to 
explain  involves  a  partial  isomorphism  of  the  set-theoretic  representation  of  the  modal 
structure,  not  physical  structure.  The  two  need  not  overlap,  we  could  have  an  accurate 
representation  but  be  modally  inhibited.  In  that  sense  the  difference  between  a  scientific 
explanation and representation would be that in each case we have a different category in which 
to locate a partial-isomorphism. In representation we look for overlaps in the actual constitutive 
structure of the target and model, in explanation we want an isomorphism in the sets of modal  
connections. We want the modal network of the model and target to be the same.
137 Toon 2010.
138 The position I advocate is therefore distinct from what Arthur Fine calls fictionalism. As Fine 
characterises it, fictionalism is an anti-realist position which argues that a scientific theory may 
be reliable without being true and without the entities it invokes existing. To classify a model as  
a representation, and thus a work of fiction, in Walton's sense, is to say nothing about the truth  
of the propositions it  prescribes or about the existence of the entities it invokes (Toon  2010 p 
305).
Empirical adequacy and truth are not part of Walton's fictions they are orthogonal to it, and 
so it is with models, lots of bad models still represent their targets according to Toon.
139 Knuuttila & Boon 2011
140 This is also an example of informalism being required to provide formalism with meaning. The 
terms in the Ising model are meaningless unless supplemented by context. See Chapter 8 for a  
fuller discussion.
141 The Carnot cycle requires a closed loop and to close this loop Carnot imagines liquefying by 
compressing  a  steam  so  that  it  returns  to  its  original  state  at  the  beginning  of  the  cycle  
(effectively this is producing steam at low temperatures as in a refrigerator). This was a step 
beyond experimental knowledge of what was possible. If Carnot had solely been concerned with 
what real heat engines at the time did do he would never have proposed such a step.
By producing such an abstract  steam engine Carnot  was able  to see the reversibility  and 
symmetry  in  the  stages  of  how  the  heat  engine  works,  something  which  would  have  been 
obscured by the particular details of a real working heat engine.  Irrelevances,  just as in the 
allometric scaling law case, are not harmless, often they obscure fundamental symmetries and 
parallels between otherwise very diverse phenomena.
142 Teller 2008.
143 Giere 2010.
144 Giere's subsequent concern is that by calling models fictions it will licence anti-scientific groups, 
such as creationists to misrepresent science as being just another story on the shelf. 
145 Morrison 1999.
 6 | MANIPULATIONISM RESURRECTED
146 I will  argue in chapter 7 that this perspectivism of variable choice lends itself to a surrealist  
interpretation: we can pick out modal facts about the world in terms of some non-referring 
terms because the world, in some sense, appears as if those terms do refer (at a level of coarse 
graining for example). I believe this is the ontological basis for understanding nihil models. 
147 Recall that formally Woodward's apparatus is not coherent without the notion of manipulation 
built foundationally into it. The notion of invariance for example is defined using manipulations, 
without  them  invariances,  in  Woodward's  sense,  cannot  be  used.  Manipulations  cannot  be 
removed from manipulationism without destroying it. Of course it may be possible- I'm sure it  
will  be-  to provide a separate theory of  counterfactual  explanation that does not use any of 
Woodward's framework, but this is not what Bokulich, for instance, provides and in any case 
manipulationism is so good at explicating causal explanation I believe it can be canonicalised to 
include non-causal  explanations,  especially if  non-causal  explanation is  seen as  a species  of 
model explanation.
148 It is worth noting that in this proposal there are hierarchies of rules of generation, just as in a  
computer game for instance there will be the rules of the imaginative fictional world, we are in a 
starship fighting off 'space invaders' or what have you, there are also the meta rules that tell you 
when those 1st order rules apply or do not, so in the story our ship may be destroyed, by the 1st 
order rules of the imaginary world our character is dead, but the meta rules of the game say that  
we are allowed another 'life' and we get a second turn re-spawning at the beginning of the level. 
The 2nd order rules are not part of the imaginative world, they exist above it to constrain when 
those rules apply or not. It is the same with models, the rules that exists in imaginative world 
created by model systems are subject to meta rules about when those rules apply in reference to  
target systems or even to other parts of the same model, such as in the cases of disunities and  
contradictions within models discussed in the previous chapter. 
149 In the fictional world they create the limit on space filling due to fractals is just another input 
parameter. We could ask how scaling laws would alter if  we changed such a parameter, how 
differently they would be if volume filling could be more or less efficient. By performing such 
counter-legal  pseudo-manipulations  we  can  see  that  the  observed  allometric  scaling  law 
relationships are profoundly shaped and constrained by the way fractal-like structures volume 
fill.  If  we  could  change  the  mathematics  of  fractals  but  observe  no  change  in  allometric  
relationships then we would know that fractals do not limit those scaling laws in any way and 
are not explanatorily apposite. Of course changing a counter-legal parameter does not imply 
that if such a thing were different in the real-world the consequences of the model would be  
carried over. In a possible other world, with different laws, other knock on effects may mean 
there  aren't  even  any  biological  organisms  for  instance,  and  the  conclusions  of  our  model 
manipulations outstrip our epistemic access to such alterations, but this does not invalidate the 
role  of  such  manipulations.  After  all,  the  conclusions  of  models  can  be  ranked as  to  their  
evidential basis, a computer simulation is less evidential than a direct experiment for instance, 
but this does not change the logic of such explanations.
In a similar way we can make sense of changing the dimension of an organism to see the  
effect on scaling laws. These kinds of manipulations may be possible in some cases, genetically 
altering a species of flatworm to be thick enough to no longer be effectively 2-dimensional for 
instance, but in most cases they are too far fetched to count as a genuine manipulation and they 
are better thought of as manipulations internal to the fictional world of the model, and within 
that  fictional  world  such  pseudo-manipulations  are  perfectly  straightforward  in  their 
consequences. 
150 Weslake points out (2010) that the cardinality of modal questions answered by an explanation is 
not  the  appropriate  metric  to  rank  explanations  by  if  we  wish  to  understand  multi-level 
explanations.  A lower level explanation involving more fundamental ontology and detail  will  
always, in principle at least, contain more modal information than a higher level explanation. To 
circumvent this Weslake advocates adding the notion of abstraction to Woodward's account. 
Higher level explanations are more abstract, in the sense that they are multiply realisable with  
respect to lower level systems. In Weslake's conception higher level theories are compatible with 
other possible worlds. For instance classical mechanical explanations are compatible with other 
possible worlds in which the quantum world behaved differently, hence classical mechanics, and 
the explanations that result from it, are modally independent from quantum mechanics. 
Weslake's formulation is problematic, abstraction is clearly an important component of many 
explanations but there is only one universe and it is not clear how statements that assert that 
classical mechanics as a physical phenomenon is possible without quantum dynamics can be 
understood. The notion of possible worlds is dogged with problems, what are our ontological 
commitments to such worlds? Are they complete worlds, and if so how can we propagate the full  
consequences of a change from our world to them? Is it even true to say that there is a possible 
world in which the world is only governed by classical mechanics if the way macroscopic objects 
behave is actually a consequence of more fundamental quantum dynamics? We can circumvent 
many of these challenges by explicating abstraction not in terms of the possible but the fictional. 
Abstractions work by creating and relating fictional worlds. 
151 This  seems  a  way  of  viewing  explanation  that  fits  nicely  with  Woodward's  original  causal 
explanatory scheme. For instance in a case of causal explanation with a redundant cause, say  
two snipers each lethally shoot a target at the same time (Woodward 2003). We can create a 
fictional world in which one of those snipers doesn't exist to then see the causal value of the  
sniper that does fire. This is another way of expressing Woodward's crucial idea that we must fix 
the  'offline'  variables  when  manipulations  are  performed  to  see  the  consequences  of  our 
manipulations to avoid cases where an apparent cause actually makes no difference under an 
intervention because of a back up redundancy. If we manipulate the value of one of our snipers 
firing to "doesn't fire" and ask how this changes our situation we see that the other sniper kills 
the target so our sniper is not explanatory. However, the same manipulation performed on the 
other  sniper  shows  that  there  is  no  change  of  output,  hence  neither  sniper  is  causally  
responsible  for  the  target's  death.  Woodward circumvents  such  absurdities  by  changing  the 
values of variables in the scenario.  Again I believe this is best understood as a model of our  
situation in which we change parameter values. If in our fictional world there is only one sniper, 
or the other never fires, then we can correctly see that the manipulation produces a change in 
the outcome and we can attribute causal agency to both snipers. 
152 Strictly speaking in my presentation there is no such thing as a causal model. Internal to the  
model the relations are not causal, we dub some models causal because when we apply them to  
the real-world we find causally interpretable manipulations
153 Peter Railton (1980) offers a counter argument to the causal explanatory story of pendula. He 
contends that when we explain periods in terms of lengths what we have is a form of structural  
explanation  which  is  asymmetrical.  For  Railton  the  explanation  is  not  causal,  nothing  is 
switched on by changing the length, there are no activations, hence it does not make sense to 
speak of  it as causal. Instead we have a structural mathematical relationship between the length 
and  the period  and by setting  the  length  we  have  structurally  determined the  period.  This 
explanation is not symmetrical however, as according to Railton when we set the length we have 
determined the propensity for the pendulum to have period T. A particular piece of string has a 
propensity to swing with a period T in simple harmonic motion (SHM) even if it it never does so. 
However, what does it mean for the pendulum to have propensity to have period T, other than  
than saying in circumstances X1....Xn it will display behaviour Y1...Yn? In other words what seems 
like a determining process is nothing of the sort. Setting the length to L in no way guarantees the 
period T. Any real pendulum may be set to swing and not be in simple harmonic motion and the 
relationship between L and T will  not hold.  It  may be perturbed and swing chaotically.  The 
actual time to takes to swing between two designated points may bear no relationship to this 
"propensity" to swing with period T. Where is this propensity located, this innate ability? Why is 
behaving  like  Y  in  circumstance  X1 an  explanatory  propensity  but  behaving  like  Z  in 
circumstance X2 is not?
I think the resolution to this is to see where Railton's worry about the causal story comes 
from. For a real  pendulum does the length cause the period? The actual  time it  takes for  a 
pendulum to swing is caused by the forces acting upon it, or to put it another way the balance 
between  kinetic  and  potential  energy.  The  length  and  the  tensional  forces  play  a  role  in 
determining this, but as stated an actual pendulum need not swing with the ideal period for an 
ideal pendulum in SHM, (in fact it won't). So the relationship between ideal period and length is  
for a model of a pendulum. For a real pendulum the time taken to swing is determined by lots of  
factors causally, but for the  model pendulum in SHM the period is determined by the length  
structurally.  This gives rise to the intuition that the causal explanation is not correct in the  
pendulum case, because the causal story isn't correct for the model pendulum. Internal to the  
model we have symmetrical determination, we can m-intervene on the period or the length to  
change the other,fixing one variable determines the other, in the model. This model pendulum 
may or may not capture the modal structure of a given real pendulum, and whether it does or 
not will depend in part on prescribing a specified degree of precision to measure the necessary 
variables. Many real pendula are approximately in SHM up to a given degree of precision. The 
model is absolute, it's applicability is not and is context dependent. 
The pendulum case allows us to notice an interesting facet of the dimensional explanations 
discussed by Lange 2009. The pendulum, like a lot of those cases, can have the functional form 
of  the relationship between L and T derived dimensionally.  I  think that this  has interesting 
consequences for how we should view dimensional explanations which identifying structural 
covariances. In  essence  we  should  think  of  dimensional  analysis  as  a  form  of  model  
explanation.
Dimensional explanations are implicitly constructed by model thinking. That is we choose 
dimensions by which to parametrise a problem, the dimensions are not read off simply from the 
target system, sometimes the target system is abstracted and idealised in such a way as to make 
one dimensional  parametrisation 'natural'.  By natural  I  think we mean that once a fictional 
world is created internal to that world the parametrisation is the straightforward one to read off.  
As has been shown in many examples we often have to ignore information to get the dimensions 
of the problem correct, this process of exclusion is a part of model building as well. 
We do not just read off the correct dimensions to characterise a problem from reality. Often 
we model the situation and in doing so co-construct the correct parametrisation, we discover 
what dimensions are explanatorily operative given a particular model scenario and explanatory 
request. Our choice of parametrisation reflects our abstractions and idealisations, for instance if 
we take an asymptotic limit in our model so that one parameter goes to zero or infinity and the 
number of variables is  reduced then that  allows a different set  of  dimensions to be used to 
characterise the problem. Similarity transforms in hydrodynamics are a good example of this: 
the allowed parametrisation depends upon conceptual choices about what is important in the 
system, that is upon modelling assumptions and explanatory constraints.
154 Of course an entirely different model could be created in which those non-manipulable elements 
could be manipulated but this is the point. For each fictional world there are rules set out at its  
creation and manipulation is a process internal to that world. The possible manipulations from 
one fictional world do not necessarily translate to another fictional world. This is what allows 
discoveries of invariances in models. We have the 'laws' of a model, which may be real laws or  
not, but they are not changeable, they are the starting points of building the model. For instance  
in  a  computer  model  they  may  be  the  algorithms  for  generating  solutions  to  differential  
equations  in  a   time-sequence.  Then  we  have  the  resultant  invariances  that  come  out  of  
specifying  those  laws-of-the  model,  for  instance  a  researcher  may  find  that  the  mass  of  
neutrinos doesn't affect galaxy formation at all (in the model) and an internal invariance has  
been discovered by m-manipulating the mass of neutrinos.
155 In some versions of  the anthropic  principle  this  type of  asymmetry  is  questioned.  Consider 
Sober's  argument  against  the  validity  of  fine  tuning  arguments,  in  which  he  contends  that 
because  our  very  existence  depends  upon  certain  elements  there  is  no  intelligible  way  of 
assigning probabilities to those elements. His example is that of a man surviving a firing squad,  
according to Sober the man has no basis to evaluate the likelihood of his own survival since he  
could  not  experience  the  case  where  he  did  not  survive.  I  think  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  
explanations for surviving firing squads and fine tuning, precisely because it is possible to build 
a fictional world in which things are different and compare that to our own. In other words, 
building  a  fictional  world  and  manipulating  elements  of  it  provides  precisely  the  basis  for  
making  intelligible  such  queries  about  the likelihood or  not  of  events  upon which our own 
existence is conditional.
156 One may object that in such a sparse universe the law of conservation of momentum is still there 
just never 'activated', yet still it governs what would happen the members of that universe. I 
think this  is  highly question begging but  at  the very  least  we can say that  epistemically,  in 
explanatory terms, we have access to some symmetries such as space-translational invariance  
prior  to  other  structural  constraints  and  we  can  imagine  worlds  in  which  conservation  of 
momentum  is  not  explanatory.  In  such  a  sparse  universe  it  would  be  perverse  to  invoke 
conservation  of  momentum  as  an  explanation  of  space-translation  symmetry.  Translational 
symmetry is more primitive, it applies to the whole universe whether momentum conserving 
collisions are taking place or not.
157 It  may  be  argued  that  there  is  more  going  on,  implicitly  there  is  the  modal  backstory  of 
answering w-questions,  yet it  is  the contention here that to incorporate these aspects of the  
explanation one must think of it as a model explanation expressed in terms of m-interventions. 
Just one its own we have a state of being, the shape of the electric field, and this is shown to 
follow deductively from the starting configuration in a DN manner. We have a series of parallel 
DN explanations for each shape of the wire/field. Instead of this infinity of DN explanations it is  
proposed that we have one model explanation which allows w-questions to be answered through 
m-interventions.
158 Saatsi & Pexton forthcoming.
159 Note that this situation is different from cases where a generalisation is required to define a new 
same object counterfactual. In this example the two wires can be identical in every way, the 
difference between the set and the members is only to be found in whether manipulations play a 
role in explanation. In asymptotic cases for instance the general set is not a sum of individual  
causal  explanations  because  the  general  requires  abstraction  to  define  new  same  object 
counterfactuals. Some w-questions are only expressible at this generalised coarse grained level.
160 There may be a distinction to be had between explaining all actual wires and all potential wires, 
but again what is meant by potential not actual? I suspect that the potential wires that are not 
actual are actually elements of the fictional world of the models of wires.
161 The problem of separability of variables is also evident in a criticism of manipulationism due to 
Strevens. Strevens does not defend explanatory autonomy, and in ordinary causal explanation 
advocates  a  reductionist  notion  of  causation.  The  problem  is  if  we  have  a  higher  level 
explanation of an event which separates out causes based upon keeping some variables constant 
and manipulating others to answer w-questions, then how does this explanation interact with a 
lower level description of the same system in which the previously separate variables are now 
physically  interacting.  Strevens'  criticism  is  that  at  one  explanatory  level  it  is  possible  to 
separate out the necessary variables, to hold some fixed while manipulations are performed, but 
when the same explanation is viewed from a lower level there may not be a natural separation of  
variables to allow this. For instance, a definable notion of setting a macroscopic variable to one  
value while leaving another macroscopic variable unchanged may be impossible when we view 
the phenomenon from a molecular level. We are then not able to say that we change the one 
without affecting the other.
If the processes of keeping variables constant is seen as actually being possible because we are 
dealing with models of systems, each with a separate fictional world, then this is not a problem  
for the manipulationist account. This is not a problem if we are considering models because 
building a model requires that you pick a level of description beforehand. There may be physical  
supervenience between the elements of reality that different models at different levels describe, 
but there is not straightforwardly explanatory reduction. Each model has its own variables and  
creates its own fictional world. When we compare two levels of explanation we are comparing 
two different model worlds and must bridge them but there is no straightforward sense in which  
the manipulationist must provide an exact analogue of the manipulation in one model world for 
the other.  To build the model requires a choice of variables and a construction of  a way of  
viewing the target system. So which input/output values we have at each descriptive level is  
internal to that model only. 
What is a legitimate request of course is that two descriptions don't contradict each other, but 
Strevens point is not that molecular descriptions would contradict the macroscopic explanation 
just  that  the  notion  of  manipulating  variables  is  inadequate  since  we  cannot  define  those 
manipulations all the way down. Viewing them as model explanations not direct explanations  
shows us that expecting the manipulations from one model to always straightforwardly apply in 
another  model  world  is  completely  unreasonable.  We  can  see  that  the  variables  physically 
supervene, but the relations between them do not have to supervene. That is when described in 
terms of input and output variables the relationship between each is internal to a model and 
even though the physical basis for each variable reduces to some lower level the relationship 
does not. Thus if we are given an explanation of an event at a higher level we can pick out causes  
that  cannot  be  picked  out  in  the  variable  space  of  a  lower  level  description,  there  is  no 
contradiction so long as there is a clear physical supervenience for each part of the model, then 
we have an explanatory complementarity, not reduction.
162 In the same way we can extend the boundaries of intervention to those things which we could 
never  even  in  principle  manipulate  and  which  do  not  seem  to  fall  into  the  same  physical 
category,  because  intervention  is  now  a  concept  about  how  we  build  models  of  difference 
making that sometimes supervenes upon a particular physical process which we can call causal, 
but doesn't have to.
163 Dowe 2000.
164 Another advantage is perhaps in areas of  physics that are difficult  to interpret causally.  For 
instance we can manipulate quantum mechanical experiments but in many interpretations of 
quantum mechanics we cannot interpret the outcome of such manipulations as deterministically 
changing  the  outcome  of  the  experiment.  Rather  manipulations  change  the  probability  of 
different outcomes, but when a particular outcome occurs this is not caused by the intervention.  
Perhaps  a  difference  here  between  regularity  explanation  and  particular  case  explanation, 
Woodward could argue that intervention is causal  in changing the probabilities of outcomes 
hence changing the regularities, any one particular case simply does not have an explanation 
beyond  stating  the  probabilities-or  if  adopt  a  propensity  view  of  probability  then  say  the  
intervention  caused  an  intrinsic  change  in  the  propensity  of  a  system  to  do  this  or  that  
regardless of whether it does it or not. Alternatively, we could view probabilistic explanation as a  
form of model explanation. We see that in our model an m-intervention changes the possibility  
space of  outcomes even if,  for  a  particular  case,  the parallel  t-intervention doesn't  alter  the 
outcome of events at all and is not a difference maker.
165  The partial structures view is a means of explicating representational relationships in terms of  
set-theoretic relations.  In this way philosophers represent the connections between theories, 
models,  and  data,  in  terms  of  relationships  between  sets,  specifically  in  terms  of  partial 
isomorphisms  between  set-theoretical  structures.  According  to  PS  theories  are  families  of  
models, and a model can be represented as a set containing elements corresponding to entities  
and their properties/relations. The idea is that both observational data and scientific theories 
can be represented as a set. A theory is representing a physical system when there is a partial-
isomorphism,  a  mapping,  between  the  set  representation  of  the  theory  and  the  set 
representation of  the data.  The mapping need not  be a  full  structure-preserving one-to-one 
mapping of elements and relations. If it is, we have a full isomorphism, but typically it is partial. 
Only some structural elements of each set map to one another. It is this partiality that allows PS 
to account for much of the openness and incompleteness of scientific theories and models. 
So, in the partial structure account, set-theoretic models are used as meta-representations of 
theories and scientific models. We have a nested hierarchy linked by partial isomorphisms. The 
set-theoretic  representations  of  theories  are  partially  isomorphic  with  (the  set-theoretic 
representations of) models of specific systems, and so on, all the way down. At the bottom level 
we have the world, which is split into two aspects. A distinction is made between raw data and 
phenomena.  Data are  “raw” observations without  theory,  whereas phenomena are theorised 
empirically.  The  data  set  is  directly  true  in  a  Tarskian  correspondence  sense  whereas  the 
phenomena are only representationally/quasi/pragmatically true. In advanced science data is 
almost never raw, it  is  categorised, aggregated, coarse-grained, and ultimately processed, all 
activities  that  presumably  fall  under  the  representational  banner.  Nevertheless,  there  is 
ultimately some level of direct sensory experience that involves no theorising,  and in the PS 
account this  is  the bottom level.  The world as  such is  not  then represented in set-theoretic 
terms, but the collection of data produced from it can be,  and we can analyse the degree of  
partial isomorphism between this representation of data and the subsequent representations 
higher up the chain. 
In the PS account we have a nested set of meta-representations of data all the way up through  
models to theories as well as a metric for discussing the overlap between these representations. 
Is  this  picture fundamentally in  conflict  with the prop-based fictional  conception of  models 
proposed by Frigg, Toon et al. and endorsed in this thesis?
I think that the two can (almost!) happily co-exist. PS is not a reductive account, it does not  
say what representation is. Much of the criticism of PS has focused on the inability of a set-
theoretic  structure  to  constitute  a  scientific  representation,  to  be  foundationally what  a 
scientific model actually is. So, for instance Frigg has criticised PS, as set-theoretic structures  
don't have the correct formal properties to account for representations, such as asymmetry. A 
partial-isomorphism  relates  two  sets,  not  a  concrete  target  system  and  a  representation. 
Representation is asymmetrical: Vermeer's painting,  The Astronomer, is a representation of a 
man looking at a celestial globe. By contrast the man Vermeer painted looking at a celestial  
globe is not a representation of Vermeer's painting. 
However,  such  criticisms  are  misplaced  since  PS  is  not  giving  a  reductive account  of 
representation.  Instead  the  set-theoretic  models  are  a  prop  for  a  philosopher  of  science  to 
represent scientific models, theories, and data sets. The test of a partial-isomorphism between 
two of these is not a direct test of whether a scientist's model possess an isomorphism to a target  
system, it is a test of whether the meta-representation of that model, as a set-theoretic structure,  
bears  an  isomorphism to  the  set-theoretic  representation  of  the  target  system (or  the  data 
component of the “empirical algebra” of the target system).
The non-reductive PS representational account. The question of what R is is left open.
Within the PS account we have an open question as to what the representational relationship,  
R, is. We can therefore supplement PS with an answer, at least in an explanatory context. That  
is, R is a Waltonian prop but constrained by modal requirements. So models are not structures,  
they are fictions (in Frigg's ontological sense), but they manage to represent through the modal 
explanatory constraints we impose on them, (potentially those modal constraints themselves 
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could be represented in set-theoretic terms, more of which later). By shifting the focus away 
from representation itself,  to  explanation,  a  picture  emerges  in  which  what  can count  as  a 
scientific representation is determined by a particular explanandum. One might worry that this  
is to conflate two things, after all explanation is only one motivation of a scientist, there are 
many others: to teach, to represent the true ontology of the world, to predict. This is true, but  
remember  that  in  this  framework  prediction  is  also  fundamentally  about  providing  modal  
information,  just  future  directed  modal  information.  Prediction  and  explanation in  the  real 
world are different but in side model worlds they are the same, or at least on a par. Therefore, if  
a scientist represents in a way that is totally untethered to either prediction or explanation then 
modal constraints will be irrelevant. My contention here though is that these cases are in the  
minority. If one wishes to contest this assertion then so be it, there is nothing much at stake, my 
claims still  apply to any model that has explanation or prediction as a desired use,  and the  
reader can take it as shorthand that from now on the word "model" applies only to this subset 
(and  decide  for  themselves  how  large  a  subset  of  actual  scientific  models  this  is).  
Representation,  in  this  explanatory  context,  becomes  a  secondary  quantity  confined by the 
needs of explanation/prediction. These modal constraints are given a unitary framework, while 
the representational  apparatus,  in  reductive terms,  can be given a pragmatic  heterogeneous 
treatment. 
166 A natural instinct is to ask what it is  that allows a model to capture modal structure.  Fine's  
response to this (1993) is that explanatory requests must be judged by the paradigms they come 
out of. Fictional models are not epistemically disconnected from us in the way mathematical 
abstracta as traditional conceived seem to be. For Fine the demand for further information is  
not legitimate, models will work in different ways, in each case a scientist will have a reason why  
that  model  is  explanatory  and  demanding  a  philosophical  one-size-fits-all  philosophical 
reconstruction is unreasonable without justifying that need. 
I have some sympathy with this view, to explain is to provide modal information. If our aim is  
to understand how science works then requests for ultimate justification may be misplaced. Just 
as a causal explanation cannot be called inadequate because a researcher cannot supply a causal 
chain that reaches all the way back to the Big Bang, or all the way down to the ultimate level of  
reality,  so  too   it  is  perhaps asking  too much to  demand always  a further step  behind 'the 
Wizard's curtain'. That said, I think one can say a little more, and that will be the subject of 
chapter 8.
167 Morrison has also stressed the highly context dependent nature of explanatory fictions (1999).
168 It  is  not  clear  if  this  is  Bokulich's  view,  sometimes modal  structure  is  stressed other times 
dynamical structure.
169 Consider the various different models of the nucleus and their different explanatory targets.
By producing such an abstract  steam engine Carnot  was able  to see the reversibility  and 
symmetry  in  the  stages  of  how  the  heat  engine  works,  something  which  would  have  been 
obscured by the particular details of a real working heat engine.  Irrelevances,  just as in the 
allometric scaling law case, are not harmless, often they obscure fundamental symmetries and 
parallels between otherwise very diverse phenomena.
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170 I am not arguing that other strategies aimed at realism are not viable or compatible with the 
notion  of  explanation  mooted  here,  only  that  as  a  general  holistic  framework  a  form  of  
surrealism should be our attitude which is supplemented on a case by case basis with other 
realist strategies that do not invoke explanatory success.
171 Of course one could argue that nihil models are not explanatory at all. The problem with this is 
that the dividing line between explanatory and non-explanatory models is entirely historically 
contingent,  the  known  fictions  of  semi-classical  models  make  them  non-explanations,  but 
theories in which elements subsequently turn out to be fictions cease to be explanatory. I believe  
Newton's theory of gravity is explanatory and what is an explanation is not a judgement that can 
only be made at the end of science.
172  Van Fraassen 1980.
173   French and Ladyman 2003.
174   Bueno 1999.
175 This view is very much in the spirit of many of Woodward's views on explanation, my aim is to  
add  formalism,  albeit  in  small  doses,  to  the  mixing  of  ontic  and  epistemic  qualities  in  his  
account.
176 The  perspectivism  argued  for  here  is  a  very  distant  cousin  of  the  historical  perspectivism 
advocated by Nietzsche, although my aim aim is to throw the bath water out of that account and 
leave the baby relatively unscathed!
177 For instance, Woodward (2003) has argued that evolution has shaped our brains to work in 
certain ways, one of which is to manipulate tools, and this predisposition to think in terms of 
manipulation has formed part  of  our conceptualisation of  causality.  Manipulationism is  not 
ahistorical: history takes a seed, our innate ability to manipulate our own bodies, then simple 
tools,  and builds  a logic of causal  explanation out  of  them, and then theoretical  non-causal  
explanation.  The  task  is  not  to  deny  history,  to  pretend  that  cave  men  and  women  were  
reasoning in the way described, or even early scientists were, rather it is to identify the seeds of 
these ways of thinking and to argue that current practice is a historical development from these  
seeds.
178 I am not arguing here that this is the case, only that such suggestions are entertained seriously 
to illustrate the potentially huge disconnect between how the world actually is and how we see it.
179 Of  course  some  interpretations,  such  as  that  suggested  by  Price  are  so  radical  in  their  
interpretation of time they undermine the possibility of the scientific method that lead them to 
their conclusions about it.  In Price's scheme, for instance,  future events near the end of the  
universe might well dictate current particle trajectories. If this is the case it is hard to see how 
experimental science could have any validity, and hence how we could have any evidence for the  
atemporal physics Price places so much emphasis on.
180 Giere 2006.
181 Brown 2009.
182 Feyerabend 1999.
183 Dewey 2007.
184 Unsurprisingly.  I claim that this perspectivism is best served by thinking in terms of modal 
topology.  When  we  shift  perspectives  we  have  to  preserve  the  'topology'  of  the  modal  
connections. That is, if we have a parameter set and a list of connections between those sets,  
then move to a new framework and keep some, or all, of those parameters we must also preserve  
the modal connections, at least for the domain in which our theory appears explanatory.  Why 
call it 'topology'? To convey the idea that not all of the modal structure has to be carried over, 
but some essential connections must be. We can add intermediate variables/processes, things 
which may for instance allow a more fine grained teasing out of modal intricacies, but we must 
also keep in global terms the modal connections of the previous model. When we move from the  
ideal gas treatment to a van der Waals model  we have many of the same input/output variables 
to connect modally in the models and each must agree on which variables are connected to 
which  others,  even though the  van der  Waals  case  adds  new variables,  new axes  of  modal  
variation as it were, extra 'nodes' that can be linked in a modal map. The word topology is use  
loosely to convey the flexibility in how the modal structure of an explanation and a successor 
explanation can each display modal information differently but keep in common some essential 
connections that represent what-depends-upon-what. To use the analogy of Beck's underground 
map mention in chapter 5, new stations can be added or subtracted and the shape of the lines  
changed but the stations cannot be moved from one line to another if an explanation has really  
got some essential modal connections correct.
185 Rather like the radical sceptic, the preferences revealed by practice by such thinkers is to treat 
tables as if they exist for the purpose of holding up their tea cups.
186 See Morrison 1999 for more details.
187 Those modal connections are in models of course and then can be tested to see if they capture  
modal information in the world, to see if the perspective adopted is a modally useful one.
188  For  instance  we  can  ask  and  answer  w-questions  about  the  transition  of  variables  form 
upstream  to  downstream  which  might  produce  different  spectral  outputs  due  to  different 
heating profiles.  Although the jump conditions must be satisfied there are  potentially many 
different ways of connecting them and when comparing to an actual observed shock region only  
one  of  these  may explain  the  observations.  The  key point  is  that  the  global  answers  to  w-
questions, the solutions of the jump conditions, remain the same, but we add more intermediate 
modal nodes with a more detail model to answer more w-questions. 
189 The use of interpellation is intended loosely, it is not meant to imply that scientific perspectives 
are like notions such as national identity. The scientific perspectives are born out of the need to  
explain.  This  explanatory  constraint  is  fundamental.  We  have  a  kind  of  modally  objective 
interpellation,  in  the  sense  that  our  basic  epistemic  perspectives  are  added  to  by  abstract  
conceptualisations that allow new modal connections to be discovered.
190 Knuuttila 2005
191 If  one  wished  it  might  be  possible  to  argue  that  a  Kuhnian  paradigm  shift  should  be  re-
conceived as not a radical discontinuous change in theory but in perspective,  and once new 
perspectives are developed scientists in that field are interpellated into seeing, or noticing, that 
perspective in other systems. For instance, the way the Ising model is useful way beyond its 
intended target system. Perspectives are a looser notion than paradigms, the main function of a 
perspective is to allow a variable parametrisation such that modal connections can be captured.
192  In Giere's terms this account might be dubbed modal surrealism.
193 Of course Poincarean conventionalism about the shape of space is possible. We actually do have 
a universal gravitational field and a flat space-time, but this does not change the point which is 
the potential for which parts of a theory we take ontologically seriously to shift with perspective. 
194  It  is  perhaps  a  classic  example  of  where  a  'trading  zone'  needs  to  be  set  up  between 
communities to agree the properties that are common to different uses of the same signifier for  
different signified.
195 One may argue that  in  principle  the molecular  genetic framework can answer all  of  the w-
questions the classical  framework can,  that  is  not  the contention here,  but  if  if  that  is  true 
answering w-questions in principle is not to answer them at all! Remember that our focus is  
explanation, explanation through model information: if one cannot actually say what-depends-
upon-what  then  we  do  not  have  an  explanation.  So,  for  instance,  many  models  from 
evolutionary biology would be hopelessly intractable if expressed in molecular genetic terms, the 
details would obscure the modal connections revealed at a coarse-grained level. It is clearly part  
of the conception of modal topology that detailed molecular explanations of particular elements 
of those explanations cannot be in conflict.  and may allow a wider set of w-questions to be 
answered. Such an observation is trivially reductionist, the explanations only reduce, if at all,  
within a historical sequence, the more abstract model being used to identify relevant partitions 
to connect modally in the first place. Those partitions may be translatable into lower level terms  
but they could never have been identified from that lower level perspective. Often tractability is  
presented as some merely pragmatic matter, what I am arguing for is the claim that tractability  
has a much more fundamental role to play than expressing the calculational limits of our latest 
supercomputer. 
196 Of course in what sense do we get things modally correct when we use classical genes? We can  
breed  peas  and  manipulate  them,  and  get  outcomes  of  those  manipulations  but  not  by  
manipulating classical genes directly, not experimentally, after all they don't exist! But how do 
we tell the difference between classical and molecular? It is very difficult. Let us say both are 
explanatory,  then we can can m-manipulate classical  genes,  and the t-manipulation involves 
manipulating molecular genes (if  such a thing exists), the phantom manipulations supervene 
upon real  manipulations.  We can see how the older  explanation can still  be  explanatory,  it  
managed to capture some modal information, but our current theory could be just the same, and 
hence we should adopt a certain level of surrealism. If it looks as if classical genes exist, so too it 
may  just  be  that  it  looks  as  if  molecular  genes  exist,  but  this  is  part  of  the  perspectivism:  
classical gene explanation doesn’t stop being an explanation because we have molecular genes. 
For instance, evolutionary biologists explain lots of things invoking the classical gene, because 
when  it  comes  to  modally  linking  variables  from  the  conceptual  parametrisations  of 
evolutionary  theory  the  world  looks  as  if  classical  genes  exist,  that  is  enough  for  those  
explanations to be explanatory in an ontic sense.
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197  Recall  that the epistemic notion of explanation is based around concepts such as providing  
understanding to an audience. Since notions like understanding are hugely relative it does not 
provide a robust enough basis for an objective explication of how science explains. That is not to  
say understanding is not hugely important in how science works; it is just that understanding is 
a house build on certain foundations,  modal foundations,  which are the seeds of all  modern 
scientific explanations.
198  Of course many who have epistemic intuitions about explanation also avail themselves of ontic  
elements as well, the aim of the theory of explanation presented here is to be clear about the  
elements of the two intuitions and how they can be synthesised.
199  Da Costa & French 2003.
200Tarski 1965.
201  Clearly Newton's theory is only empirically adequate up to a specified level of precision, below 
that  deviations  from  his  equations  are  found  for  everyday  objects.  Thus  the  domain  is 
constrained by those things which do not fall into it at a level of precision, and by that level of  
precision itself. If our experimental apparatus gets more sophisticated then what the domain of  
applicability is, relative to this new measurement standard, changes. 
202 To a certain extent whether an explanation is a c-explanation or a q-explanation depends upon  
one's  instincts,  for  example if  one wishes to deny tables  and chairs  exist  in any meaningful 
emergent way then one can relegate explanations involving them to q-explanations, if on the 
other hand one wishes to maintain they are “really real” then some explanations involving them 
may be c-explanations. For our purposes it does not matter which attitude one takes, what is  
required for this thesis is that a distinction between c and q explanations is maintainable in  
principle.
203 Even in Galilean idealisations we can argue that with the idealisations included in we have a 
quasi-explanation and with them taken out we move to a correspondence explanation.
204 This  surrealist  take  on  explanation  cuts  across  the  observational  divide  identified  by  Van 
Fraassen in his constructive empiricism, The surreal aspects of the world are not localised to 
unobservables, a small child may explain their Christmas presents in terms of Santa Claus- the 
world surrealistically looks as if Santa leaves them presents, the child may leave different treats 
for Rudolf some of which are eaten and others not and build a modal picture of what-depends-
upon -what in terms of the ontology of father Christmas, such quasi-true explanations are not 
limited to unobservables in principle.
205 I use theories and models interchangeably in this section since both can be explanatory in the  
ways I describe.
206 Of course from the extrinsic perspective we can compare two theories and see how a theory was  
able to be quasi-true, we can see how GR can recover the appearance of Newtonian mechanics in 
a domain, but we can only do this in comparative terms, not in isolation (and very often we will 
be comparing two quasi-true theories).
207 It should be pointed out that although this thesis is defending a realist intuition about science,  
albeit one cocooned in a ball of surrealism, the notions of quasi-explanation and c-explanation 
could probably be accommodated by an anti-realist, just as the notion of quasi-true can be, what  
we have then is the  distinction between things we known are pure fictions and things we are 
agnostic about. It does not matter, the explanatory issue still remains even for an anti-realists, in 
explicating scientific practice are scientists actually explaining when they save the phenomena 
with known fictions as distinct from agnostic ontologies.
208 In Newton's theory structural connections between observables are made which are also made 
in GR for example, and in both these structural connections facilitate modal connections which 
make Newtonian gravitational theory quasi-explanatory. Newton shows that cannonballs falling 
to earth and planets orbiting the sun are fundamentally in the same type of relation (GR also 
preserves  this  unification).  Newton  can  theoretically  link  these  by  proposing  a  universal 
gravitational field which is the reason why these systems behave in the same way. From the 
point of view of the standard ontological reading of GR these systems behave in the same way 
not because of a gravitational field but because of curved space-time, but we can recover why the  
world  (within  an  empirical  domain)  looks  as  if  a  gravitational  field  exists.  However,  that 
gravitational field is what allowed models to capture the modal structure of those systems, the 
perspective is essential for unifying the systems and unifying them is part of capturing modal 
structure, and by adopting this perspective Newton extends the experimental results of what-
depends upon-what to areas of the universe that experiments are not performable on. 
In order to say what depends upon what and answer w-questions in Newton's theory we need 
the notion of gravitational field, within GR we need the notion of curved space-time, from the 
extrinsic view we can see the partial-isomorphisms between the relations of Newton's theory 
and Einstein's, it is no coincidence that both GR and Newton's theory agree about the modal 
structure of the world (in observational terms) in the domain for which Newton's theory appears 
as if it is true in a correspondence sense. The modal topologies of each theory for that domain 
overlap, even if the variables (the 'nodes') are different, the structure of modal connections is the 
same. Ontic features of the world are identified and used in the explanation but that does not 
mean every feature of the explanation is true (in a correspondence sense).
209Of course to say something is an explanation in a domain is not to claim that it  is  the best 
explanation possible.
210  Of course whether any current scientific theories are c-true is an interesting topic but not one I 
shall pursue here. What matters is that a great number of scientific theories are merely quasi-
true and that provides a basis for defining quasi-explanations.
211  None of the talk of perspectives  should lead anyone to believe that perspectives  cannot be 
assessed and ranked. Ultimately they are ranked by their objective modal utility or prediction 
and control, we may wish to impose a given variable set on the world, say grue and bleen, and 
ask how they modally connect, but although this is the same in principle as defining the classical  
gene and asking how it modally connects to pea colour in its utility, they are very different. This 
is  where surrealism comes in,  the perspectives and fictional  worlds of scientists intended to 
explain do so by picking out surreal (or real) facts about the world. 
212  For  instance  in  the  semi-classical  chaos  models  discussed  by  Bokulich  there  is  dynamical 
continuity between quantum and classical  mechanics.  The reasons why a perspective allows 
modal  information  to  be  expressed  accurately  and  quasi-truthfully,  will  be  extremely 
heterogeneous. To provide an exhaustive list may not even be possible and is not of interest to 
this argument which is intended to be explicitly unitary. The overall framework is that these 
surreal facts are captured by adopting a perspective. It may be the case that the surrealism is  
brute, we may never be able to say in a given case why the worlds looks as-if a certain entity  
exists even if we discover that it does not. For a philosophical account of explanation saying 
more is certainly desirable but is not essential for an understanding of explanation 
213  The  idea  of  surrealism  and  new  perspective  is  not  one  of  simple  sublimation  of  modal 
information into a new theory that answers a wider set of w-questions. The situation is not this 
simply  because  of  this  transformation  of  the  subject-objects  of  knowledge  in  the  new 
formulation. It is not simply that we add to a list of w-questions we can answer when we move 
from one explanation to another, not instead we sometimes change our understanding of the 
variables we are connecting modally as well. To say that a new explanation simply subsumes the  
w-questions of an old explanation is to miss  this element of concept  stretching which takes 
place.  The  Aufhebung  involves  not  simple  sublimation  into  a  new  explanation  but  the 
preservation  and  reformulation  of  modal  connections.  Two  explanations  must  be 
complementary  for  the  domains  in  which  they  are  both  quasi-explanatory,  they  cannot 
contradict,  and  one  may  subsume  some  w-questions  from  the  other,  but  the  relationship 
generally will be more complex.
214  One could argue that a successor theory latches onto the properties of  an entity better in some 
sense. Whether this is intelligible depends upon the amount of concept stretching one is minded 
to  allow  in  different  theories  with  different  ontologies.  We  can  revive  seemingly  debunked 
ontologies by keeping the name but radically stretching the properties associated with them. 
However these cases probably amount to little but linguistic games, we may say an ancient 
Greek atomic theory got the ontology 'less wrong' in some sense, or Newton's corpuscular theory 
of light, but what we are really saying is that we have some metaphorical resemblance with the 
ontologies we now have. This metaphorical resemblance doesn't amount to anything substantive 
however when so many of the properties of the entities involved have been so radically altered in 
our theories. For explanation the point remains, a better explanation does not imply necessarily 
that the ontology it proposes is 'less wrong' in some sense, only that the ontology it proposes can  
be used to represent a wider range of modal facts. 
215  Or when we do so it is from the extrinsic view and we are comparing two theories, the second 
theory providing a 'metalanguage' to assess the truth of the first.
216  In  this  respect  it  is  in  the  spirit  of  Lakatos'  research  programs,  which  are  never  truly 
abandoned. They operate in a positive heuristic phase allowing new hypotheses to be generated 
or degenerate, but a degenerating research program always has the potential to come back.
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